British Wreck Commissioner's Inquiry
Day 30
Final Arguments, cont.
Mr. Laing:
They did supply the figures, you know, and the Board of Trade approved of them. You will find at the bottom of page 8 they approved of them.
Mr. Edwards:
I was going to say that generally. It is only fair to the builders to say, if your Lordship will look at page 9 of the correspondence, that this appears: "Noted. This vessel is now completed and all the requirements of the Board contained in this Minute have been satisfactorily carried out."
Mr. Laing:
I would rather you read the one at the bottom of page 8.
Mr. Edwards:
"With reference to yours of the 10th August enclosing calculation of trim of vessel with No. 1 hold, firemen's passage and forepeak flooded, I have to inform you that this is considered satisfactory, and that the openings in the upper deck leading to the firemen's passage and to No. 1 hold will not now be required to be trunked up watertight to the saloon deck." You remember, perhaps, my Lord, that Mr. Archer, who had made this recommendation, gave certain evidence, and he stated in reply to a question of mine that he thought, in the light of the "Titanic" disaster, it would have been very much better if these requirements at that time had been insisted upon. This is not against the builders at all.
Mr. Laing:
I think that is a misconception, if I may say so.
Mr. Edwards:
I do not know that I need call special attention to it. All these letters go to the one point, that in the first place the Board of Trade surveyors do appear to have anticipated the thing, and do appear to have made certain recommendations which, after a discussion with London, and after a discussion with the builders, one by one, they appear to have abandoned.
What I was just going to allude to was this, and it comes to the final point as to the rules and regulations of the Board of Trade. I desire to reiterate what I put in reply to your Lordship's question that the view - I think the right view - is that there should be by the Board of Trade rules and regulations of a binding character; that those rules and regulations should go fairly low down in the gradation of detail; and that there should be standards definite and enforceable by which the surveyors in each locality are to be guided. As to what particular rules and regulations there should be, that is not a matter with which one can entirely deal with here, of course. As to the nature and character of bulkheads, that has gone to a committee; as to whether there should or should not be watertight decks, that has gone to a committee; as to what I may call the interrelation between the sinkability of the ship and the boat accommodation that has gone to a committee. But there are a certain number of things which are still left open, and here I have to say one or two words particularly on behalf of my friends who are not addressing your Lordship. I am asked, on behalf of Mr. Cotter, to emphasise that the Board of Trade should insist upon an efficient boat drill, in which every member of the crew of a ship may take part. I am also asked, on his behalf, to emphasise the need for there being rules and regulations which shall be insisted upon as to bulkhead door drill. He also desires to commend to your Lordship the recommendation of one or two of the Witnesses, that there should be lifebuoys, with acetylene lamp attachments, so that any persons unfortunate enough to be thrown into the sea in a catastrophe of this kind may be seen, and he also asks very specially - it probably will be a matter that your Lordship will rather urge should be considered by the Boat Committee - that attention should be given to the rigid need for the consideration of the method of lowering and raising boats. He also asks me to say - and in this I join with him, although it was very well put by my friend Mr. Scanlan - that in the light of the "Titanic" disaster, and in view of the fact that as yet the unsinkable ship has not been designed, there should be a drastic alteration in the Regulations of the Board of Trade with regard to boat accommodation. Those are also points which I am asked to urge on behalf of Mr. Lewis.
I am not going to take up your Lordship's time on the question of the relative unsinkability of the ship, but your Lordship will remember that when Sir Norman Hill was in the box he produced certain Minutes of Proceedings of a certain Committee. I have had an opportunity of looking through those Minutes, and I am quite sure, bearing in mind that they were the utterances of skilled men, that they will weigh with your Lordship. I am not going to ask your Lordship to trouble to go through all the Minutes, but I would ask your Lordship, particularly to refer to the following pages: 34, 37, 38, 43, 52, 55, 56, 58, 59, and 63. What those Minutes broadly show is this, that at present there is no design that has yet been evolved of a ship that makes her even practically unsinkable, and that, therefore, in the ordinary course of things the possibility must be contemplated of disasters in future; that your Lordship must therefore consider the question of to what extent there should be boat accommodation. Your Lordship will, I hope, in your finding, give as the result of this Enquiry certain suggestions more specific than have yet been made to the Committee as to the considerations to which they should direct their minds in considering an increase in the boat accommodation.
