British Wreck Commissioner's Inquiry
Day 29
Final Arguments, cont.
The Commissioner:
I am listening to it.
Mr. Harbinson:
I quote that, my Lord, to reinforce two facts; first, the number of Irish passengers who have travelled, and in whom, as your Lordship knows, I am specially interested, and also the number of British passengers who have crossed by steamers plying on the North Atlantic for the last ten years. It amounts to over a million and a half, and must furnish a considerable portion of the revenue of the various shipping companies. Therefore, as I respectfully suggest to your Lordship, this is to a large extent an inarticulate class, not people who are very well educated, not people who belong to that rank of life where they can look after themselves, nor people who are accustomed to travel; in Ireland certainly, and to a large extent in England, I think, people who come from rural divisions, and who probably have seen a ship for the first time. These are people not accustomed to the ways of travelling, and, therefore, my respectful submission to your Lordship is that these are people who in times of danger and emergency require special attention and special protection. They would be unaccustomed, my Lord, to the many passages, the many ways of communication which would lead from the third class quarters on the "Titanic" to the boat deck. They would never have been on the boat deck, because what is the evidence? The evidence of Captain Clarke, on page 679, is that when he made the inspection at Southampton before the "Titanic" sailed the emergency doors were locked and the barriers were fastened. He made that inspection, as he says, at 8 o'clock in the morning of the day upon which the "Titanic" sailed.
Then there was Hart, the Steward, whose evidence your Lordship will find at page 214. I wish to deal, if I may say so, with this matter with absolute fairness, concealing nothing, and giving the evidence that bears on the matter regardless of whether it bears out the view which I shall put before your Lordship or not. At page 214 Hart told the Court that provision was made for having the third class passengers directed to the boat deck. At Question 10213 he was asked - I asked him, as a matter of fact: "(Q.) You have told us that you saw a number of stewards placed at various portions to direct the third class passengers how they were to go? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) About how many stewards were so placed? - (A.) I passed about five or six on the starboard side. (Q.) Who else besides you, then, were bringing the people from their berths - rousing them and bringing them up to the boat deck? How many others? - (A.) almost eight. A portion of the third class stewards were room stewards, of whom I am the only survivor. (Q.) I understood that there were only eight third class stewards in the aft portion altogether? - (A.) To look after them. (Q.) Who were stationed at various places to direct the third class passengers the way they were to go? - (A.) Not of that eight. (Q.) There were five? - (A.) Five others. (Q.) What class stewards were they? - (A.) I could not tell you. Stewards were placed all round the ship. (Q.) Do you know who placed them there? - (A.) I cannot tell you. (Q.) Do you know the stewards by sight who were placed to direct the third class passengers? - (A.) No. (Q.) But you say they were not third class stewards? - (A.) They were not third class stewards. (Q.) Did you see the emergency door open? - (A.) I saw it open. The swing door to the second class, you mean? (Q.) Yes? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) Do you know at what time it was opened? - (A.) Yes, I can tell you. It was open at half-past 12. (Q.) Would it be right" (and, my Lord, this question I was obliged to put because of a number of statements that had been made in the papers. I put this question, although, of course, I was not a position to adduce any evidence to substantiate it, but, if I may say so, my position sometimes in some of the questions I put resembles that of a navigator trying to steer between Scylla and Charybdis; I did not want to put some of the questions, but there were some questions I was obliged to put and I put this question in that way) "if anyone said that a number of sailors were keeping back the third class passengers from reaching the boat deck? - (A.) Would it be right to do so? (Q.) Would it be right if any one said so? - (A.) I do not say that it would be right. (Q.) I asked you would it be right if anyone said so? - (A.) I would not like to say it would be right. (The Commissioner.) Would it be true? - (A.) I should not think so." Then I say: "It is not what you think. Did you see any sailors keeping back the third class passengers from reaching the boat deck? (The Commissioner.) Did you see anyone keeping the third class passengers back so as to prevent them getting to the boat deck?" and he says, "No, my Lord."
