British Wreck Commissioner's Inquiry

Day 34

Final Arguments, cont.

The Commissioner:
Well, remarkably well.

The Attorney-General:
The earlier question and answer to which I called your Lordship's attention, 13617, deals with the dark colour of the iceberg. There is a body of evidence besides that with which I am not going to deal in detail, but to which I will give the reference and which I will indicate to you. The result of it all is this, that according to the view which I present to your Lordship, not only did Lightoller (who was not on the bridge at the time, it is said) know that there would be no ripple, to use a more neutral phrase with regard to it, at the base of the berg on the waterline, but he also knew that he might expect to meet an iceberg which would present this dark appearance. Those are the two things which he knew. He says that quite clearly himself. Those are the two things which we have to deal with in this case, and which are suggested as the abnormal conditions.

Now, before I proceed to call your Lordship's attention to a few more passages in the evidence - they will be very few - I want to see what it was that they did know. I have made this point about Lightoller. In order to establish (before we get to the precautions that were taken) what it was they knew, one wants to get at the frame of mind of the Officers on this night before the actual collision happened, and, therefore, it is that I have called attention to what they did know. Now, my Lord, what else did they know? They knew of the warnings of those four wireless telegrams to which reference has been made. They knew that the temperature had fallen very considerably during that evening; and although I am not going to contend on the evidence that a mere fall of the temperature is an indication of ice region, I do submit that when you know you are approaching an ice region, a fall within two hours of ten degrees in the month of April is at least some indication that you are getting near to ice. That is all. I do not wish to push it any further than that.

The Commissioner:
I am not sure there is much in that.

The Attorney-General:
I do not think it is very important; it emphasises the fact that they knew they were approaching ice, that is all.

The Commissioner:
I am not sure about that. I am not sure that proximity to an iceberg necessarily means cold air.

The Attorney-General:
No, my Lord, nor am I, with respect, suggesting it; I am drawing the distinction; I say not necessarily.

The Commissioner:
It is not the cold air that proves an iceberg. The iceberg comes down from the North, but I am not at all satisfied that it creates a large atmosphere round itself which becomes cold.

The Attorney-General:
Oh, no.

The Commissioner:
It may do.

The Attorney-General:
I quite understand that view if you are dealing with an isolated iceberg, but that is not what they expected. One has to get rid of the notion that they were expecting they might meet an isolated iceberg or two. That is not what they were expecting. They had had definite notification of icebergs and ice-fields, which is a very different thing.

The Commissioner:
Yes, but some miles away.

The Attorney-General:
Yes.

The Commissioner:
The ice-fields were a considerable distance away, and although it would be, of course, a large field of ice, I doubt whether it would affect the atmosphere miles away so as to make itself obvious.

The Attorney-General:
As I said just now, I am not attempting to press it any further than this; that knowing they were approaching the vicinity of ice, that they had reason to expect to come upon ice, that that sudden drop of temperature was some indication to them that they might be then just upon it. I do not want to put it any higher than that, and that is the sole use I am making of it. It is only to get at the state of mind they were in had to take the precautions.

Further, they knew that ice was coming South earlier than usual; they knew that, of course, from the reports, not only from the specific reports of the particular position of these icebergs and ice-fields which were signaled to them by wireless telegraphy, but they knew from that very fact that the ice was coming south earlier than they would ordinarily expect. It amounts to this, therefore: that on that particular night in the month of April it behoved them to take extraordinary care, because they must expect, or at any rate they might expect to meet considerable quantities of ice coming down Southward. That is the highest I want to put it.

Then further, although with the change of course which had been made between 5 and 5.50 that evening of proceeding some seven to ten miles to the Southward before they turned the corner, they might have expected to have avoided some of the ice which was reported, they had no reason to expect that they had avoided all the actual ice reported to them; and they had certainly no reason to expect that they had avoided all ice, even though they avoided all ice reported. That depended, of course, upon the argument that I addressed to your Lordship just now, that they must have known the ice was coming to the South, and although they had avoided the particular ice reported to them by those messages, they might still well have anticipated that ice would be drifting South across the track.