There is only one other point, my Lord, and I have finished, and that is this. Apart altogether from the particular Rules and Regulations of the Board of Trade; apart altogether from the question as to whether these so-called Rules and Regulations are suggestions as a guide, and not Rules to bind - I shall submit to your Lordship, in connection with the final question which your Lordship has to decide, that there has been disclosed in these proceedings an extraordinary state of affairs as to the general outlook on the part of the Marine Department of the Board of Trade in regard to these matters. When one remembers that Sir Alfred Chalmers has been the responsible technical adviser for so many years, and when Sir Alfred Chalmers declares that to him no single Rule or Regulation of the Board of Trade should be altered, when Sir Alfred Chalmers tells your Lordship that the "Titanic" disaster has no lesson for the Board of Trade, one is, by a lightning flash, given an amazing revelation as to the character and personnel of this Department.
The Commissioner:
Sir Alfred Chalmers is no longer an official of the Board of Trade.
Mr. Edwards:
That is true, my Lord, but Sir Alfred Chalmers was the responsible technical adviser at the time that the "Titanic" was being designed. And I ought to say that it was gratifying, it was encouraging, it was relieving that his successor is a man of a totally different view, and I hope that as the result of this Enquiry something may be done.
Now, my Lord, again I desire to thank you for the perfectly amazing patience that you have manifested in a difficult Enquiry. It has not been an easy task for any of us; it has been a sad task; it has been in many parts an unpleasant task, because of the seeking to find those, if any, on whom blame should be attached. It has been the most appalling calamity of its kind in the world's history; but if as the result of this Enquiry, guided by your Lordship's great skill, by your Lordship's profound patience, and by the skilled advice of your advisers - if as the result of this great calamity something is done to make travelling by sea safer; something is done by better equipment, by increased use of system of wireless telegraphy, to diminish the toll of the loss of life at sea, then those fifteen hundred people who have gone to the bottom of the Atlantic will not have died in vain.
The Commissioner:
Thank you, Mr. Edwards.
Sir Robert Finlay:
My Lord, it is now my duty to address the Court on behalf of the White Star Line, and in speaking on behalf of the White Star Line I may say, as I have already intimated, that those who represent Captain Smith have put themselves in my hands; and I desire to say, in the first instance, a very few words with regard to Captain Smith. I stated that it was the desire of myself, as representing those to whom he was dearest, that no technical difficulty should stand in the way of a complete examination into the circumstances connected with this great disaster. We desire that these circumstances should be thoroughly probed, and I shall ask the Court when that examination is complete to say that no blame of any sort or kind attaches to Captain Smith, or to those who were associated with him in the navigation of this vessel. No immunity is asked for on behalf of Captain Smith because he is dead. He died on the deck, as many an English captain has died, and as many an English captain will die. But his conduct must be investigated, and I trust that the result of that investigation will be that his character as a skilful commander comes out absolutely untarnished. At the same time I must say this, that I think we might have been spared some of the attacks that have been made upon Captain Smith by Mr. Harbinson and by Mr. Edwards. Your Lordship will recollect the nature of the observations which formed the staple of some considerable portion of both their speeches, to the effect that Captain Smith had been influenced by one who was but a passenger on board the vessel; had deferred to his opinion and had wished to throw the responsibility for the Captain's course of action upon him. May I remind your Lordship of the way in which the position of a Captain with regard to any person on board, be he director or be he owner, was defined in terms not unlike those used by your Lordship. I refer to Captain Rostron's evidence. The passage will be found at page 745 of the transcript, at the top of the page. I say to Captain Rostron: "You gave evidence in America? