British Wreck Commissioner's Inquiry
Day 35
Final Arguments, cont.
The Commissioner:
That is another man.
The Attorney-General:
Yes. [17898] "Was that in reference to the strength of the falls? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) And the tackle for lowering? - (A.) I should say that is what he thought." Then your Lordship says "That is rather a leading question. (To the Witness.) This boat was being lowered, like the others, from the davits? - (A.) Yes, my Lord. (Q.) And being lowered a long way? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) From the davits to the water? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) Does it occur to you that Mr. Wilde might have thought that the load in her was quite enough? - (A.) Yes, I think that is about what he thought. He said there was quite enough in it to lower from the davits." Then there is a little discussion about it, and your Lordship says: "What occurred to me was that you were putting the blame on the davits and the falls, and I do not think myself, at present, that the davits and falls had anything to do with it, but it was the fear of the boat buckling and throwing the people out." Then there was some examination about that - "The falls were perfectly new. There was no difficulty experienced in lowering."
The Commissioner:
I remember the suggestion made in this examination was that the falls and boats were not strong. This examination was being conducted by Mr. Scanlan. The suggestion, you know, against this ship was that the boat was not strong enough; that was the suggestion thrown out by the examination. It was not well founded, because the boats were strong.
The Attorney-General:
There is no suggestion that they were not.
The Commissioner:
According to this man, a boat which would hold about sixty was allowed to be lowered with about forty.
The Attorney-General:
Thirty-eight, my Lord.
The Commissioner:
I do not see why they should wish to construct a boat for the purpose of carrying sixty people, if it is only to be used for the purpose of carrying forty.
(After a short adjournment.)
The Attorney-General:
My Lord, I have said all that I desire to say about the buckling of the boats, or the suggested weakness of the falls - that they were not of sufficient strength to carry boats with their full complements. I want to call attention now to the evidence and I shall only do so very generally, because I think it has been so very fully explained during the course of this Enquiry. The second reason to which I referred, why there were not more passengers in the boats, was that the order had been given that women and children only were to be placed in the boats, and that there was a difficulty in getting women and children to go into the boats. There are a great many passages in the evidence, but I do not expect that your Lordship would desire me to go through that, as that is a matter upon which there can be no controversy.
The Commissioner:
I think not.
The Attorney-General:
If your Lordship pleases. The same observations would apply to the evidence which has been given about the gangway. That is the third suggested reason why there were not more passengers placed in the boats, because it was contemplated that this gangway would be opened and that they would be able to recall the boats to put more passengers in them. It simply remains as a suggestion; nothing was done, as your Lordship knows, with regard to it; and I gather from the evidence also that if it had been necessary to do it, it would have taken a considerable amount of time to open this gangway door and presumably to fit the gangway so as to lower the gangway and let the passengers down by it into the boats.
The next thing that I desire to direct attention to, and that very shortly, is why it was that there were not more passengers picked up by the boats after the vessel had foundered? There are four reasons given for that through the evidence. The first was that the persons in the boats were afraid of being swamped by others attempting to board them; that I have already commented upon. The second was that there was a danger of suction; the third that the boats were told to pull for a light and were too far away to return (that only applies to some of the boats); and the fourth was that the boats were not well enough manned to make their way back to the ship with any hope of being useful. That was thrown out as an explanation of why some of the boats did not go back. It occurs to me that the last one is a very unsatisfactory explanation, because there does not seem to be any reason why they should not have been able to get back, assuming that they had remained only within a short distance of the "Titanic." The evidence upon that is somewhat voluminous, but I cannot think again that any useful purpose is served by travelling in detail through that, as these four reasons are sufficiently well established by the evidence. It seems to me, to make it unnecessary for me to travel through it in detail, and to call your Lordship's attention to particular questions and answers.
Then, my Lord, I return to the general question which I was considering in dealing with the boats; that is, as to what steps were taken to save life. In the first place, I have called your Lordship's attention to what was done with regard to the boats. Then there were the attempts to summon the passengers to the boat deck with lifebelts and warm clothing. Your Lordship will remember there was a good deal of evidence given in detail with regard to that. The evidence with regard to the third class passengers is, in the main, the evidence of Hart, at pages 221 to 225, and at page 230; and the evidence of Pearcey at page 231, Mackay, 237, and 239, and Wheat, at page 241. Your attention has been called in some detail to this, and I think you have all the references that are material upon it. If your Lordship should require them again I can supply them, but I do not want to do it unnecessarily, as I am very anxious to get to a conclusion. I think your Lordship really has them sufficiently. That deals with the orders that were given with regard to the boats, and with the summoning of the passengers to the deck.
