British Wreck Commissioner's Inquiry
Day 29
Final Arguments, cont.
The Commissioner:
You are not directing yourself to the objection the Attorney-General put nor to what I was asking you. Question 26 empowers us to make any recommendations or suggestions that we may think fit, having regard to the circumstances of the casualty, with a view to promoting the safety of vessels and persons at sea. Now, I do not think, you know, that the appointment of Mr. Carruthers has got anything to do with the circumstances of the casualty and I doubt very much whether the fact that there are only two Officers, in addition to the Captain, has anything to do with the circumstances of the casualty. It may be a very desirable thing to enquire into, but I can imagine thousands of questions which it might be desirable to enquire into.
Mr. Holmes:
I rather understood that this Enquiry was not to be limited merely to the nature of an inquest on a few persons who are dead, which can do no one any good whatever, but to try to do something to prevent accidents of a similar nature in the future, and I can conceive very few questions -
The Commissioner:
You know these two questions, Mr. Holmes, that you have been dealing with for the last few minutes appear to me not to have any reference to the casualty at all, but to be material to your Society.
Mr. Holmes:
Not to my Society, my Lord, alone by a long way - it is the whole mercantile marine.
Mr. Roche:
At the same time it is fair to tell your Lordship that my Society takes an entirely different view to my learned friends, not unnaturally.
The Commissioner:
I am quite sure you do, and I can imagine other people taking that view also. I do not think, Mr. Holmes, we ought to enter into these matters.
Mr. Holmes:
Very well, my Lord. Then a point upon which Mr. Roche has touched slightly this morning, and which I think your Lordship will have to take into consideration very carefully, if there is not to be a recommendation for boats for all, is the question of fire on board ship, and the regulations which are at present in existence upon that point.
The Commissioner:
I have had very little evidence about fire. I do not know what your suggestions amount to or why we should do anything. There was that fire, for instance, that Mr. Edwards took so much interest in.
Mr. Holmes:
Nothing to do with that, my Lord, but if you are not to recommend that there shall be sufficient boat accommodation on every ship for all persons, then the regulations for fire appliances should be more stringent, more carefully carried out and surveyed.
The Commissioner:
I really have heard no evidence as to fire appliances. I know nothing about them.
Mr. Holmes:
With all respect, my Lord, I asked Mr. Archer all about the provisions.
The Commissioner:
Do you think you have brought the subject of fire appliances on board these big ships to our notice with such particularity that we are able to deal with it? As far as I am concerned, I am not.
Mr. Holmes:
I took him through all the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act and the Instructions to the Surveyors. It may have escaped your Lordship's memory.
The Commissioner:
Do you, Mr. Attorney, expect us to deal with the fire appliances?
The Attorney-General:
No, my Lord, not with fire appliances, but I understood my friend's questions to be directed to this, that the circumstance of the possibility of a fire would be taken into your Lordship's consideration as one of the elements in determining the boat accommodation that should be provided.
The Commissioner:
That I can understand.
Mr. Holmes:
That is my point.
The Commissioner:
I rather understood we were really invited to enquire into the sufficiency of the appliances for a steamship fire.
The Attorney-General:
We could not do that; we have not the evidence.
Mr. Holmes:
No, but I do suggest that you should recommend that there should be further and more stringent provision made for the supply of fire extinguishing appliances to ships unless they have -
The Commissioner:
I cannot do that; I have not heard sufficient evidence.
The Attorney-General:
No.
The Commissioner:
Nor until this morning have I realised that we were expected to deal with the supply of appliances for extinguishing fires.
Sir Robert Finlay:
I think, my Lord, there has been no suggestion that everything that was wanted was not there on board the "Titanic."
Mr. Holmes:
I am not suggesting for one moment that there was anything wrong with the fire appliances on the "Titanic."
The Commissioner:
Then, if you are not, you are travelling outside matters which have anything to do with this casualty. I think you must leave the fire appliances.