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) May I put one passage to you? You were asked this by Senator Smith. I am reading to you from the evidence in America. 'Captain, is it customary to take orders from a director or a general officer of the company aboard? - (A.) No, Sir. (Q.) From whom do you take orders? - (A.) From no one. (Q.) Aboard ship? - (A.) At sea, immediately I leave port until I arrive at port, the Captain is in absolute control, and takes orders from no one. I have never known it in our company or any other big company when a director or managing owner would issue orders on that ship. It matters not who comes on board that ship, they are either passengers or crew. (Q.) There is no official status and no authority whatever with them? That is correct? - (A.) That is correct. (Q.) Did you know Captain Smith? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) He was a very experienced officer, I think? - (A.) Yes, very. (Q.) Of very high standing? - (A.) Very high indeed." My Lord, it is suggested by Mr. Harbinson and by Mr. Edwards with regard to this officer of great eminence, who died on the deck, that he was guilty of a departure from all the traditions of the Service; that he deferred to the opinion of one, the chairman of the company, who happened to be on board: that he wished to devolve the responsibility upon him; and that he was guilty of abdicating the duty which was incumbent upon him. I do not desire to read at length what was said, but I may refer to page 779 of the Notes of yesterday's Proceedings, setting out Mr. Harbinson's speech on this matter. I may summarise his remarks in this way. He suggested that Mr. Ismay's mere presence on board affected the navigation of the ship. He said it. He said that the Captain, when he handed that telegram from the "Baltic" with regard to the ice to Mr. Ismay, he handed it to him to invite his opinion, and he finally said that he did not accept as true Mr. Ismay's statement that he had no conversation with the Captain upon it.
Then, my Lord, Mr. Edwards said this - I will refer to the page, the imputation is so serious. Your Lordship will find this at page 785, in the second column, at the end of the fourth paragraph from the top: "I suggest that in view of his own evidence" - that is Mr. Ismay's evidence - "there is only one conclusion, and that is that the Captain was anxious that whatever was done should be done upon the responsibility of Mr. Ismay. Well, my Lord - (The Commissioner.) I mean by shaking my head that he could not accomplish such a thing. (Mr. Clement Edwards.) That may be. (The Commissioner.) The Captain could not shift his responsibility. (Mr. Clement Edwards.) That may be, my Lord. I at once recognise that whatever pressure may have been put upon him by the owner, he had got charge of that vessel and could not in any way get rid of his legal liability before he got into port. (The Commissioner.) Nor his responsibility. (Mr. Clement Edwards.) Nor am I suggesting it was an effective thing, but I am leading up to something else." Then at the bottom of that column, at the last line but one on page 785, Mr. Edwards returned to the charge: "I suggest that it was nothing of the sort, but that Mr. Ismay was anxious that there should be a record - I am not suggesting by that anything improper - but that he was hoping for a record first passage for this great ship. One knows what the stress of competition is, and how valuable from the point of view of commercial success, as we know from what is said in the papers, an advertisement of that kind is; and I again suggest, not that he could do it lawfully or legally, but that at all events in order that the onus - the responsibility - should be with Mr. Ismay and not with the Captain was the purpose for which the Captain handed that message to him."