The Commissioner:
Sir Robert Finlay's case, of course, was that the alteration of the course was such as to lead them to the conclusion that they had cleared the ice, that they were passing some bergs under their stern, as it were, and that the others were too far away to be of any consequence. But I am at a loss to reconcile that argument with the fact that Lightoller and Moody were making a calculation which led one of them to the conclusion that they would reach ice, or might expect to reach ice, about 9.30 and the other one about eleven.

The Attorney-General:
And Murdoch says to Lightoller when Murdoch relieves him at 10 o'clock (page 308, Question 13707.): "'It is pretty cold.' I said 'Yes, it is freezing.' I said something about we might be up around the ice any time now."

The Commissioner:
Yes, I did not draw Sir Robert Finlay's attention to that, and I do not think he dealt with it.

The Attorney-General:
May I finish that answer? I meant to deal with it in another connection, but it just bears out what your Lordship is saying: "I said something about we might be up around the ice any time now, as far as I remember. I cannot remember the exact words, but suggested that we should be naturally round the ice. I passed the word on to him. Of course, I knew we were up to the 49 degrees by, roughly, half-past 9"; but this conversation about what took place in the future was 10 o'clock, and then in this last answer your Lordship intervened and said to him: "You yourself knew the boat was already in the ice region at this time? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) Did you tell Murdoch so? - (A.) Yes, my Lord, as I say, when he came on deck. (Q.) What did you say to him? - (A.) That we were up around the ice, or something to that effect; that we were within the region of where the ice had been reported. The actual words I cannot remember; but I gave him to understand that we were within the region where ice had been reported."

Mr. Laing:
Your Lordship asked what our view about that was. It was this: that they plot down, or are supposed to plot down, on the chart, these ice messages they get, and that all that was meant by these conversations is, as appears quite clearly here, that at 9 or 9.30 in one case, and at 11 o'clock in the other case, they would be within the region where the ice was reported. That is all it comes to. It says so in terms.

The Commissioner:
Here, again, Mr. Lightoller's memory is remarkably accurate. I think the impression he wanted to produce on my mind was that they were making calculations which showed them that they were then about the place where the ice existed, not about the place where it had existed, but about the place where it did then exist.

Mr. Laing:
May I read that answer again?

The Commissioner:
Certainly, by all means.

Mr. Laing:
"What did you say to him? - (A.) That we were up around the ice, or something to that effect, that we were within the region of where the ice had been reported. The actual words I cannot remember, but I gave him to understand that we were within the region where ice had been reported." That is what he says.

The Attorney-General:
I am afraid that will not do. I quite agree with my friend that if you take those words alone they would bear at any rate, or are capable of bearing, the meaning which he desires to attribute to them, but there is a lot which has preceded that.

The Commissioner:
Let us look at page 309.

The Attorney-General:
I think your Lordship ought to read a little earlier. The only view which it is possible to take from Mr. Lightoller's evidence - on pages: 307, 308 and 309, not taking isolated passages from them, is that he knew they were approaching ice; and therefore he had a conversation on the point that they were approaching ice, not approaching the region where it was reported, but his view was they were approaching it, and therefore he had this conversation with the Captain and with Mr. Murdoch. Let us see what he says.

The Commissioner:
I put the question to him (13618.): "Then you had both made up your minds at that time that you were about to encounter icebergs? - (A.) No, my Lord, not necessarily. (Q.) It sounds very like it, you know? - (A.) No, not necessarily, my Lord. (Q.) You were both talking about what those icebergs would show to you? - (A.) As a natural precaution. We knew we were in the vicinity of ice, and though you cross the Atlantic for years and have ice reported and never see it, and at other times it is not reported and you do see it, you nevertheless do take necessary precautions, all you can, to make perfectly sure that the weather is clear and that the Officers understand the indications of ice and all that sort of thing."

The Attorney-General:
If my friend is right in the suggestion that all he meant was he was within the reported region, what is the object of his talking about "it is a pity there is no breeze to create a ripple" to show the ice which he was not expecting to encounter, according to my friend?

The Commissioner:
There, again, comes in the misfortune of that conversation.

The Attorney-General:
Why is it a misfortune, with respect?

The Commissioner:
Misfortune to them.