Mr. Holmes:
Then, my Lord, the last point which I wish to mention - I think this is one your Lordship will allow me to proceed upon quite shortly - is the provision in these life-saving appliances Rules that only four of the boats supplied to a ship should be properly equipped with the various equipments. No one was able to explain it properly, except that Mr. Archer said he thought it was probably in the minds of the persons who framed the Rule that the boats would all keep together and that, therefore, if four of them were fully equipped that would be sufficient. I submit to your Lordship that is quite insufficient, and that your Lordship should recommend that not only four but the whole, at all events, of the lifeboats - I would not say necessarily all of the collapsible boats - supplied to the ship should be properly equipped with all necessary appliances.
The Commissioner:
I do not know where you could put them in the collapsible boats.
Mr. Holmes:
That is why I do not suggest the Rule should be extended to any collapsible boat.
Those are all the points I want to bring to your Lordship's notice except, in conclusion, to say that I have been asked by the representatives of the deceased Officers to thank your Lordship and His Majesty's Government and the representatives of the White Star Line for the expression of sympathy with which they opened this case.
The Commissioner:
I am very glad to hear you say that, Mr. Holmes.
Mr. Holmes:
And, finally, I wish to associate myself with Mr. Scanlan's application for costs in this case, and to remind your Lordship that, at the time when my application for leave to appear was granted, you did state that you thought the Imperial Merchant Service Guild ought to be represented.
The Attorney-General:
I take it your Lordship will deal with all matters of costs afterwards.
The Commissioner:
I shall deal with all questions of costs afterwards.
Mr. Harbinson:
If it please your Lordship, at the suggestion of my friend Mr. Edwards, who will probably propose to deal with the various topics that the other speakers overlook, when he comes afterwards, I venture now to address a few observations to your Lordship.
The Commissioner:
I take exception to that observation. I do not think any of them have overlooked anything.
Mr. Harbinson:
Well, for the observations I overlook.
The Commissioner:
No, no, no, you will certainly overlook nothing.
Mr. Harbinson:
And the subjects we fail to deal with; but I hope, my Lord, in addressing your Lordship, I shall not rival the exploits of an advocate who recently addressed a Court for three weeks, and at the end of that period applied for an adjournment in order that he might resuscitate his failing energies, and that he might the better continue his oratorical efforts when the Court met again.
The Attorney-General:
May we know where this was?
Mr. Harbinson:
I think it was in Italy.
The Commissioner:
In Viterbo, or some place like that.
Mr. Harbinson:
I think it was, my Lord; I remember reading it quite recently. While I am endeavouring to curtail myself as much as possible, and I probably will be consulting the wishes of all in that regard, at the same time there are a few statements that I should like to make to your Lordship.
The first proposition, my Lord, that I desire to submit is that this calamitous accident, this disaster, was not the outcome of an inevitable accident. By "inevitable accident," my Lord, I mean an accident which could not possibly have been prevented by the exercise of ordinary care, caution or skill, and my suggestion to your Lordship will be (and of course I shall endeavour in what I say to make, as far as I can avoid it, no reflections upon anyone) that if proper and seamanlike care had been exercised this very deplorable disaster could have been avoided.
Now, my Lord, on this question of "inevitable accident," would your Lordship allow me to refer you to "Bevan, on Negligence," page 879?
The Commissioner:
I do not think you need do that; it is a most respectable work, but I do not want it. Put it away, Mr. Harbinson.
Mr. Harbinson:
I have it here, my Lord, if your Lordship desires to refer to it, but, of course, I accept the suggestion that your Lordship makes. My point is this, that after the warnings were received by the Captain of the "Titanic," no special precautions were taken to cope with the contingency of ice in his track. Now it will not be necessary for me to refer to any authority to establish the proposition that negligence is of the same quality while steaming on the Atlantic Ocean or driving on the Thames Embankment, if life is lost as the result of excessive speed or negligent conduct, my point being, my Lord, that it is the same practically whether at sea or on land. There is no difference in the quality of the act. Could it be seriously suggested, my Lord, that if, to give you an illustration, the driver of a motor-car were warned when driving along the road that some obstruction was on the road, for instance, that a flock of cattle were on the road, if he were warned of this, could it be seriously argued that he fulfilled his duty by taking, say, the other side of the road from the side upon which he was told the cattle were encamped and going on at full speed in the hope that he might be able to detect this obstruction before he came up with it?