I say, my Lord, that is a most unworthy suggestion. It is a suggestion that never ought to have been made. It imputes to a man who has died in the discharge of his duty, who is of the highest standing, the highest capacity, that he departed from all the rules by which his profession is guided. It is a suggestion for which there is not a tittle of evidence; and, more than that, it rests on an assumption which is directly negatived by the evidence. It is put that Mr. Ismay was anxious - and that the Captain lent himself to it - that there should be a record passage. If the evidence had been looked at before such a cruel insinuation was thrown out it would have been found that the reverse is the case. Your Lordship has in mind - because I know it was a point to which your Lordship at once called attention - the evidence given by Mr. Sanderson. It occurs at two pages, and by putting them together you get the result - pages 476 and 498. When those two passages are compared, it is obvious that this was not intended to be a record passage nor anything of the kind. In fact, I think I may appeal to your Lordship, and to the experienced gentlemen who sit beside you, as to whether it would be a usual thing to attempt to have what is called a record passage on the first trip of any vessel. Anyhow, that was not attempted, and was not intended with regard to the "Titanic." At page 476 Mr. Sanderson gives the figures with regard to the "Olympic," at Question 19281: "No doubt the White Star keeps a record showing what is the best done by the White Star, and we shall see how this matter stands? - (A.) I can give it to you. The fastest passage the "Olympic" has ever made from Queenstown to New York is 5 days, 7 hours, 29 minutes." And then at Question 19284: "From New York to Plymouth, her fastest passage is 5 days, 14 hours, 32 minutes." There you have got the "Olympic." Then, at page 498, your Lordship had cleared up the question of what the duration of the voyage of the "Titanic" would have been if it had been followed out as was contemplated, arriving on the Wednesday morning. It is Question 19788 - this is still in Mr. Sanderson's evidence - and the Attorney-General is speaking: "Supposing she had left Queenstown at 2.30 on the 11th April and had arrived in New York on the Wednesday morning at 5 o'clock her passage would have taken, allowing, of course, for the voyage westward, five days, 19 hours, and 30 minutes? (Sir Robert Finlay.) Arriving on Wednesday morning. (The Attorney-General.) Allowing for her arrival at 5 o'clock on Wednesday morning. The record, I think, that was given yesterday of the 'Olympic' from Queenstown was 5 days, 17 hours and 29 minutes." That is a mistake that was corrected three lines further down. "(The Commissioner.) So that the 'Titanic' would have taken about two hours longer? (The Attorney-General.) Yes, if she had arrived at 5 o'clock on Wednesday morning. (The Witness.) I think the difference was more than that, my Lord. I think the 'Olympic's' time was 5 days, 7 hours - not 17 hours. (Mr. Maurice Hill.) It was 7 hours, my Lord. You will find it on page 476 of the notes. (The Commissioner.) What is it, Mr. Hill? (Mr. Maurice Hill.) Five days, 7 hours, 29 minutes. (The Attorney-General.) Is that right? - (A.) Yes, 5 days, 7 hours, and 29 minutes is correct. (The Commissioner.) Then it is a difference of 12 hours? - (A.) Yes, 12 hours." Under those circumstances, my Lord, is it not a little too bad that there should have been laid this foundation for an attack upon the memory of Captain Smith - that they were bent upon making a record passage in the "Titanic," when it is perfectly obvious they were bent on doing nothing of the kind. It was contemplated that they should not attempt to arrive on the Tuesday evening, but that they should only get in on the Wednesday morning, as it would be more convenient in other respects. So that the whole of the foundation upon which this monstrous charge has been based is not only unsupported, but it is destroyed by the evidence itself. It is further destroyed by the conversation to which I shall have occasion to refer again when I deal with Mr. Ismay's evidence in detail, and from his point of view - the conversation between Mr. Ismay and Mr. Bell at Queenstown. I venture to say, my Lord, that this suggestion ought never to have been put forward - that the Captain handed this telegram from the "Baltic" about the ice to Mr. Ismay to get his opinion, to be told by him what was to be done, or because he was anxious to devolve the responsibility upon him. I say there is no evidence of it whatever. Your Lordship was told that the disaster was one of unparalleled magnitude. That the disaster is unparalleled in its magnitude is no excuse for throwing such aspersions upon the memory of a dead man.
(After a short adjournment.)
Sir Robert Finlay:
My Lord, there is one other point of a preliminary nature on which I must say a few words, and that arises out of the observations made by Mr. Edwards with reference to Mr. Ismay's getting into this boat and leaving the vessel. Your Lordship asked what was the duty on which Mr. Edwards was insisting, and as far as I understood his position it was this. He said Mr. Ismay had no right to save his life at the expense of any other life.
The Commissioner:
No moral right.
