British Wreck Commissioner's Inquiry
Day 30
Final Arguments, cont.
Sir Robert Finlay:
May I be allowed to make only one observation - I am quite satisfied with what your Lordship has said - and it is this, that the reason why we did not get them is this: the message from the "Mesaba" and the second message from the "Californian" came to the operator when he was busy with Cape Race.
The Commissioner:
That is, no doubt, the explanation to my mind at present - that he was busy with private telegrams, and he did not think those were of any significance, and he put them aside.
Sir Robert Finlay:
I do not know whether the system might be amended, but it is quite obvious that if the operator is busy with private telegrams, which are paid for in addition to the lump rate which covers ship's messages, of course he is naturally and properly enough, from the point of view of his company, anxious to get on with that branch of his business, and puts aside the others.
The Attorney-General:
Oh, no; I do not know whether my friend bears in mind the evidence which has been given, and I thought it was beyond question that that is just what he must not do; all other messages have to be put aside for navigation messages.
The Commissioner:
The rule, no doubt, is, as I remember it, that telegrams affecting the navigation of the ship are to be given precedence of all. That is the rule.
The Attorney-General:
Yes.
The Commissioner:
But whether Phillips attended to the rule is another matter.
Sir Robert Finlay:
Your Lordship recollects, with regard to one message from the "Californian," that the answer was: "Keep out; I am busy with Cape Race." That was the message with regard to ice.
The Attorney-General:
The question as to whether Phillips did it or did not is a matter which is very difficult to inquire into further; but my friend's observation was directed to the general system. Your Lordship will remember that we went into it with great care, and I produced the rule and showed exactly what the precedence is, beginning with the distress message first, and then navigation messages, and proceeding then to Government messages, or, rather, Government messages before navigation, and then going on to the private messages.
Sir Robert Finlay:
Yes.
The Attorney-General:
It was very clearly stated.
Sir Robert Finlay:
I am not in conflict with the Attorney-General at all about that. What I am upon is the desirability of the rules being more rigidly observed.
The Commissioner:
That may be. If I come to the conclusion that Phillips did not follow his directions I may have to say something about it; but unless I am very well satisfied that he neglected his duty I shall not say anything.
Sir Robert Finlay:
It is only fair to remember that Phillips is dead, and we have not his account. But what is established is this, that these messages did not reach the bridge, and the only observation I want to make is this, that it is a very great calamity that these messages, particularly the "Mesaba" message, did not reach the bridge. The "Mesaba" message was, as Mr. Lightoller said when his attention was called to it, one of a very startling nature, and the whole of this calamity might have been averted, and in all probability would have been averted, if that "Mesaba" message, which arrived very late, not very long before the collision, about 11 o'clock I think, had been taken down and taken to the Captain or to the officer in charge on the bridge. But that was not done. The same thing applies to the "Amerika" message. The "Amerika" message was received much earlier in the day; it was received between one and two, but it was received only for transmission to the Hydrographic Department via Cape Race. It is quite clear that what happened to the "Amerika" message was this: it was put aside to be dealt with along with the mass of Marconigrams that were to be sent off as soon as they got in touch with Cape Race, which happened at 8.30, and from 8.30 onwards down to the time of the collision the press of work in dealing with Cape Race, private messages to Cape Race and messages from Cape Race, was very great, and kept the operator very busy indeed.
What I do suggest is that while I agree with the Attorney-General that the rules are excellent, attention might be called to the vital necessity of the Marconi operator always postponing any business in which he may happen to be engaged for a matter of that kind. I only refer, by way of illustration, to what happened to the Witness, Bride. Your Lordship recollects that a message arrived to the "Titanic" about ice. He was busy with his accounts, and he went on with his accounts. Then twenty minutes afterwards he heard that same message being repeated to another vessel, and he took it down and handed it over. He says, and it may be the case, that if he had not overheard it being sent to another vessel he would have asked the vessel that sent it to repeat the message. That may be, but at the same time I think that it is a point which requires emphasising, that as soon as the Marconi operator gets a message, whether it is intended for another ship primarily, or whether it is directed to the ship on which he is, postponing everything else if it relates to ice, or a derelict, or anything of that kind, he should communicate with the officer in charge on the bridge or with the Captain himself.