Now, my Lord, I wish to say distinctly that no evidence has been given in the course of this case that would substantiate a charge that any attempt was made to keep back the third class passengers. There is not an atom or a tittle of evidence upon which any such allegation could be based, and I do not for one moment say the third class passengers were deliberately kept back or were kept back at all in the sense that any effort was made to prevent them reaching the boat deck. I desire further, my Lord, to say that there is no evidence that when they did reach the boat deck there was any discrimination practised either by the Officers or the sailors in putting them into the boats. It would be wrong of me to say so, because there is no evidence which would bear me out in saying so, and I think it only fair that in speaking on behalf of the third class passengers I should make that observation to your Lordship. But, my Lord, how do we account for the disproportion in the saved as between the third class and the other classes? My Lord, I regret to say I cannot accept the statements made by Hart as being in all respects absolutely accurate. If I may put it colloquially, my Lord, my suggestion would be that the picture has been somewhat touched up, because in the evidence given by several Witnesses, and in answer to questions which I put to quite a number who came into the witness-box, there was not one of them who could say that they had heard any instructions given to stewards to go and take their places and direct these third class passengers to the boat deck. Hart says they were there, that the emergency door was opened, but he is the only third class steward called, and we have only got his uncorroborated evidence to rely upon. Now, my Lord, is this account which he gives consistent in all respects with the number of third class passengers who have been drowned. I questioned him further to this effect: Question 10255, "According to you, all the women and children, from the aft part of the boat who were taken up and who wanted to escape could have done so?" and he says, "I do not doubt that for a moment." True it is that in another portion of his evidence he said that some of them who did go to the boat deck returned again, but in Question 10200 he said: "It was only a small number who refused to leave," that is to say, who refused to leave their cabins. He says, "It was only a small number who refused to leave."
Now, my submission to your Lordship is this, that if there had been a proper organisation of the stewards in the third class quarters, if a proper warning had been given to the third class passengers, if they had been told that the position of the "Titanic" was dangerous and that the ship was doomed, my submission to your Lordship is that if they had been told that, and, further, told that the "Carpathia" was coming to their rescue, a circumstance they could have been informed of, then I say it is highly improbable that any of them would have refused, even in small numbers, to have left the sinking ship.
Now, my Lord, the question has been raised - I raised it, and my friend Mr. Holmes said it was rather ridiculous, but, of course, that is a matter of opinion - of a general alarm. True it is, my Lord, that if a general alarm were sounded it is possible it might give rise to panic - I admit that at once - but, my Lord, on the other hand, there is also the view to be considered that it is only fair that people who are on a ship that is doomed should in some way be apprised of the serious condition of the circumstances in which they are placed, and it is therefore a matter I would respectfully suggest to your Lordship for consideration and for the consideration of your Lordship's skilled advisers, as to whether or not it would be desirable in case of danger, fire, or wreck, that some kind of general alarm should be sounded. That is a matter I would leave to your Lordship and to your Lordship's skilled advisers, but I merely suggest that it is a matter which is worthy of serious consideration. I do think on this occasion, as appears from the evidence of Boxhall and Bride that the passengers on the "Titanic" could have been informed by the Officers that the "Carpathia" was coming to their assistance. There is no doubt that that was known to those on board of the "Titanic," because if your Lordship refers to the evidence of the Fourth Officer, Boxhall, on page 361, Question 15610, I asked him, (Q.) "Did you hear the Captain say anything to anybody about the ship being doomed?" and he says, "The Captain did remark something to me in the earlier part of the evening after the order had been given to clear the boats. I encountered him when reporting something to him and he was enquiring about the men going on with the work, and I said, 'Yes, they are carrying on all right.' I said, 'Is it really serious?' He said, 'Mr. Andrews tells me he gives her from an hour to an hour and a half to live.' That must have been some little time afterwards. Evidently Mr. Andrews had been down." Therefore, my Lord, the Captain a very short time after the collision, at any rate some time after the collision, knew that the "Titanic" was not going to survive.
Now, my Lord, in reference to the knowledge of the "Carpathia," it will be found from Bride, whose evidence on that subject appears at page 393, Question 16795. I asked him, "Do you remember how long it was after the collision when you learned that the 'Carpathia' was coming to your assistance? - (A.) The 'Carpathia' was the second boat to answer our call. (Q.) Can you remember how long it was after the collision? - (A.) No, I could not tell you; it was within a very short space of time after we sent out our first distress signal."