Sir Robert Finlay:
No moral right. Mr. Ismay did not save his life at the expense of any other life. If Mr. Edwards had taken the trouble to look at the evidence he would have seen how unfounded was the charge he was levying against the living Mr. Ismay as against the dead Captain Smith. If your Lordship would look at three pages 443, 453 and 464 your Lordship will see that there is not the slightest ground for the suggestion that any other life would have been saved if Mr. Ismay had not got into that boat. The only result would have been that the boat would have gone away with a place empty, no other person would have got into it, and no other life would have been saved. It is on page 443, beginning at Question 18555, "But, except the collapsibles, had every boat been lowered? - (A.) Every wooden boat was away. (Q.) All the eight on that side? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) Did you see how many passengers were put into this collapsible? - (A.) No, I did not see at the time. (Q.) Did she appear to be full? - (A.) She was very fairly full. (Q.) Would you tell us what happened after you got the women and children in? - (A.) After all the women and children were in and after all the people that were on deck had got in, I got into the boat as she was being lowered away." Your Lordship called attention to that passage, which I have no doubt you had in your memory while Mr. Edwards was speaking. He did not get into the boat till she was being lowered away. Then on page 453, at Question 18866, your Lordship put to Mr. Edwards this: "(Q.) Your point, Mr. Edwards, as I understand, is this: That, having regard to his position, it was his duty to remain upon that ship until she went to the bottom. That is your point? (Mr. Clement Edwards.) Yes, and inasmuch - (The Commissioner.) That is your point? (Mr. Clement Edwards.) Frankly, that is so. I do not flinch from it a little bit. But I want to get it from this Witness, inasmuch as he took upon himself to give certain directions at a certain time, why he did not discharge the responsibility even after that, having regard to other persons or passengers? - (A.) There were no more passengers to get into that boat. The boat was actually being lowered away. (Q.) That is your answer? - (A.) Yes." Then at page 464, Question 19058, the Attorney-General says: "The object of these questions I am putting to you, Mr. Ismay, is to draw your attention to this, that, at any rate, when the last boat left the 'Titanic' you must have known that a number of passengers and crew were still on board the vessel? - (A.) I did. (Q.) And you have told us that you did not see any on the deck? - (A.) I did not. (Q.) At least, I think you limited that to passengers; I am not sure you were asked about the crew? - (A.) There were no passengers on deck. (Q.) And you said also that you did not see any as the boat was lowered? - (A.) I did not. (Q.) I am not sure whether you said it in answer to the Court, or whether it is only in the statement I have got from you, but at any rate that was your view; as the boat was lowered and you passed the decks you did not see any passengers on the decks? - (A.) I did not." Now, Mr. Edwards said that Mr. Ismay's plain duty was to have gone away looking for passengers. The boat was being lowered. Mr. Ismay might have gone and looked for passengers; he could not have brought any passenger in time to have occupied the place in that boat, for the boat was actually being lowered; it was not till that moment that he stepped in.
Then the question comes to be this: was it Mr. Ismay's duty to remain there, although by doing so he could save no other life, although by doing so he could have done no good to any human being? My Lord, if Mr. Ismay had felt impelled to commit a suicide of that kind, the same kindly critics who are now attacking him would have said that he went to the bottom because he did not dare to face the Enquiry that he knew must follow. I submit to your Lordship that there is no observation of an unfavourable nature to be made from any point of view upon Mr. Ismay's conduct. There was not upon him that duty which the Captain always feels to go down with the ship if there still remains anyone else on board. Mr. Ismay did all he could in the way of helping the women and children. It was only when the boat was actually being lowered and when that place would have gone away empty that he got into it. I submit to your Lordship that Mr. Ismay violated no duty; he violated no point of honour - I will put it as high as that - and that if he had thrown away his life in the manner now suggested it would have been said by those who are now attacking him that he did it because he was conscious that he could not face the Enquiry into the loss of this vessel.
My Lord, I pass from these preliminary matters, and I am glad to do so, and I shall now direct the attention of the Court to the evidence taken under two heads, the first relating to the navigation of the vessel in view of the announcements which had been made with regard to ice; the second relating to the number of boats provided, the use that was made of those boats, and generally the way in which things were managed after the collision had taken place, and it was known that the vessel was in danger.