The Commissioner:
Do let us get back to the "Titanic."
Mr. Harbinson:
Why I want to give this illustration is this: It is said that the Captain of the "Titanic" did slightly alter his course, and I think, my Lord, he went slightly further Southward than had been the custom of navigation in that track. But there is no -
The Commissioner:
Do you make any point of that, Sir Robert Finlay - that there was a slight alteration of the course?
Sir Robert Finlay:
Well, my Lord, I say this: The Captain made that alteration. Of course, he is not here to state the precise reason which led him to make it. I say it was a proper alteration to make, and we are not, of course, in a position fully to judge of all the motives which actuated him in making it.
The Commissioner:
You do not follow me. Are you going to say that it was a precaution taken by the Captain in consequence of the telegrams which he had received about ice?
Sir Robert Finlay:
In all probability, my Lord, I think it was.
The Commissioner:
Very well. Now, Mr. Harbinson.
Mr. Harbinson:
I thank your Lordship. If I may I would like, with your Lordship's permission, to adhere to the illustration I gave; it is merely to illustrate -
The Commissioner:
Are you coming back to the Embankment now?
Mr. Harbinson:
No, my Lord, but I wish to compare the illustration I give of the cattle browsing, or encamped on the road, with the ice. The Captain must have known that ice -
The Commissioner:
I do not follow this.
Mr. Harbinson:
I wish to make it quite clear. When the Captain of the "Titanic" was informed that there was ice in the track he must have known that ice was an object that would drift with the current and might, therefore, move slightly down, even so as to be on the track that he had altered to, that is to say, that it would not remain stationary. That is an element or feature that I think should have entered into his calculation. That would have been an act of ordinary prudent calculation in a captain who had been many years at sea. In the same way, if the driver of a motor-car were told that there was an obstruction, say, any living obstruction, on the road, he would not be adequately discharging his duty in taking the other side of the road from that upon which he was told the obstruction was located because he should calculate that the obstruction might naturally change from one side of the road to the other. And therefore, my contention, with great respect, my Lord, is this: that the only method by which such a contingency could be adequately coped with was by reducing speed. In this case speed as your Lordship knows, was not reduced. The Captain relied, or his Officers relied on their natural powers of perceiving obstacles at a distance. But, my Lord, what is the result? The disaster to the "Titanic" shows that they failed to do that. They failed, and as the result of that failure, my Lord, the world has been shocked by the calamitous nature of the event. Therefore, my contention is this - I respectfully press it on your Lordship - that when the warnings about ice were conveyed to the Captain and to the Officers of the "Titanic," knowing the nature of ice, knowing, my Lord, as it is in evidence that that the sea did gradually subside to a flat calm, and that, therefore, as the result of the atmospheric conditions it would be more difficult to detect ice because, my Lord, not only would they be unable to hear the wash of the water against the berg, but also they would probably be unable to detect the white foam that would be caused by the water breaking against the berg - those facts should have been present to their minds and as a result of that, as a special result of the peculiar atmospheric conditions which prevailed, special precautions should have been taken. The most marked precaution that should have been taken was the reduction of speed. My learned friends have suggested, some of them, that an additional man should have been placed at the bow and I think that suggestion is substantiated by the evidence of Sir Ernest Shackleton, who unquestionably adheres to the view that the nearer a look-out man can come to the waterline the more effective are his services likely to be. Nothing like that was done. No special precautions were taken. So far as we know, the Captain communicated with nobody beyond giving the Marconigram to Mr. Bruce Ismay and afterwards getting it and giving it to the Officers for the chart room.