Then there is a third step which was taken, which was to send up distress signals and to use the Morse flashlight. The evidence as to that is in Rowe's evidence on page 419, Questions 17657 to 17684. He says that rockets were sent up. It comes at the end of Question 17657. It gives in detail what happened. The particular question with regard to the evidence of the time they were sent up, is at the end, Question 17684. On the same page, 419, there is the evidence about the Morse signaling, Question 17660; and then at 17684 is the sending up of the rockets from about a quarter to 1; he says he noticed it till about 1.25.
Boxhall's evidence with regard to it is on pages 356 and 357, Questions 15394 to 15420. He is asked about the steamer: "(Q.) Could you see how far off she was? - (A.) No, I could not see, but I had sent in the meantime for some rockets, and told the Captain I had sent for some rockets, and told him I would send them off, and told him when I saw this light. He said, Yes, carry on with it. I was sending rockets off and watching this steamer. Between the time of sending the rockets off and watching the steamer approach us I was making myself generally useful round the port side of the deck. (Q.) How many rockets did you send up, about? - (A.) I could not say, between half a dozen and a dozen, I should say, as near as I could tell. (Q.) What sort of rockets were they? - (A.) The rocket distress signal." Then he describes their effect: "(A.) You see a luminous tail behind them and then they explode in the air and burst into stars. (Q.) Did you send them up at intervals one at a time? - (A.) One at a time, yes. (Q.) At about what kind of intervals? - (A.) Well, probably five minutes; I did not take any times. (Q.) Did you watch the lights of this steamer while you were sending the rockets up? - (A.) Yes."
I may have to recur to that in connection with the "Californian" incident later. At present all I wanted to do was to call your Lordship's attention to what steps were taken.
Then besides that, there are the wireless messages which were sent which appear in the Marconi procès-verbal, of which your Lordship already has the information - I mean the C. Q. D. and the S. O. S. messages, which were sent all round. No doubt everything was done that was possible by wireless telegraphy in order to attract the attention of vessels. I think the first signal sent, from the procès-verbal, was 12.15 a.m. to the "La Provence." If your Lordship has the Marconi records it is only necessary to call attention to the time at which the first message was sent, which was 12.15 a.m.; "'La Provence' receives 'Titanic' distress signals." Then also at 12.15 a.m.: "'Mount Temple: 'Titanic' sending C.Q.D., says require assistance, gives position"; and at 12.25 the "Carpathia" receives the message. That is on the same page. The first is "La Provence" receives "Titanic" distress signals at 12.15, then the "Mount Temple" hears the "Titanic" at 12.15 sending the C.Q.D., and then I went on to 12.25, when the "Carpathia" received the signal. I think to that your Lordship must add the evidence of Mr. Cottam, which is at page 405, which shows that the message sent immediately by the Captain of the "Carpathia," Captain Rostron, was that he was turning round and coming to the assistance of the "Titanic." It does not appear in the procès-verbal , because Mr. Cottam explained he did not write it down. You find that at page 405, Question 17107 - I might begin at 17105 - he says he confirmed the message before reporting it to the bridge: "I asked him if he intended me to go straight away to the bridge and get the ship turned round immediately, and he said, 'Yes, quick.' (Q.) Did you go to the bridge? - (A.) Straight away, yes. (Q.) You reported it to your Captain? - (A.) To the Officer on watch first, and, from him, to the Captain. (Q.) Then what was done about the 'Carpathia'? - (A.) She was turned round immediately. (Q.) And made for the position? - (A.) And headed for the position, yes. (Q.) Then you, I suppose, would go back to the Marconi room to your instrument? - (A.) Yes I did; I went right away. (Q.) Up to this time had you sent the 'Titanic' any news of where you were? - (A.) No, not up to then. I went straight away back to the cabin and sent our position. (Q.) Who gave you your position? - (A.) The Captain gave me our position. (Q.) Then you were in a position to tell the 'Titanic' where you were? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) And did you tell her that you were coming to her assistance? - (A.) I did."