The Attorney-General:
I only wish to say this. I quite follow my friend's suggestions with regard to that, but he has made certain observations, and although he may not mean them to cast a reflection upon Phillips, I cannot help thinking they do, and if that is intended we ought to have had an indication at a very early stage in this matter. When we discussed the "Mesaba" your Lordship indicated that you could not see at present that that message had got to the bridge; I agreed that upon the evidence that was the position and there was no means of proving it. And, therefore, in your Lordship's view, that message was to be left out. I remember quite well, when I handed up this document to your Lordship, which had been compiled, giving the five telegrams which had been received with regard to ice, I pointed out specifically that I was not going to deal with the "Mesaba" because of what had been said. I treated that as out of the case altogether, and, so far I have understood hitherto, that it has been since we adopted that view.
The Commissioner:
I do not understand Sir Robert Finlay to say more than this: the "Mesaba's" message did arrive; it does not, as far as the evidence goes, appear to have been delivered on the bridge, and if it was not delivered on the bridge - there is always an "if" - then it is desirable that the attention of the men in the Marconi room should be directed to the importance of it.
The Attorney-General:
I should not have objected and should not object to anything which was stated which would indicate that it was not taken to the bridge, and my friend is entitled to suggest to your Lordship that you should say, if you think it right in view of the evidence which has been given, that special attention should be given to navigation messages. The point I am upon is that upon the evidence which is all we have to deal with, those special directions are given. My friend's observations which he has just made certainly indicate this, as I follow him, that if that message had been delivered it would have made, according to the argument he put before you, or might have made a very important difference. If he is going to say that, I am equally entitled to say, and shall say - I give this notice of it at once in consequence of what my friend has said - that I cannot leave it where he left it, or rather where your Lordship left it when you asked me the question, and I left it out of the case. After what my friend has said, I cannot leave it there. It seems to cast a serious reflection, upon the man who received it. The suggestion is that he was not carrying out his duty, which was to give the navigation message to the bridge, and my friend says if that is the case it was important that there should be special directions given.
The Commissioner:
It has nothing to do with the Enquiry.
The Attorney-General:
I agree; but I do object to this being said after my saying in answer to your Lordship that I treated this as being a message which had not been received at all, and it was ruled out of the case, and nothing further was done. I object to my friend making these observations which, however much he may disclaim the intention do carry with them a reflection upon the person in charge.
The Commissioner:
They are observations which have nothing to do with the Enquiry.
The Attorney-General:
I agree, but if they are made it makes it necessary for me to reply to them.
The Commissioner:
Here are three messages which are admitted to be received. What Sir Robert Finlay has to do, in my opinion, is to satisfy me, if he can, that in face of those three messages this ship was justified in going at 22 knots an hour.
Sir Robert Finlay:
I accept that absolutely.
The Commissioner:
That is the real point. Let us leave out the "Mesaba" altogether.
Sir Robert Finlay:
Be it so, my Lord. Now, the first observation I wish to make is this, that ice in the sea is not fixed. A good many observations have been made in some quarters as if, when you had notice of an iceberg being at a particular point, you were to proceed as if the berg were moored in that quarter and change your course if you were heading there. Of course, an iceberg is not fixed. Captain Rostron dealt very effectively with that point. He said, of course you do not change your course even in the case, as I gathered he intended, if you are heading for that spot where the berg is reported; of course you do not change your course, because the iceberg is itself moving. It is exactly like two vehicles crossing one another. One is heading for the spot where the other is, but both are moving, and the vehicle that is heading for the other continues on its course; it passes over the spot where the other vehicle was, but where, owing to its motion, it is no longer. It would be absurd to proceed on the idea that when an iceberg is reported as being at a particular spot you are to take it as if it were going to remain there. An iceberg drifts in a manner which I shall deal with presently. With regard to field ice it is somewhat different. Field ice does not drift to the same extent, and its direction in this locality would not be quite the same.
Your Lordship has observed that this Marconigram related to bergs and to field ice. Now the drift of icebergs in this locality it is impossible to ascertain with entire accuracy but what we do know is this: You are in the region of the Gulf Stream. The Gulf Stream runs there in a direction to the north of east, and it runs at the rate of something like 2 or 3 knots. That is stated in the volume of the "United States Pilot," which has been so often referred to, at page 11. It is of course, rather rough; various rates are given; I will not read the whole passage. The direction, as appears on the chart, of the Gulf Stream, is to the north of east, roughly E.N.E. Now that would take field ice in that locality in an easterly or slightly north-easterly direction. With icebergs it is different, because, under the Gulf Stream, you have the Labrador Current running in a southerly direction. The Gulf Stream is, I suppose, some 50 or 60 fathoms deep, and underneath that you have the cold Labrador Current running. May I again refer your Lordship to the "United States Pilot," Part I., at page 12, and page 34. They say the Labrador Current is "very irregular in its action, but attains at times a velocity of from 20 to 30 miles a day; vessels therefore find no difficulty in working to the westward when anywhere northward of the Gulf Stream; and vessels crossing the Gulf Stream should be on the look-out for it."