The Commissioner:
When was that?
Mr. Harbinson:
That would be, my Lord, about half-an-hour after the collision, as far as my recollection serves me, and he says it was shortly after they sent out their first distress signal.
The Attorney-General:
I think 12.25 was the first C.Q.D. message.
Mr. Harbinson:
That would be three-quarters of an hour. I asked him, at Question 16797, "And you took the message that the 'Carpathia' was coming, to the Captain?" And his answer was "Yes."
My Lord, I think with that knowledge in the possession of the Captain, if there had been conveyed to the passengers the seriousness of their situation and the fact that assistance was near at hand, at any rate was on its way, the lifeboats would have been properly filled and a greater number saved. I think such information ought to have been given, and especially to these third class passengers, who, as your Lordship knows, were in a different position, both as regards environment and as regards previous experience of the sea, from the cabin passengers.
The Attorney-General:
May we get that time right? 12.15 is the message to the "Mount Temple," receive from the "Titanic," and 12.25 is the message from the "Titanic" to the "Carpathia," which the "Carpathia" received.
Sir Robert Finlay:
My Lord, I would submit that the four following questions and answers ought to have been read. I think my friend stopped at Question 16797 on page 393?
Mr. Harbinson:
Yes.
Sir Robert Finlay:
Question 16798 and the following questions are these: - "(Q.) Now do you know if the Captain communicated the substance of your message to any of the Officers or to the crew? - (A.) I passed the word myself as I went to find the Captain. (Q.) To whom did you pass it? - (A.) To anybody I happened to come close to. (Q.) Did you pass it to any of the Officers? - (A.) Not to my knowledge. (Q.) But you gave it out that the 'Carpathia' was coming to your assistance? - (A.) Yes."
Mr. Harbinson:
Yes, that is quite right, Sir Robert. My submission is that the Captain had the knowledge, and that the knowledge should have been communicated. That is my respectful submission. Now, my Lord, there is a question which has been dealt with, and I do not wish to take up any time dealing with it in detail, and that is regarding the despatch of these lifeboats not adequately filled. The fact remains. But might I refer just to one piece of evidence in connection with that, and that is to the evidence of Fifth Officer Lowe at page 368, Question 15906? "(Q.) Is it not the function of lifeboats on a steamer, as far as possible, to take away the full complement of passengers? - (A.) Yes, but I was going on the idea that the gangway doors were going to be opened and to take people from there. (Q.) And that was why you lowered the boats from the boat deck when they were not altogether full? - (A.) Certainly; we were not going to load a boat with its floating capacity from the davits. (Q.) What grounds or evidence had you for the opinion you formed that there was going to be additional people put in the lifeboats from the gangways? - (A.) I really forget now. I must have overheard it. (Q.) Do you remember whom you overheard saying it? - (A.) I do not. (Q.) Did you hear any instructions given for those gangways to be opened?" and he said, "Had I any instructions?" and then I repeat, "Did you hear any instructions given?" and his answer is, "No, but as I say, I overheard a conversation somewhere referring to the gangway doors being opened, and that the boatswain and a crowd of men had gone down there."
The Attorney-General:
Had been sent there.
Mr. Harbinson:
(Q.) With reference to these boats that were lowered on your side, at which you assisted, did you, after they had been lowered, have any means of communicating with those on board in order to have them filled up through the gangways?" and his answer is "Yes; I told them to haul off from the ship's side, but to remain within hail. That is what I told each of them, with the exception of the boat that Mr. Pitman went in." Then I go on, "What I want to get at is this."