Now, my Lord, what was the object of the Captain in taking the Marconigram with reference to the "Baltic" to Mr. Bruce Ismay? I ventured, as your Lordship may see, in the cross-examination of Mr. Ismay, to suggest to him that it was on the part of the Captain an attempt to invite from Mr. Ismay an expression of opinion as regards the speed the vessel was maintaining. Your Lordship may remember that it came out in Mr. Ismay's evidence that prior to the "Titanic" leaving Queenstown he had a discussion with Mr. Bell, the Chief Engineer, on this question of speed, that that discussion with Mr. Bell took place without the Captain's knowledge, the Captain was not present, and that at that discussion with Mr. Bell it was arranged that the speed of the vessel was to be gradually increased, and, my Lord, the expression was used, "We were to run her at her full speed on the following Monday," the day after the Sunday upon which this great disaster occurred. "We were to run her at her full speed on the following Monday"! The vessel gradually forging her way across the Atlantic did increase her speed. Mr. Ismay stated that at no time during the passage did he attempt to interfere with the Captain, that he had no conversation with the Captain, that he was never on the bridge with the Captain and never in the Captain's room. Now those being the relations which prevailed between Mr. Ismay and the Captain. I again put it to your Lordship, was it not a very extraordinary circumstance that on this particular Sunday afternoon, when the Captain received this Marconigram about ice, he should go and search out for Mr. Ismay and hand him the message. I take it, my Lord, and I ask your Lordship to agree with me, that this was a very special precaution on the part of the Captain. Mr. Ismay says there was no discussion between them; I am loth, of course - it would be very regrettable if I were obliged to say, as I fear I am obliged to say - that that seems, at any rate to my mind, somewhat improbable, because I can hardly believe that it is consistent with the conduct of the Captain, after seeking him out and taking this Marconigram to him, that this Marconigram should merely be handed to Mr. Ismay, casually taken by him, glanced at, and put in his pocket, and that no conversation at all should take place with regard to its contents as between him and the Captain. My suggestion to your Lordship is that Captain Smith of the "Titanic" did feel, after the warnings about ice, that the situation was becoming dangerous, that the owner, the Managing Director, the Chairman of the International Mercantile Marine, the chief, the directing spirit of the Oceanic Navigation Company was on board, and I say, even considering the relations that do prevail in these ships between owners and Captain, it was impossible that Mr. Ismay, on board this new ship making her trial trip, should not imperceptibly exercise some influence on the Captain. My contention to your Lordship is that his very presence on that boat, the "Titanic," had an effect on the navigation of the ship, even although he never said a single word; that under the circumstances, as Mr. Ismay was there for the purpose, as he said, of seeing how the vessel ran for the purpose of discovering defects, that as Mr. Andrews was there representing the builders, Messrs. Harland and Wolff, as this was the trial trip of the largest vessel in the world, going from England, from these kingdoms to America - they were all on the alert, and that undoubtedly the presence of Mr. Ismay exercised considerable influence on the navigation. That is my contention.
Now, my Lord, that being the condition, I suggest that the speed at which the "Titanic" was going was excessive, and that if, after the warning had been given, special precautions had been taken and a diminution of speed had been ordered, in all probability the vessel would never have gone to the bottom. Now, whether it is navigating on the Atlantic Ocean or travelling in London on any highway, what is the rate that should guide those who are in command either of vessels or vehicles? It is this I respectfully submit to your Lordship's better judgment: that the speed should be such that they should have either the ship or the motor-car, or whatever it is, under such control as to avoid an object after being seen. And, as the result proves, my Lord, the "Titanic" was unable to avoid this object after it was notified from the crow's-nest, because, I believe I am right in saying that that was the place where the notification came from first, I do not think there is any evidence, so far as I can remember, that it was seen on the bridge until the notification was received from the crow's-nest.
The Commissioner:
There is some evidence: I do not know that there is very much, but there is some evidence. Lightoller, I think, says that, in his opinion, the helm had been starboarded before the message came from the crow's-nest.
Mr. Harbinson:
Yes, my Lord.
The Commissioner:
And he says that leads him to think that they saw the iceberg from the bridge before the crow's-nest announced it, however, that is the whole of it.
Mr. Harbinson:
Your Lordship is quite correct; Mr. Lightoller did say that, but except that isolated expression of opinion, with which there did not seem to be any very general agreement, I think there was no other. Of course, as your Lordship sees, assuming that they did see it from the bridge at the same time that it was notified from the crow's-nest, any interval of time that could have taken place must necessarily have been very short, considering how soon the collision occurred after the ice was notified.