The Commissioner:
What time was that?
The Attorney-General:
That is 12.35 'Titanic' time. We have had it at some time that that was the time it took place. Bride gave us the time and I will give you the reference.
The Commissioner:
Bride tells us when he received it?
The Attorney-General:
Yes, it is at page 388, Question 16517: "What was the message from the 'Carpathia,' so far as you can recollect it? - (A.) She transmitted her position and told us she had turned round and was coming along as fast as she could. (Q.) To your assistance? - (A.) Yes." Then at Question 16523 he says he reported that to the Captain and Mr. Phillips remained in the room.
The Commissioner:
That does not give the time.
The Attorney-General:
No, my Lord, he has said the time, but for the moment I have not the reference. At Question 16511 you will see: "You have told us you came up at 12 o'clock and that then you heard this conversation." The only importance of that was that, of course, it must be at some period after that that he is on deck, because he comes back there at 12 o'clock. This is very near it on page 393, at the end of his evidence, Question 16795, "Do you remember how long it was after the collision when you learned that the "Carpathia" was coming to your assistance? - (A.) The "Carpathia" was the second boat to answer our call. (Q.) Can you remember how long that was after the collision? - (A.) No, I could not tell you; it was within a very short space of time after we sent out our first distress signal. (Q.) And you took that message to the Captain, you told us? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) Now, do you know if the Captain communicated the substance of your message to any of the Officers or to the crew? - (A.) I passed the word myself as I went to find the Captain. (Q.) To whom did you pass it? - (A.) To anybody whom I happened to go close by. (Q.) Did you pass it to any of the Officers? - (A.) Not to my knowledge. (Q.) But you gave it out that the "Carpathia" was coming to your assistance? - (A.) Yes.
The Commissioner:
Where do you get the 12.35 from?
The Attorney-General:
12.25 is the time given of the message being received by the "Carpathia" from the "Titanic."
The Commissioner:
I thought 12.35 was the time when the "Titanic" received the message; I thought you said so. It would be the same time, I suppose. I mean to say, when the "Carpathia" sends a message to the "Titanic," the "Titanic" receives it at the same moment.
The Attorney-General:
Yes, 12.25, you have got quite definitely that call was received from the "Titanic" by the "Carpathia." Then you know what happened is that Cottam goes to the bridge.
The Commissioner:
He went to the bridge and spoke to the Captain, and the Captain said: "Let them know our position, and tell them we are coming."
The Attorney-General:
Yes.
The Commissioner:
That could not have taken more than a few minutes.
The Attorney-General:
I do not reckon it more than a few minutes. I put it at the very latest at 12.35. That is how I get to the time.
The Commissioner:
Evidently Bride cannot tell us exactly, but it must have been very shortly after.
The Attorney-General:
It is within a few minutes, certainly. I do not want to take too close a time; I put it at 10 minutes, so as to make it quite safe.
The Commissioner:
At about 20 minutes to 1 they would receive the "Carpathia's" message.
The Attorney-General:
Yes.
The Commissioner:
It is a good hour after the accident.
The Attorney-General:
Apparently the first signal by wireless telegraphy, so far as I have been able to get from the evidence, is 12.15. From 11.40 to 12.15 nothing was done by Marconigram, so far as this shows us. But at that time the message is sent out, and your Lordship sees, was received by several vessels at 12.15, by the "Carpathia" at 12.25, and then within a few minutes she sends her message that she is coming to their assistance. Of course, they go on for a considerable time, but I do not think it helps very much. What your Lordship wanted to know was when the "Carpathia" signalled.
Now, my Lord, that deals with all the steps that were taken after the vessel had come into collision. It is not very easy to see why they did not send a message earlier by Marconigram, because they knew apparently within a very few minutes, within 10 minutes, that the vessel was seriously injured. They may have waited.
The Commissioner:
That is what occurred to me. The Captain must have known it was necessary to get assistance as speedily as possible, within a quarter of an hour, and one would have thought he would have gone straight to the Marconi room and summoned assistance. But you say 12.15 is the first.
The Attorney-General:
Yes, that is the first. That is "Titanic" time.