Now, my Lord, it is clear there was some confusion with regard to these gangway doors. Whether it was the intention that the boats should be partially filled on the boat deck and afterwards completely filled when they were lowered to the gangway doors is a matter, I think, that is a point of speculation, but that there was some discussion about the opening of the gangway doors, as Lowe says, I think there can be no reasonable doubt, and that that might account for the boats being to some extent lowered inadequately filled from the boat deck. But what I want to suggest is this, that the fact that those boats were lowered unfilled, or improperly filled, that the fact that there was some discussion or some thought that they might subsequently take on additional passengers from the gangway doors, which was never done, shows there was confusion and a lack of proper system and administration amongst the Officers and those in control of the boat at this time when it was being filled. True it is, and I think it fair to say, that this was a new ship, and that the Officers had only been on it for a very short time, a few days at the most. True it is also that the sailors and firemen who principally manned the boats were also new to it, but still I think under a proper system of organisation and administration sufficient time had elapsed from the time they joined the "Titanic" to have accustomed them to their duties if an emergency arose. But, my Lord, it is clear that the possibility of danger arising had not occurred to their minds, and nothing was done, and the result was a certain amount of confusion - not chaos, I do not go so far as to say that - but there was a certain amount of confusion and misunderstanding, with the result that only roughly 700 people were saved in the lifeboats when there was lifeboat capacity and accommodation for between 1,100 and 1,200. It would have been quite possible for these boats, when they lowered to have concentrated on boats that were improperly filled or inadequately filled, to have transferred their passengers and come back and taken on additional passengers. That could easily have been done - concentration in some boats while others came back and got further passengers. There was time to do that, but, my Lord, it was not done, and that, I respectfully suggest to your Lordship, is an omission which undoubtedly resulted in the loss of a few hundred lives that possibly might have been saved if the boats had been filled to their full carrying capacity. As regards the manning of the boats, I wish to say nothing beyond this; that it is a curious coincidence and bears out the contention I have been respectfully submitting to your Lordship that in No. 1 boat, about which I am to offer no criticism beyond saying this, there was a crew of seven to man it and only five passengers, but in No. 12 boat there were over 40 passengers and only a crew of two. I respectfully commend that to your Lordship's consideration, and I think, if I may say so, it justifies me in saying that on this occasion in connection with the manning the administration was not all that it might have been.
As regards other subjects which I touched on in the course of this Enquiry, it will be for your Lordship and your Lordship's skilled advisers, to consider the whole question of the launching of lifeboats from davits 70 feet high. I did make the suggestion that some consideration might be given to the question of whether or not the boats might be lowered from the stern or from a slip further down the side of the boat, and, if I might make a suggestion to your Lordship in the presence of the Attorney-General, it would be this, that in this committee that is considering the question of bulkheads, the relation of boats to bulkheads, it might be not undesirable that within the scope of its discussions it might include the question also of the proper launching of boats and the proper positions and the importance, at any rate, of the safe manner in which boats could be launched.
With regard to a suggestion that I made, my Lord, it will also be a matter for your Lordship to consider, and that is as far as possible this question of the continuous service of crews on board these liners that ply across the Atlantic. I do not think it requires argument that if men who are accustomed to work on a boat, familiar with the vessel, with its various passages and ramifications, are employed continuously on that vessel, they will be more serviceable, better accustomed to their positions and better fitted to discharge their duties in times of danger and emergency; and if any system could be devised - I do not suggest a system of compulsion, but if it could be accomplished by inducement, by the offer of benefits - I do not wish to say that additional burdens should be thrown on the shipping companies - but if arrangements could be devised by employing them as shore gangs whereby these crews could be employed more continuously on Atlantic-going vessels, it might tend to safer navigation and to more dispatch in the matter of life-saving in case of danger.
Now, my Lord, here is one other question that I should like to touch upon, and that is the question of the Board of Trade.
The Commissioner:
The Board of Trade? Do you propose to deal with that?
Mr. Harbinson:
I do not propose to deal with the Board of Trade with regard to bulkheads at all; I leave that absolutely to my learned friend who will follow; in fact, my Lord, I think it is probably better for me practically not to touch on the Board of Trade beyond saying this, that the learned Attorney-General has a big task, I think before him when he comes to vindicate the Board of Trade because, if I may say so, I think to seek to defend the Board of Trade is like defending the indefensible. Its position is serious. It wakes up in 1894, and it makes Rules with reference to vessels up to 10,000 tons, and then, my Lord, it goes to sleep and it does nothing. There is nothing done, no steps taken to extend the scale, although vessels are built between 1894 and 1910 which leap up in tonnage from 10,000 to between 40,000 and 50,000 tons. Nothing is done, my Lord, in that time to deal with the extension of the boat scale; nothing is done to frame regulations with regard to speed -
The Commissioner:
You are trenching on Mr. Edwards' speech.