Then at page 34 you have this passage with regard to ice: "These icebergs are sometimes over 200 feet in height, and of considerable extent; they have been seen as far south as latitude 39 deg. N., to obtain which position they must have crossed the Gulf Stream, impelled by the cold Arctic Current underrunning the warm waters of the Gulf Stream. That this should happen is not to be wondered at when it is considered that the specific gravity of fresh water ice, of which these bergs are composed, is about seven-eighths that of sea water; so that however vast the berg may appear to the eye of the observer, he can in reality only see one-eighth of its bulk, the remaining seven-eighths being submerged and subject to the deep water currents of the ocean. The track of an iceberg is indeed directed mainly by current, so small a portion of its surface being exposed to the action of the winds that its course is but slightly retarded or deflected by moderate breezes." The wind at this time, what wind there was, had been, I think the evidence is, from the south-west; then it dropped in the afternoon of the Sunday. Any effect the wind had had would be to move it in a north-easterly direction; but that would be a negligible quantity, because the motion of the berg, as of field ice, is really determined by the currents. This berg, your Lordship remembers from the evidence, was some 60 or 70 feet high. If you take seven times that you get a good deal over 400 feet under water, which would take it down to the influence of the cold southerly stream.
The Attorney-General:
A little higher than that.
Sir Robert Finlay:
My friend says that the iceberg was higher than that.
The Commissioner:
The iceberg was higher because we know something fell on the deck; but I do not quite follow you when you say that a part of the iceberg would be seven times deeper in the water than the part which stood up above the water.
Sir Robert Finlay:
Yes.
The Commissioner:
That does not at all follow.
Sir Robert Finlay:
The bulk under water is seven times the bulk above water.
The Commissioner:
Yes, but that is quite a different thing.
Sir Robert Finlay:
It may be different; but one cannot enter into a very nice calculation. Where you have a berg which is larger, say 80 feet or 90 feet -
The Attorney-General:
Eighty feet.
Sir Robert Finlay:
I will take it at 80 feet - above the water. You have seven times that bulk below, and the chances are overwhelming that that reaches down to the Labrador Current and is operated upon in the manner suggested.
The Commissioner:
What depth is the Labrador Current?
Sir Robert Finlay:
I suppose about 50 fathoms - that is 300 feet.
The Commissioner:
That is a very great depth, you know.
Sir Robert Finlay:
But the bulk below water being seven times that above water, unless there is some great abnormality of shape, you get the lower part of the iceberg in the Labrador Current.
The Commissioner:
That may be so; that is all you can say.
Sir Robert Finlay:
I do not desire to be dogmatic about it, but one thing which is perfectly plain is that it either is or it is not. If it is, the iceberg will be taken by the Labrador Current in a Southerly direction, and making allowance for the influence exerted by the Gulf Stream on the upper part of the submerged portion, it will go in a South-Easterly direction. The Labrador Current will take it South, and the Gulf Stream would tend to take it East-North-East roughly; the resultant would be the course of the berg. If the berg does not reach below the Gulf Stream then it will go East-North-East with the Gulf Stream. And with regard to the field ice, that of course does not reach down to the cold Labrador Current, which is running Southward. Any drift of the field ice depends entirely upon the Gulf Stream, and its direction will be - I am speaking, of course, very roughly - East-North-East.
It is very difficult for us to endeavour to reproduce what passed through Captain Smith's mind when he got the information of which he was in possession, but I think he may undoubtedly have come to this conclusion, that it was desirable to hold on as did 10 miles further South than his regular track before turning the corner, and for this reason. If, as was probable, the bergs which had been reported were under the influence of the Labrador Current they would be going in a Southerly direction - South by East - and they would be going at a rate which would certainly take them well to the South of the altered course which he took.
The Commissioner:
Do you object to my interrupting you?
Sir Robert Finlay:
I am much obliged.
The Commissioner:
It seems to me that the fact that he had three icebergs - I am speaking of icebergs at present - notified to him, not only ought to have been conveyed to his mind that there were those three, but also that there might be many others.
Sir Robert Finlay:
There might be, yes.
The Commissioner:
I should like you to deal with that - if it is a fair inference from the Marconigram, that there may be others.
Sir Robert Finlay:
There may be others.
The Commissioner:
Coming down South.
Sir Robert Finlay:
Yes.
The Commissioner:
Coming across his course.
Sir Robert Finlay:
Yes, my Lord.
The Commissioner:
How, then, do you justify what he did?
Sir Robert Finlay:
Does your Lordship mean in the matter of speed?