Well, now, that, I think, disposes of all the evidence that there is, as to steps taken after the collision. What happened subsequently has given rise to some doubt at one time, but I think it is abundantly clear now, particularly after the evidence of the Officers, that, although it may have been thought at one moment, and certainly was by some of the crew - some of the earlier Witnesses who were called before you - that the vessel had broken in two at one stage, and that the head, the fore part of the vessel, had disappeared, leaving the afterpart floating for a time, which then disappeared, that is disposed of now.
The Commissioner:
There is no suggestion of that now.
The Attorney-General:
No. I think the reason why they came to that conclusion was that apparently one of the funnels broke aft, and possibly those looking at it, seeing that happen, may have thought that meant that the afterpart of the vessel was still afloat. That is some explanation of it. But it is quite plain, I think, from the evidence which has been given now that she did not break in two, there can be no question of that, and that she did go down certainly with her stern at an angle of something like 45 degrees. I think that seems to be established pretty clearly by the evidence, especially by the evidence of the Officers, and that would be explained also by the plan which Mr. Wilding put in, which showed your Lordship what would happen if those compartments became filled. It is exactly what those who are skilled in the flotability of vessels would naturally expect to happen, and what, according to the evidence, did happen.
That brings me to the two last points, undoubtedly important ones, upon which I have to address you, and one is the very important matter of the boat accommodation provided by the "Titanic," and also as to whether that boat accommodation was sufficient. Well, it is quite plain, and there is nothing to be said to the contrary, that according to the evidence we have got the boat accommodation was not sufficient for the number of passengers who were on board; I mean by that that on this particular occasion, had there been more boats and had the passengers been willing to leave in the boats, a greater number of lives would undoubtedly have been saved. That is quite clear.
In the observations which I want to make to your Lordship now with respect to this matter, I have to deal with the suggestions which are made as to the want of proper provision by the Board of Trade for an emergency of this character, and I think it substantially amounts, when one has considered all the evidence that has been given, to the suggestion that the Board of Trade ought to have provided a scale of boat accommodation for vessels of over 10,000 tons and in different gradations, so that it would have been necessary according to the Board of Trade requirements.
The Commissioner:
Over 10,000?
The Attorney-General:
Yes, I say over 10,000, because it stopped there; over 10,000 and upwards was where it stopped, as your Lordship remembers; and a good deal of criticism has been directed to the fact that the Board of Trade did not make a scale dealing with the different gradations of tonnage over that 10,000 tonnage. I want to call your Lordship's attention to how that matter stands, but before I do so I just want to refer, which I shall do very shortly because of what your Lordship has already said, to the evidence about the bulkheads. It is very difficult to separate entirely the consideration of these two matters, because the policy of the Advisory Committee and the policy also of the Bulkhead Committee, which sat in 1890 and reported upon this matter, was that it was better to make ample provision for the unsinkability of the ship, so far as it was possible, than to provide complete accommodation for all persons on board the vessel.
With reference to that what I should submit to the Court is, that both the Board of Trade and the Committee who were dealing with this matter were right to this extent, that it is more important to have efficient provision of watertight compartments and proper subdivision, sufficiently strong bulkheads, so arranged that if there is a collision and penetration of the ship's side, the vessel should still float, than it is to have complete accommodation for the full number of passengers. I do not mean for a moment by that to suggest that it is not necessary to have boats; that is not the point of my observation at all. What I do mean is that the first thing to look to is the provide as far as you possibly can, according to the scientific knowledge of the present day, the unsinkability of the vessel.
And, my Lord, one has to bear in mind also in that connection that it is an extremely rare occurrence in the annals of the sea for a vessel to be struck as this one was in so many compartments. In the ordinary course of things, if you provide that your vessel was unsinkable, assuming she had two adjoining compartments holed, and particularly if she was so loaded that she would float with a third compartment also penetrated, that would be all that human ingenuity could devise for the purpose of protecting the ship. In this particular case, as I have already indicated and submitted to the Court, and do not want to repeat, the grave injuries that were inflicted were owing to the excessive speed at which this vessel was travelling when meeting the iceberg, the consequence of which was that she received so many wounds. The view taken with regard to this has been very consistent from the time the Bulkhead Committee - what has been called Sir Edward Harland's Committee - was appointed in 1890, and reported, up to the present date; and it seems also to have been the view of the German authorities, because your Lordship will remember from the documents which I put before you that they have the same system in Germany, that provided a vessel is equipped with efficient watertight compartments, the demand that is made upon her for additional boat accommodation is dispensed with to a certain extent. That is what they say - you need only provide half the full boat accommodation if you have efficient watertight compartments. What we do is very much the same thing, I am referring now to Rule 12, to which your Lordship has had a good deal of reference, in the Board of Trade Rules. It is on page 16 of the Rules of the Board of Trade. "When ships of any class are divided into efficient watertight compartments to the satisfaction of the Board of Trade, they shall only be required to carry additional boats, rafts, and buoyant apparatus one-half of the capacity required by these Rules, but the exemption shall not extend to lifejackets or similar approved articles of equal buoyancy suitable to be worn on the person."