Mr. Harbinson:
I should be very loth to do that.
Mr. Clement Edwards:
Shortening my task, my Lord.
Mr. Harbinson:
I do not wish to entrench on the ground which Mr. Edwards is going to cover, but I think, my Lord, he is to cover it so fully that anything I say will not detract in the slightest from the multifariousness of the topics which he proposes to deal with. May I only say this? I did take a point with reference to the dent in the "Olympic." I think that matter is rather serious. It was described by Mr. Wilding as a dent, but the information I had was that it was something more serious, although I accept his description, of course. I say that, of course, pointed and should have pointed to the necessity of a double skin, but my learned friend, Mr. Edwards, will deal with that, and probably he will also bear in mind when he is dealing with it that this slight damage to the "Olympic" did occur, and that an argument can be based upon it. Now, with reference to that, I think I have said all I wish to say. I wish to say that the Board of Trade has got many eyes and many ears, but it does not seem to have any brains.
Mr. Clement Edwards:
I do not know what there is for me to say after that, my Lord.
The Commissioner:
I think your speech is being quite spoilt.
Mr. Harbinson:
And although it gets information from all sides it does not seem to be able to digest it, to assimilate it, or to apply it; and if, as the result of this awful tragedy the Board of Trade could be modernised, and made, as it were, the reflex of the living, throbbing and palpitating life of this country, then I should think, at all events, appalling, world-wide as this calamity has been, my Lord, it will have borne some fruit.
(After a short adjournment.)
The Commissioner:
Mr. Laing, you appear, I believe, for Messrs. Harland and Wolff.
Mr. Laing:
Yes, my Lord.
The Commissioner:
I want to tell you that we should like to hear you upon the question of the bulkhead between No. 5 and No. 4 boiler rooms.
Mr. Laing:
If your Lordship pleases.
The Commissioner:
It is suggested that if that bulkhead had been carried up to C deck, even if the water got into No. 4 boiler room, over the top of the bulkhead between 4 and 5, the ship would have been afloat much longer. Supposing you were to have a bulkhead going up to C deck, then the vessel would have been much longer afloat, unless it be true that No. 4 boiler room was holed to such an extent that the water came in in quantities which the pumps could not cope with. Do I make myself clear?
Mr. Laing:
Yes, my Lord, I think I understand what your Lordship means.
The Commissioner:
It is suggested, you know, that if the bulkhead between 4 and 5 had been carried up to C deck, and it be true to say that No. 4 boiler room was not holed to such an extent that the pumps could not cope with the water which came in, then the boat would have floated for a considerably longer time.
Mr. Laing:
I follow that, and I will look up the evidence with regard to that.
The Commissioner:
Now, Mr. Edwards.
Mr. Clement Edwards:
May it please your Lordship: What I am going to say in the main will be said not only on behalf of my own clients, but, accepting your Lordship's suggestion, also on behalf of the Seafarers' Union, represented by Mr. Lewis; the Stewards' Union, represented by Mr. Cotter; and the Shipwrights' Society, represented by Mr. Pringle. I am instructed to say on behalf of these and also on behalf of my clients that we join with those who have expressed their appreciation of the sympathy which His Majesty's Government has tendered to the sufferers in this terrible catastrophe, and also the sympathy which has been extended by the owners of the "Titanic"; and also - particularly those of us who are appearing here - desire to express to your Lordship (whatever ultimately may be your Lordship's views does not for this purpose matter) our very highest appreciation of the very great and profound patience which you have manifested in a very difficult Enquiry, very laborious, and presenting many trying circumstances.