The Commissioner:
Yes, I do, indeed.
Sir Robert Finlay:
I justify it, my Lord, in this way, and I will deal with that point at once. I was going to take up two other points first, but I will go at once to that.
The Commissioner:
Do not let me interrupt you.
Sir Robert Finlay:
I prefer doing it for this reason; it is the crucial point in the case. A great deal of evidence has been directed to it, and the evidence is absolutely overwhelming that no one in the Atlantic trade lowers speed in consequence of ice being reported.
The Commissioner:
I am disposed to agree with you about that; but then I have to find out the cause of this disaster, and I have to say what, in my opinion, it was. Now the cause of the disaster, the effective cause of this disaster it appears to me - I suggest to you, at all events - was her going at this great speed when there was in fact an iceberg in the way. If the speed had been one-half or less than one-half the probability is that this catastrophe would have been averted.
Sir Robert Finlay:
It might or might not, my Lord.
The Commissioner:
It might or might not, and I distinguish - I shall be very glad if I can continue to distinguish - between what may be called an error of the Captain's judgment and negligence. But whether it be negligence or error of judgment does not affect the question what was the cause, the effective cause of the accident.
Sir Robert Finlay:
Before I proceed to deal with the evidence about speed, let me call your Lordship's attention to what a very near thing it was here. I am going to deal with the look-out by and by - I am taking it out of the order I proposed, but I think your Lordship's order is, perhaps, better. When the iceberg was reported they starboarded. If they had not starboarded, if they had run right on there would have been a great shock, and one, probably two, compartments near the bows would have been stove in, and all those who were in the berths in that part of the ship would have been killed, but the ship would not have sunk.
The Commissioner:
That is Mr. Wilding's suggestion.
Sir Robert Finlay:
Yes, and I think that it is borne out by all the probabilities, because though there would have been a tremendous shock, it is impossible to suppose that you would have had the extensive opening made along the side of the vessel which was made under the circumstances that took place. Now suppose the officer on the bridge had held on his course and an Enquiry had taken place, what would have been said of any man who, under such circumstances, had held on his course and gone full tilt at the iceberg? The severest censure the Court could have pronounced would have been visited upon him.
The Commissioner:
He would not have done that. He would have stopped and reversed, but still gone stem on.
Sir Robert Finlay:
Stopped and reversed and gone stem on, but the stopping and reversing would not have had time to produce an effect such as to prevent the consequences which Mr. Wilding described here.
The Commissioner:
No.
Sir Robert Finlay:
So that, my Lord, it stands in this way: if he had done that you would have had a number of people killed; you would have had great damage to the forward part of the vessel; but the passengers and crew, at all events with the exception, perhaps, of some of the third class passengers forward, would have escaped with their lives and without any serious inconvenience. That is what would have happened. But it was not an error of judgment to starboard: it was the right thing to do.
The Commissioner:
I am not sure, but I do not think it matters. If Mr. Wilding is right that that vessel would never have sunk at all, and that you would have, at most, killed a couple of hundred people if you had gone straight stem on to the ice, if he is right about that, then it was a foolish or a wrong thing to starboard and so damage the ship that she could not float and 1,300 people were killed.
Sir Robert Finlay:
Surely, if there ever was a case of being wise after the event it is illustrated by that proposition.
The Commissioner:
I quite agree, and nobody in his senses, in my opinion, could blame the man who starboarded the helm. It might be a much better thing, as Mr. Wilding says, to have gone stem on, but nobody would blame the man who starboarded his helm.
Sir Robert Finlay:
On the contrary, he would have deservedly incurred the most severe blame if he had not starboarded.
The Commissioner:
I am not sure. How can you say that, if you once admit the statement that by going stem on he would have preserved the lives of 1,300 people?
Sir Robert Finlay:
For this reason, my Lord: You must look at things as they are, as they present themselves to the minds of those on the bridge at the time.
The Commissioner:
Of course you must; but how you can say that he would have been blamed if it be the fact that by going stem on he would have saved 1,300 lives that were subsequently lost?
Sir Robert Finlay:
Not 1,300.
The Commissioner:
Whatever the number was.
Sir Robert Finlay:
Say 20 or 30.
The Commissioner:
Twenty or 30 what?
Sir Robert Finlay:
I beg your Lordship's pardon. I thought you were referring to the number of lives that would have been lost by going stem on.
The Commissioner:
Oh, no. If this man, Murdoch, had gone straight stem on to this berg, if Mr. Wilding is right, the result would have been that 1,300 lives which were lost would have been saved.