Now if this vessel, the "Titanic," had been going at a reduced speed the argument I wish to reinforce is the argument which has been addressed to your Lordship on that particular point by my friend, Mr. Roche, this morning, and that is that, assuming that she had been reduced to half her speed and that she had been only able to turn two points in the distance she had traversed from the place where the object was seen, at the same time she would have been able to have the more effectually reversed her engines, brought the fact of the reversal into play, and thereby in that regard the impact would not have been so great as it was. Now a number of Captains were called to say what the practice is with regard to navigating the Atlantic, and Mr. Pritchard, the ex-Captain of the "Mauretania," which he says steams 26 knots an hour (that was the only one of the captains whose vessel did exceed the speed of the "Titanic") said his practice was to do exactly what was done in the case of the "Titanic." With regard to the others, there was Captain Young, of the "City of Rome," who said that his was a 17-knot vessel; Captain Stewart, of the "Empress of Britain," 18 knots; Captain Ranson, of the "Baltic," 16; and, as your Lordship will remember, there was Captain Apfeld, of the Red Star Line, who said, if I recollect aright, that his vessel's speed was something like 18 knots an hour. Now all these vessels, with the single exception of the "Mauretania" - and this is a consideration I would like to impress on your Lordship - are considerably slower than the "Titanic." Therefore, they do not incur the same risk by navigating in that way (that would be my submission) for that reason, that they are the better able, even assuming that their helm answers slower and that they can only turn the same number of points in the distance that intervenes between the place the object is seen and the object, to bring their ship to a standstill.
Now, that is the situation. Why, on this particular occasion, was there not a conference of the Officers called after ice had been notified? If that is not the usual practice on these ships for the captain to discuss with the Officers, why were not some special instructions given considering that a very special message with regard to icebergs and field ice had been received? I would like to make one suggestion to your Lordship, and it is this, that the matter, in all its gravity, did not seem to come home to the Officers, and I wish to illustrate Mr. Lightoller as the Officer to whom I refer, and that therefore it probably did not come home with sufficient force to Captain Smith. Now Mr. Lightoller told me - I think he also told your Lordship - that he had made a calculation as to the time he expected the "Titanic" would be in the vicinity of ice, and it will be within your Lordship's recollection that he said half-past 9 was the time he expected the ship to reach the ice. Mr. Moody, the Sixth Officer, had also made a calculation with reference to the time this vessel should reach ice, and the time he indicated was 11 o'clock, a difference of an hour and a-half in the calculations of these two Officers. My Lord, that seems a pretty considerable margin. To my mind, at any rate, it would seem a difference in calculation which would call for some further Enquiry in view of the repeated warnings the "Titanic" had received. But yet, as illustrating my point, that the gravity of the situation, after the warnings that had been given to them had not been realised with sufficient force, Mr. Lightoller allowed Mr. Murdoch to come on at 10 o'clock when Mr. Murdoch relieved Mr. Lightoller, and he never mentioned the question of the difference of their calculations. I wish to make no reflection on Mr. Lightoller's capacity or his general conduct, but at the same time I think it my duty to mention this matter to your Lordship that to my mind that was a matter which should unquestionably have been brought to Mr. Murdoch's attention. That difference in calculation as to the time when they might expect to reach ice was of vital importance, considering the speed at which the "Titanic" was travelling, and yet not one single word about that was said to Murdoch when he relieved Lightoller at 10 o'clock. My Lord, is that consistent with careful seamanship? Is it consistent with careful seamanship that when two Officers make a calculation with regard to the time a vessel speeding at, roughly, 22 knots an hour, will be in the vicinity of ice, and there is an hour and half difference, and not one single word of it is mentioned to the senior Officer when he comes on watch? I quote that as an illustration of the sort - I hope I am not using too strong a word if I say - of slackness that prevailed amongst the Officers in regard to the warnings that they had received, and also in regard to this question of ice, considering the speed at which the vessel was then going.