Now, I should like in the next place to remove any possible alarm that might have been conveyed to your Lordship's mind by the perfectly unauthorised programme of my intentions tendered to your Lordship by my friend Mr. Harbinson. I have no sort of intention to travel over a single inch of the ground which I think can possibly be avoided, and your Lordship has by certain intimations already enabled me very much to cut short anything that I should have had to say; that is to say, a good deal of my cross-examination was directed to the construction and efficacy of bulkheads of different kinds, transverse and longitudinal, and also to the question of the advantages or otherwise of watertight decks, and also to what I may call the interrelation between boat accommodation and the sinkability of the ship as affected by the question of bulkheads. Your Lordship on all these three points has already indicated a certain line which is this, that in the opinion of your Lordship the Committee which has already been set up should devote attention to these problems, so that so far as each one of those questions is concerned as affecting the future I do not propose to trespass in the least degree upon your Lordship's time by discussing them. Of course, I have to touch on each one of them in relation to the actual accident to the "Titanic," and also in relation to what I may call the relative responsibility of owners, builders and Board of Trade in regard to each one, and that of course will constitute the main part of the remarks which I have to address to your Lordship.
There are certain other matters; for instance, there is the question of boat accommodation and manning and equipment, and I may say at once that except for certain particular remarks which I may desire especially to address to your Lordship on behalf of my friends Mr. Lewis and Mr. Cotter, I at once freely and fully adopt the suggestions made to your Lordship by Mr. Scanlan, and I shall, therefore, not attempt anything like a detailed discussion of those.
Then, of course, there are a number of questions which, of necessity, the learned Attorney-General must go into quite fully, and, if I may say so, with respect, the evidence is almost so unanimous upon the point that I do not think there is likely to be much disparity of view and submission between what I might call the view put by the learned Attorney-General and the view which I should desire to submit to your Lordship; and upon this question again I do not propose taking up any time. So that what I have to say narrows down, if I may say so, to the question of construction in relation to the avoidance or the mitigation of the calamity, and to certain particular incidents upon which I feel that a certain amount of responsibility rests upon my shoulders owing to a particular line that I took in cross-examination.
Now, the first point upon which I desire to address some observations to your Lordship is the question as to the immediate cause of the calamity and whether the look-out was deficient or not. I think the evidence points inevitably to the conclusion that there was some negligence in the matter of navigation; that is to say, under the special circumstances which have been given in evidence here there was an excessive speed. In connection with that a very important question will arise as to the responsibility of persons other than the late lamented Captain. We have had put in the sailing directions and regulations of the International Marine Company, which governs not only the navigation of the White Star but also governs the navigation of the Dominion Line and also the Atlantic Transport Line. Now those regulations are important in relation to what precisely happened to the "Titanic" in so far as this is concerned, that while there are no specific regulations as to what a Captain is to do so far as ice is concerned other than in what one may call the Canadian ice regions, those regulations do lay down quite conclusively that if a certain conditions of things exist, and because a certain condition of things is likely to exist, there is to be the exercise of the greatest possible care and caution and particular care and caution in slowing down and avoidance in those regions.
Now, if there had been in the case of the navigation of the "Titanic" no warning, if there had been no indication then, if I may say so, I think that the evidence which has been called by the learned Attorney-General, the evidence of captains, and other evidence called by him at the request of those appearing for the White Star Company, would be of very great importance - very great importance; but when you have a condition of things indicated by the "Baltic" Marconigram, which is descriptive by its wording, of precisely that state of things against which the captains are warned by this very company in navigating in the Canadian ice-field, I suggest that there is this responsibility placed upon those navigating the ship that, having had shown to them that there is present a condition of things equivalent to that for which regulations exist elsewhere; they must manifest precisely the same degree of care and caution and avoidance. That, I submit, is so?
Now, in connection with this arises a very grave personal question as to how far any independence of mind and judgment of Captain Smith, of course, the responsible person, may have been affected by the presence and attitude of the managing director of the company on board his ship. On that aspect of the question I want to state two or three preliminary points. We have had it in evidence from Mr. Ismay that he did discuss with Mr. Bell, the Chief Engineer, at Queenstown, the question of the speed; we have it further in his evidence that the Captain, so far as Mr. Ismay was aware, knew nothing at all about that interview. We have that at Queenstown, and at Queenstown there is a decision arrived at between Mr. Ismay, on his own evidence, and the Chief Engineer, that is to say taking his own rendering, that on the Monday and Tuesday, all being well according to the matter of weather, they are so to put up the revolutions as to attain to the maximum of 78. Now Mr. Ismay has this knowledge at Queenstown when the ship leaves; Mr. Ismay has this knowledge right away through on to the Sunday. Now Mr. Ismay was asked an exceedingly important and valuable question on page 454, by Mr. Holmes. It is Question 18873.