Now the first of those points depends of course to a great extent upon the question of the ice warnings, and I wish to bring home to the Court the fact that there were only three ice warnings which reached the officers of the "Titanic"; there was the ice warning from the "Caronia," there was the ice warning from the "Baltic," and there was the first message from the "Californian." The second message from the "Californian" was never transmitted. The answer was, "Keep out; I am busy with Cape Race." The message from the "Mesaba" was never taken to the bridge, in all probability for the same reason, and the message from the "Amerika," which was one sent merely for transmission to Cape Race, was laid aside with the others to be transmitted, and was never, according to the evidence, handed to any one of the officers.
Now the three messages we have to deal with are the "Caronia," the "Baltic," and the first message of the "Californian." I would ask your Lordship to look at this chart, which is on a very much enlarged scale. It is divided into 20 miles squares, and is drawn on a scale of quarter inch to the mile. It sets out in a pictorial way what the state of things, as shown by these messages, was. (handing in the same.) Your Lordship sees there the interval between longitude 49 and longitude 51, at latitude 42 N., which represents the region where, according to the "Caronia," message, bergs, growlers and field ice were to be found on the 12th April. There is a line indicating the position. Of course, that line does not mean that the whole of that was occupied by a solid barrier of bergs and field ice; only that the message of the "Caronia" showed that there was a good deal of ice in various forms between these two degrees of longitude, and in or about latitude 42 N. Then your Lordship will observe the spot where the ice reported by the "Baltic" is; it is a report of bergs and field ice in 41.51 N. latitude, 49.52 W., as reported by the Greek steamer, the "Athenai"; and lastly, your Lordship will observe the ice reported by the "Californian," three bergs, five miles to the South of the position of the "Californian." The position taken for the "Californian" there is 42.5 N., as the Captain gave it. The message states 42.3 N. as being its position, so there would be two miles difference - I do not think, for my purpose, it makes any difference - and the message was that the three bergs were five miles to the South of the position of the "Californian" in 42.5 or 42.3 N. and 49.9 W.
That is a picture of what had been brought to the mind of the Captain of the "Titanic," and of the officers. Would your Lordship now kindly look at the message sent by the "Caronia," which was the first in the order of date. It was sent at 9 on the morning of the 14th April, the Sunday - I am taking "Titanic" time throughout for convenience.
The Commissioner:
Ship's time?
Sir Robert Finlay:
Yes, 9 a.m. on Sunday, the 14th April. The message your Lordship will find set out at page 374 of the evidence. It is Question 16099. It is addressed to "Captain, 'Titanic,' Westbound steamers report bergs, growlers, and field ice in 42 degrees N. from 49 to 51 W., April 12, Compliments, Barr." Now, the important points to be noticed about that telegram are that it reports bergs, growlers, and field ice in that locality; and, secondly, that it is a report of ice in these various forms having been seen in that locality on the 12th April. That your Lordship will find, I think, is very important, that West-bound steamers reported ice in that locality on April 12th, that is to say, at least 48 hours before the time when the collision took place, and in all probability a good deal more. I mean a good many hours more, but at least a minimum of 48 hours. When the "Titanic" got that message, that is to say, at 9 in the morning of Sunday, the 14th April, she was in longitude 43.50 W. and 43.35 N. That does not appear in that large chart, because there really was not room to go so far back and so far up.
The way we get that is this: We know that she turned the corner, that is the corner that she took further to the South, at 5.50. We reckoned back from that at 22 knots, and that brings us to that position.
The Commissioner:
Which position?
Sir Robert Finlay:
The position I have given, 43.50 W., 43.35 N. It is marked on this chart which I have before me, if I may show it to your Lordship. (Handing same to the Commissioner.) Then if your Lordship will also observe at the same time as that smaller chart is before you the position of the "Titanic" when the "Baltic's" message was received, reckoning in the same way back from the corner where she turned at 5.50, you get the "Titanic" at the time she received the "Baltic's" message at 45.40 W., 42.35 N. She was a little further to the Southward, and of course a good deal further to the West.
The Attorney-General:
Have you the "Titanic's" time?