I am only referring to that for this purpose. I only want to show that the policy has been the same in this country and in Germany to encourage efficient watertight compartments, and that those charged with the administration of these maritime matters in Germany as well as here have taken the view that, provided there is an efficient subdivision of proper watertight compartments, there is an exemption from the provision that the full number of additional craft of all kinds shall be carried.
The Commissioner:
I do not see the reason.
The Attorney-General:
One reason I should think would be that they want to encourage vessels to have efficient watertight compartments.
The Commissioner:
It seems to me a most improper thing to bribe, as it were, the shipowner to build his vessel with the lives of the people who are on board.
The Attorney-General:
That is not what they intend to do. Both in Germany and here, what they thought they were doing by it -
The Commissioner:
As long as there is a reasonable possibility of the ship foundering why should there be less boat accommodation than the number of lives requires?
The Attorney-General:
The view, no doubt, is, that if you have provided efficient watertight compartments, you have made a very good provision against the foundering of the vessel; and that they can keep the vessel afloat so much longer, and that if you have a certain number of boats you may be able then, with this number, to get assistance or to take your passengers off to another vessel or to the shore, as the case may be, inasmuch as you can keep your vessel afloat so much longer if you have watertight compartments.
The Commissioner:
This Rule was made long before the days of Marconi apparatus.
The Attorney-General:
Oh, yes, it was made about 10 years before they had that. I think the evidence is the first vessel was in 1900 in which they had wireless telegraphy. The Report of Sir Edward Harland's Committee was in 1890.
The Commissioner:
Was it, or was it in 1894?
The Attorney-General:
No, in 1894 there was another alteration.
The Commissioner:
There was one alteration, from 9,000 to 10,000.
The Attorney-General:
Yes; that is on a different matter. That is dealing with the scale of boats. But whatever the reason was, and I quite appreciate the criticism which may be directed in view of what we now know; it certainly would not entitle, and I would not suggest that it entitled, a shipowner to dispense with a sufficient number of boats. But the view taken, the policy pursued right through from 1894, not only here but abroad, was that if you had these watertight compartments you may dispense with some part of the additional boat accommodation.
The Commissioner:
There has been very little.
The Attorney-General:
Not much. I think we had the evidence. It is some 60 odd during the number of years, at most, three or four a year.
The Commissioner:
Are you upon the question of the Board of Trade now with reference to the boat accommodation?
The Attorney-General:
Yes, I shall have to deal with that now.
The Commissioner:
Are you upon it now?
The Attorney-General:
Yes, I indicated just now I am going to deal with the boat accommodation, and of course in considering it I have to consider the suggestion which was made and the criticism upon the conduct of the Board of Trade. I must consider that in dealing with the whole of this matter. It applies, and I think you must bear it in mind, both in dealing with the bulkheads and with the boats. What I wanted to say about the boats, before I get to what actually happened with the Board of Trade, is that one must bear in mind in this connection that so far as the records of loss of life at sea go there is no case on record where the boats provided have not been sufficient for the purposes of saving life. There is no case on record, according to the evidence - your Lordship will remember Captain Young was asked the question, and I think by your Lordship - in which it has been shown that life has been lost in consequence of an insufficiency of boats. You also have to bear in mind in this connection that for a great number of years the loss of life was very small compared to the number of passengers carried. The reason why I refer to that is, as your Lordship will appreciate, that the Committee that was sitting considering these matters and the Board of Trade afterwards, in dealing with the advice of the Committee, would have naturally to have regard to what had happened as guiding them as to what was likely to happen in the future.