The Attorney-General:
There are two questions before that.
Mr. Edwards:
Perhaps there are two or three earlier questions which I should read?
The Attorney-General:
Yes, I think so.
Mr. Edwards:
He was examined by Mr. Holmes, and at the bottom of page 453, Question 18869, he is asked: "(Q.) You have told us at the conversation between you and the Chief Engineer the Captain was not present? - (A.) He was not. (Q.) And that you had no conversation with him during the voyage about speed? - (A.) Absolutely none. (Q.) Then will you tell us how it was he was to become aware of your decision to increase the speed on the Tuesday? - (A.) I think the Engineer would probably have spoken to him. (Q.) Did you make any arrangement with the Engineer about that? - (A.) I did not. (Q.) Then, as far as you know, the Captain was not aware that you were going to make this increase in speed? - (A.) No."
I suggest that shows that Mr. Ismay was taking upon himself a very tremendous responsibility. He has denied any conversation having taken place as between himself and the Captain, so that the extent, if any, to which his attitude may have affected the mind of the Captain we do not know; but certain it is that for the purpose of the future in this connection it is in the highest degree important that no person in the position of what I may call commercial supremacy should be allowed under any circumstances to discuss except through the responsible head of the ship, the Captain, any question of speed or navigation at all.
Sir Robert Finlay:
I think in this connection the last answers given by Mr. Ismay to me at page 460 should be read. They begin at Question 19000: "(Q.) Now I think there is only one other matter I want you to tell me about. You were asked about a conversation with Mr. Bell that took place at Queenstown? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) And it was suggested, if I followed the questions, that you had given some orders to Mr. Bell as to the speed? - (A.) No, I had given no orders. (Q.) Will you just repeat exactly what took place between you and Mr. Bell? - (A.) Mr. Bell came into my room, and I spoke to him with regard to the coal which he had on board the ship. I also said that there was no chance of the ship arriving in New York on the Tuesday; that we had very much better make up our minds to arrive there on the Wednesday morning and be off the lightship at 5 o'clock, and if the weather was fine and right in every respect on the Monday or Tuesday we then could take a run out of the ship. (Q.) Was that all? - (A.) That is all. (Q.) Did you ever contemplate that being done without communication with the Captain? (A.) Certainly not."
The Commissioner:
I suppose that the speed on the Monday could not have been increased or the number of revolutions increased without the Captain knowing of it.
Mr. Edwards:
Oh, yes, my Lord; I do not suggest that the revolutions could have been increased without the Officer in charge of the bridge at a given time knowing it, but it is quite clear that you could increase the speed without the knowledge of the Captain, at all events for a period.
The Commissioner:
Of course I know that; but what I mean is there could be no real increase of the speed without the Captain becoming speedily aware of it. I do not know that what I am saying depreciates at all from the point of your observation, with which I am certainly disposed to agree, that there ought to be absolutely no interference, direct or indirect, by what I call a stranger to the navigation, as Mr. Ismay undoubtedly from my point of view was. He was a stranger to the navigation of the ship, or ought to have been.
Mr. Edwards:
If that is your Lordship's view there is no need for me to pursue that aspect of the question further. That is quite sufficient for my purpose.
In that connection, however, there is another matter that arises, and that is this. A Marconigram - as things have turned out the most vital Marconigram - comes to the "Titanic" from the "Baltic." Mr. Ismay, in reply to questions by myself, admitted that he was sufficiently familiar with the Rules of navigation and sufficiently familiar with the practice with regard to Marconigrams to say this: that whenever a Marconigram came to a ship affecting the navigation, the right course to adopt was to have it posted in the chart room.
The Commissioner:
Give me the reference to that. I have no doubt it is so, but I should like to have the reference.