My Lord, those being my contentions, I desire to make the submission to your Lordship that the disaster to the "Titanic" was not the result of inevitable accident, and if it was not the result of inevitable accident, blame must attach to some one. My Lord, blame is at the root of negligence, blame must attach to someone, and my suggestion is that the vessel was not navigated with an adequate amount of care consistent with the warnings that had been received, and that blame undoubtedly attaches to those who were in charge of the navigation of the vessel. I would respectfully, as I say again, press on your Lordship that your Lordship should find that she was not navigated with proper care, that there was a breach of the duty to take care, which Lord Herschell has defined as constituting negligence, and that the breach of the duty to take care in this instance was to take adequate care to protect and preserve the lives of those who were on board; that that breach of the duty to take care amounts to negligence, and my respectful submission to your Lordship is that there was negligence in the navigation of the "Titanic."
Now, my Lord, that question of negligence touches on the Questions, submitted by the learned Attorney-General to the Court, 9, 10, 12, 13, and 14. These Questions 9, 10, 12, 13, and 14 relate to ice and speed, and they bear directly upon the question of negligence. Now, my Lord, having dealt with that aspect of the question, I wish more briefly to refer to portions of Questions 21 and 24 - the latter portion only of Question 21. "What is the proportion which each of these numbers" (that is, the numbers of the different classes) "bears to the corresponding total on board immediately before the casualty? What reason is there for the disproportion, if any?" and Question 24, "What was the cause of the loss of the 'Titanic' and of the loss of life which thereby ensued or occurred? Was the construction of the vessel and its arrangements such as to make it difficult for any class of passenger or any portion of the crew to take full advantage of the existing provisions for safety?"
Now, there has been a huge volume of evidence given, and I do not desire to range over it at large. A brilliant writer, my Lord, has invented, or constructed, a somewhat unorthodox paradox, that the best way to meet a temptation is to yield to it. Like many paradoxes, my Lord, I fear that is only half a truth, and I am much too orthodox in morals to practice it on this occasion, and, therefore, I shall confine myself to the questions that more immediately concern me. Now might I refer your Lordship to the Certificate for Clearance? I am here specially representing, as your Lordship knows, all the third class passengers. I represent, I am glad to say, not only my own countrymen but also the English third class passengers, and thereby, I hope, symbolise in some way that community of interests and sentiment which we all hope in the near future will be established between the two countries. There were 710 third class passengers carried, and out of that number, my Lord, 176 were saved. Now, there were 113 (Your Lordship asked for this, and perhaps I may be allowed to repeat it) Irish passengers taken on at Queenstown, and of that number 57 were males and 56 females. Out of the 57 males, my Lord, 7 were saved, 12 percent; and out of the 56 females 33 were saved, making 59 percent. Now, might I refer your Lordship to the Table in the evidence, which you will get at page 479, and just compare that with the percentages as given in the Table. Of the first class passengers the percentage saved (I need not trouble with the numbers) was men 34 percent, women 97 percent, and children 100 percent. Of the second class, men 8 percent, women 84 percent, and children 100 percent. Of the third class, men 12 percent, women 55 percent, and children 30 percent. The disproportion, as your Lordship sees, is very considerable. Now, my Lord, of the Irish, a constituent element of the third class, of men there were 12 percent saved, exactly the same as the percentage of the whole of the third class passengers; women, 59 percent, and there is no figure furnished to me as regards the children.
The Attorney-General:
They are all under the males and females.
Mr. Harbinson:
I thank you, Mr. Attorney-General; I did not know. Through a question I put to Sir Walter Howell, when he was in the Witness chair, asking the number with reference to third class emigrants, I merely quote this to show your Lordship the importance of the class - I have no reason to believe your Lordship would dispute it, but I thought it proper to put the question, and with great Courtesy Sir Walter Howell has furnished me with the returns for the last ten years. I do not propose to read that because it would take too long, but may I mention that I have added up the numbers and I find that the number of third class Irish passengers who have gone to North America for the last ten years from 1902 to 1911 is 294,359, and that the number of British passengers who have gone to North America during the same period is 1,369,260. Those figures show, my Lord, that the proportion of Irish passengers who have crossed the North Atlantic to North America in that 10 years bears to the proportion of the total number of third class passengers who have gone from Great Britain the relation of between one-fourth and one-fifth. Between one-fourth and one-fifth of the whole number who have crossed to North America in that time, steerage passengers, have come from Ireland. If your Lordship cares to see this table you can have it afterwards for the purpose of verification.
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