Sir Robert Finlay:
Yes; but no one would have known what the result of starboarding would have been, and any Court would have said that Mr. Murdoch was guilty of the grossest possible negligence in not trying to avoid that berg. What happened was this: One must work it out by seeing how the thing presents itself to those who have to deal with it.
The Commissioner:
Nobody could blame Mr. Murdoch for trying to avoid the berg; all I say is, and all I mean is that, if Mr. Wilding is right, then starboarding the helm was not a wise thing to do.
Sir Robert Finlay:
Your Lordship will forgive me; as it turned out, a great many lives were lost, but no one could have foreseen that.
The Commissioner:
No.
Sir Robert Finlay:
What one has to apply one's mind to is this: Suppose Mr. Murdoch had held straight on, only stopping and reversing, what would any Court have said about his conduct? He could not then have brought home to the mind of the Court that if he had starboarded he would have been caught by this point of ice which would have ripped up his side like a sardine knife. He would have been told: "You are guilty of the grossest possible negligence; if you had starboarded, you would in all probability have avoided that berg."
The Commissioner:
But in point of fact, he did not avoid it by starboarding.
Sir Robert Finlay:
I know he did not.
The Commissioner:
What it did was to rip up the whole side of the ship.
Sir Robert Finlay:
We are upon the question of whether he did the right thing, and I say, not only could he not be blamed, as your Lordship has said, for starboarding, but he would have deserved the severest blame if he had not starboarded. One cannot judge of the thing by the light of after events. What happened was this. By starboarding, as one of the look-out men said to the other, it appeared as if it were a near shave. They avoided the body of the berg, but there was this projecting spike which caught the starboard bow under the water, ripped up the vessel for some six watertight compartments, so that the vessel ultimately sank. That was an extraordinary accident, a very extraordinary accident, and all the circumstances are circumstances that I daresay never happened in the history of the world before and may never happen again.
The Commissioner:
But you know we are getting away from the point to which I wanted to direct you attention. With the knowledge that there was a possibility of finding icebergs right in the track, how is the speed of 22 knots an hour justified? That is the point.
Sir Robert Finlay:
I am coming back to that, if I have made clear my position that not only could he not be blamed for starboarding, but he would be deserving of the severest blame if he had not. I very confidently submit that to the judgment of the Court when this question comes to be considered, but I will go on at once now to the question of speed.
The Commissioner:
I do not think the starboarding has anything to do with it at present. What I mean is that that speed ought not to have been on the ship in the face of those Marconigrams.
Sir Robert Finlay:
With great deference I submit, when the evidence is looked at, the Court cannot come to that conclusion. Can it be said that Captain Smith was guilty of negligence by doing that which had been done by every vessel in this trade for a long series of years? I will call attention presently to the evidence on the point, because I think the effect of the evidence must a little have faded from your Lordship's mind, having regard to what your Lordship said a few minutes ago. But before calling attention to the evidence as to the uniform practice, I desire to call attention to the fact that it had worked well and given admirable results in practice, and I will test that by taking three sets of tables coming from perfectly different quarters. Will your Lordship take first the table produced by the Board of Trade? Your Lordship will find it at page 580, Question 22142. These are the statistics produced by the Board of Trade, and they show that from 1892 to 1901 three and a quarter million passengers were carried across the Atlantic, that system of keeping full speed, though ice is reported, being maintained all the time. During that time only 73 were lost. From 1902 to 1911 six million passengers were carried across the Atlantic, that is Question 22148 on the same page, but out of those six millions only nine were lost. I very much doubt whether, if the practice of slowing down had been adopted, the loss would not have been very much greater, for a reason I will give presently. The second set of statistics are those of the White Star Line for 11 years. It is on pages 496 and 497. The first number I am giving is excluding the "Titanic": 2,179,594 passengers had been carried by the White Star Line during those 11 years. There had been only two deaths from collision. It does not appear it was by icebergs; in fact, I do not think it was, it was by ships. There were only two deaths. How can it be said that there was something wrong with a system which yields such a result as that? Every one of these vessels had been keeping up speed after ice was reported, and yet I gather the Attorney-General is going to ask the Court to find negligence on the part of the Captain of the "Titanic" for doing what every Captain during all that time had done.
The Commissioner:
I do not think it is necessary for him to ask that; he may ask it, but I do not think it necessary.
Sir Robert Finlay:
If he asks it I certainly hope he will not get it. I submit he cannot. I do not know what line my friend is going to take about this.
The Commissioner:
What he is going to ask is what was the cause of this accident.
Sir Robert Finlay:
Was there blame?
The Commissioner:
He might ask that as well, but the real question is, What was the cause of the accident, the effective cause?
Continued >