Mr. Edwards:
It is on page 452, Question 18828: "(Q.) Now I will come to the question of the 'Baltic' telegram. Did you, before that particular Sunday, know what was the practice with regard to Marconigrams received by the Officers on the ship relating to the navigation of the ship? Did you know what it was the practice to do with those Marconigrams as soon as they had been received? - (A.) I believe the practice was to put them up in the chart room for the Officers. (Q.) Did you know that on Sunday, April the 14th? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) Was not the Marconigram from the 'Baltic' essentially a message affecting navigation? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) Then will you say why, under those circumstances, with that knowledge, you put that Marconigram into your pocket? - (A.) Because it was given to me, as I believe now just before lunchtime, and I went down and had it in my pocket." So that it is perfectly clear that when that Marconigram was handed to Mr. Ismay he was in full possession of the knowledge that a Marconigram of that character had to be posted up in the chart room. Now why was the Marconigram given to him at all? He admits there was no other Marconigram shown to him on this journey on the "Titanic." I suggest that in view of his own evidence there is only one conclusion, and that is that the Captain was anxious that whatever was done should be done upon the responsibility of Mr. Ismay. Well, my Lord -
The Commissioner:
I mean by shaking my head that he could not accomplish such a thing.
Mr. Edwards:
That may be.
The Commissioner:
The Captain could not shift his responsibility.
Mr. Edwards:
That may be, my Lord. I at once recognise that whatever pressure may have been put upon him by his owner, he had got charge of that vessel and could not in any way get rid of his legal liability before he got into port.
The Commissioner:
Nor his responsibility.
Mr. Edwards:
Nor am I suggesting it was an effective thing, but I am leading up to something else. What I am suggesting is this. I may put it in a way which will be a little less objectionable perhaps to the precision with which necessarily your Lordship is looking at the matter, and it is this, that the fact of the Captain handing this Marconigram almost as soon as it came to the Managing Director of the Company, showed conclusively the very special and peculiar position which Mr. Ismay occupied upon that ship, and that he was not treated by the Captain in any way as an ordinary or casual passenger. That is further shown by the very fact that as soon as Mr. Ismay came out of his room after the impact the first thing he did, on his own evidence, was to go straight to the bridge. Of course, your Lordship is sufficiently familiar with the Rules of these liners to know that that is not a place to which on a great liner a passenger is admitted. But what I am coming back to is this: I asked Mr. Ismay why he put that Marconigram in his pocket, and there are two or three questions to which I want to call your Lordship's attention. I asked Mr. Ismay at Question 18832, on page 452, "and you suggest that you put it in your pocket simply in a fit of absentmindedness? - (A.) Yes, entirely. (Q.) And had it occurred to you when you were talking to Mrs. Ryerson that you had absentmindedly put this message into your pocket? - (A.) It had not. (Q.) It had not occurred to you? - (A.) No. (Q.) And you still retained it in your pocket until it was asked for by Captain Smith late in the evening? - (A.) Ten minutes past seven, I think it was, he asked me for it. (Q.) That is to say, it had been in your possession for something like five hours. - (A.) Yes, I should think so. (Q.) And you seriously say it was put into your pocket in a fit of absentmindedness and retained for five hours? - (A.) Yes."
Now, my Lord, when your Lordship remembers on the evidence how rare a thing it is for ice to be seen down on this main track and even then only in the form of icebergs, a colossal ship like the "Titanic" going out on her first voyage to be suddenly warned that right in her track there are not only icebergs, but field ice, great masses of field ice, to suggest that the Marconigram of the "Baltic" was so unimportant that Mr. Ismay could really and truthfully put that Marconigram in his pocket and retain it in his pocket for a period of five hours in mere absentmindedness, is to suggest that your Lordship must be exceedingly credulous. I suggest that it was nothing of the sort, but that Mr. Ismay was anxious that there should be a record - I am not suggesting by that anything improper - but that he was hoping for a record first passage for this great ship. One knows what the stress of competition is and how valuable from the point of view of commercial success, as we know from what is said in the papers an advertisement of that kind is; and I again suggest not that he could do it lawfully or legally, but that at all events in order that the onus - the responsibility - should be with Mr. Ismay and not with the Captain, was the purpose for which the Captain handed that message to him. If the matter had no importance for all those hours, it could have had no very special importance that evening; but yet we know that at 7 o'clock, on Mr. Ismay's own showing, it was the Captain, and the Captain himself, who asked for the return of that Marconigram, and it was not volunteered by Mr. Ismay to the Captain.
Continued >