Now, there are a number of criticisms which have been directed, and properly directed, I think, to the providing of increased boat accommodation. I do not profess to say, and I gather from what your Lordship said at an earlier stage, you did not intend to say what number of boats should be provided in a vessel of this character, but I think one is entitled to say this; that as the result of what has happened with regard to the "Titanic," it is clear there should be a larger number of boats provided. That is, I think, how it stands at present, that it is not sufficient merely to stipulate that there should be a boatage accommodation of 9,625 feet cubic capacity, as it was prior to this for vessels of 10,000 tons and upwards, but there ought to be increased accommodation; and when I say that, your Lordship will bear in mind that the matter has been enquired into quite recently by the Committee in 1911, and that they formulated their views as to a new scale with regard to boats.
Before I deal with the boats I want to clear out of the way, if I may, the question relating to bulkheads. I am bound to refer to it, because, of course, it forms an important element, or has been thought to form an important element, in considering how many boats should be provided for a vessel. But in this Enquiry, and in your Lordship's Report, as we know, we have not to deal with the requirements, we have not to consider whether or not the Bulkheads Committee which reported in 1890, or which was appointed in 1890, when, sufficiently far; whether there should be a watertight deck, a matter which has formed the subject of considerable discussion; or whether you should have longitudinal divisions such as exist in the "Mauretania" and the "Lusitania." I think what one may say with reference to it, and what one is justified in saying upon the evidence, is that the "Titanic," according to all the knowledge available at the time of her construction, was a well equipped vessel, and was efficiently provided with watertight compartments. Whether the system which they adopted was as good as or better than the system adopted in the "Mauretania" and "Lusitania" is no doubt a matter which will form the subject for investigation by the Committee which has been appointed to consider these matters.
But there are obviously considerations which must apply, considerations of advantages and disadvantages of both systems. In fact, I am quite sure from what your Lordship has said, that you are not in a position to pronounce, and that you do not intend to pronounce, upon that question in this Enquiry. It is obviously as the result of the questions which have been put during the course of this investigation, a very difficult matter and one which will involve a great deal of expert knowledge and investigation. The only reason that I am referring to it at present is that I do not feel that it would be right to suggest, and I certainly do not suggest, that the "Titanic" when she left on this first voyage was not properly equipped or not properly constructed or not properly designed. The view which I present to your Lordship as the result of all the evidence is that she was according to all experience and knowledge as good a ship as had ever left port, and that every care had been taken to make her, as they thought, unsinkable. But as we know from the result of what happened, they turned out to be quite wrong.
The Commissioner:
"Unsinkable" is a comparative term in that connection.
The Attorney-General:
As your Lordship pleases. I was going to say "unsinkable" means having regard to what you would ordinarily expect to happen to a vessel. The term has undoubtedly been used with regard to vessels, and was used with regard to the "Titanic" and the "Olympic" because it was thought that a vessel which would float with two adjoining compartments flooded was an unsinkable vessel. I propose therefore to say nothing further with regard to bulkheads than that, merely having called attention to the design of this vessel, as I am bound to do, because of the questions which are before your Lordship.
A good deal of criticism was directed also at one time, with which I am not going to deal, as to the requirements of the Board of Trade, or some officials of the Board of Trade not having been complied with - I mean with reference to Table C. I think my friend, Mr. Laing, showed quite clearly from the correspondence that that was erroneous.
The Commissioner:
I think the correspondence quite disposed of that.
The Attorney-General:
Yes, my Lord; it has quite disposed of it, and I do not propose to say anything more about it. When one read the correspondence it disposed entirely of that question.
When we come to consider what boat accommodation should have been provided, there are a number of considerations which certainly have affected those who have advised the Board of Trade hitherto, apart from what has happened to the "Titanic." It was said and thought apparently that if you carried more boats on a vessel such as the "Titanic," or a large increase in the number of boats, you would make her too tender. It was thought that you would hamper her decks, and it would be difficult to use the boats. Another consideration which was put, was that it would be difficult to launch them, that you would not be able to launch a large number of the boats if you had them on the deck. Then one must also bear in mind that it is an extremely rare occurrence that you would be able to launch all the boats on both sides of the vessel, as happened in this case. But, nevertheless, the view that I suggest to the Court as the result of all this evidence is, that more boats could be carried. What number I do not propose to say, because naturally that must depend upon many considerations. I think the best answer that can be given to the arguments that were urged about the tenderness of the vessel is that in fact a larger number of boats is carried on board of some of the larger German vessels.
Continued >