Sir Robert Finlay:
Yes, the "Titanic's" time was 1.42. Now, my Lord, the message sent from the "Baltic" is set out at page 377, Question 16176. It will, of course, also be in the collection of the various Marconigrams which has been printed for the convenience of the Court.
The Attorney-General:
It is not in the proces-verbaux, it is in "received and sent messages."
Sir Robert Finlay:
I almost think it might be more convenient to take it from the shorthand notes.
The Commissioner:
Perhaps it is.
Sir Robert Finlay:
"Captain Smith, 'Titanic.' Have had moderate variable winds and clear fine weather since leaving. Greek steamer 'Athenai' reports passing icebergs and large quantities of field ice today in latitude 41.51 N., longitude 49.52 W. Last night we spoke German oil-tank steamer 'Deutschland,' Stettin to Philadelphia, not under control, short of coal, lat. 40.42 N., long. 55.11 W. Wishes to be reported to New York and other steamers. Wish you and 'Titanic' all success. - Commander." That is the message sent by the "Baltic." The third message is the message sent by the "Californian"; that was sent a good deal later. The "Caronia" message reporting ice two days before, on the 12th April, was sent, as I said, at 9 a.m. on the Sunday. The "Baltic" message was sent at 1.42 in the afternoon, and the "Californian" message, the first message from them, which was given to the officers was at half-past 7 or 7.25 - it is variously given - on the Sunday. It was a message sent to the "Antillian" and overheard by the Marconi operator on board the "Titanic." That message your Lordship will find at page 201, Question 8943: "To Captain, 'Antillian,' 6.30 p.m. apparent time, ship; latitude 42.3 N., longitude 49.9 W. Three large bergs five miles to Southward of us. Regards. Lord." As I said, Captain Lord, in his evidence, gave the latitude as 42.5 N., but the telegram puts it at 42.3 N. I do not think for my purpose it makes any difference. It would make two miles difference, of course. The "Titanic" at the time she got that message at 7.30 p.m. would be in 48.12 W., 41.52 N. With regard to the "Caronia" message and the "Baltic" message the receipt is admitted by the Officers and admitted on all hands. With regard to the first message from the "Californian," no Officer has spoken of it, but Bride, the Operator, says he did take it on to the bridge, and, of course, there is no contradiction; so that it may be taken that message was received on the bridge. Bride, your Lordship may recollect by mistake - some confusion I should think with the New York time - put it at 5.30; it really was 7.30 or 7.25. Bride did say 5.30, but that must be a mistake. On the evidence, it stands that Bride gave it to someone, we do not know to whom, some Officer on the bridge, at 7.25 or 7.30.
The Commissioner:
I think Bride says it is the only telegram that he had any recollection of.
The Attorney-General:
Yes.
Sir Robert Finlay:
With regard to all the other messages, that from the "Mesaba," which warned about that great oblong which your Lordship remembers is drawn on a chart which was handed up by my friend the Attorney-General, showing the great oblong which was first delineated by the Solicitor-General in the course of the case -
The Commissioner:
Do you suggest, Mr. Attorney, that I ought to take into consideration any other telegram than the three which Sir Robert Finlay has referred to.
The Attorney-General:
No, my Lord, we cannot carry them further than they have been carried. They got to the Marconi room, but this is as far as we can take them.
The Commissioner:
My view at present is that we ought not to fix the ship with knowledge of any telegram except those three. I do not think we ought to do it.
The Attorney-General:
I assented to that.
The Commissioner:
I only ask you because, if you are going to say that we ought to take into consideration others, I think you had better let us know.
The Attorney-General:
I assented to that view some days ago when your Lordship put it.
The Commissioner:
You did.
The Attorney-General:
Yes; I am not departing from it. I said we could not take it any further, and I was not going to attempt to prove any more.
The Commissioner:
Then I do not think you need trouble about this, Sir Robert.
Sir Robert Finlay:
I was only going to say this: I think I may put it higher than that it is not proved; I submit it is proved that we did not get them.
The Commissioner:
But that does not matter, because I am going to proceed on the assumption that you only had the three.
Continued >