The Attorney-General:
I know it may be. It may be it is a misfortune that he has to state the fact.

The Commissioner:
The Solicitor-General says to him at Question 13480: "Here was a message shown you which referred to ice in latitude 42 N.? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) Do you recollect, or can you help us at all, did that indication 42 N. indicate to you that it was near where you were likely to go? - (A.) It would, had I taken particular notice of the latitude, though, as a matter of fact, latitude with regard to ice conveys so very little. (Q.) Is that because it tends to set North or South? - (A.) North and South, yes." He means to say it is coming down South, I suppose?

The Attorney-General:
Yes.

The Commissioner:
"(The Commissioner.) I do not follow that? - (A.) We take very little notice of the latitude because it conveys very little. You cannot rely on latitude. (Q.) (The Solicitor-General.) For ice? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) (The Solicitor-General.) He answered that 'Because the ice tends to set North and South. (To the Witness.) Then do you attach more importance to the longitude? - (A.) Far more."

Mr. Laing:
Will your Lordship look at Question 13487?

The Commissioner:
Yes: "(Q.) That is longitude. Did you form any sort of impression at that time as to what time of day or night you were likely to reach the area indicated? - (A.) Not at that time."

Mr. Laing:
That is all, my Lord. "The area indicated."

The Commissioner:
You know there is a singular omission on the part of Mr. Lightoller to tell Murdoch that Moody's calculation was, according to him, wrong.

The Attorney-General:
He seems to have acted upon it as if it were right. I think this matter is put at rest so far as Mr. Lightoller is concerned, without reading the three or four pages to which I have referred, if you look at page 328, your Lordship's own questions, and the answers when Mr. Scanlan was examining him.

The Commissioner:
Will you read it to me?

The Attorney-General:
Yes. It is page 328, Question 14352. I was only going to read two questions and answers that are quite material, but one can follow it a little more easily if I read these few questions and answers preceding; it will save me reading the pages to which I have given the reference. If you look at page 327, Question 14346, leading up to what I said just now: "(Q.) Did the course which you followed lead you into the region from which the presence of ice was reported to you? - (A.) The course set at noon? (Q.) Yes? - (A.) No. (Q.) Did the course you were following up to the time you left your watch at ten o'clock lead necessarily to a place where you expected ice? - (A.) Where there was a possibility of seeing ice? (Q.) Not only a possibility of seeing it, but a possibility, and almost a certainty, of running into it? - (A.) Oh, no. (The Commissioner.) I do not think he could say that. (To the Witness.) Before you left the bridge did you know you were making for a locality in which ice was to be expected? - (A.) Quite so. (Mr. Scanlan.) Because you so stated to Mr. Murdoch when you were leaving the watch, according to your evidence here yesterday? - (A.) Yes. Let me explain my point, and we will get it far clearer. You see, we were making for a vicinity where ice had been reported, as you say year after year, and time and again, and I do not think for the last two or three years I have seen an iceberg, although ships ahead of us have reported ice time and time again. There was no absolute certainty that we were running into an ice-field, or running amongst icebergs or anything else, and it might have been as it has been in years before ice reported inside a certain longitude."

Now come the two questions and answers on which I rely. Your Lordship says: "I can understand that; it does not follow that because ice is reported you are going to have a collision with an iceberg? - (A.) That is what I wish to convey. (Q.) You need not trouble about that at all as far as I am concerned. The point which I understand is being put to you at present is this, that you knew you were steering into what I may call an ice-field, a district in which there were icebergs and growlers and field ice. That is what you want to put, Mr. Scanlan? (Mr. Scanlan.) Yes, it is, my Lord. (To the Witness.) You knew you were heading there when you left the watch" - that is 10 o'clock, and he says, 'Yes." Now that is the point.

Mr. Laing:
Reading the ones you have read surely it only means he was going into a place where ice had been reported.

The Attorney-General:
Oh, no; it means more than that.

The Commissioner:
It did not give me that impression at the time, Mr. Laing, at all; it gave me the impression at the time that what he meant to convey to me was that they were running into a place where they might expect to encounter ice; not that they were running into a place where they had been advised that ice had been previously.

The Attorney-General:
May I remind your Lordship further upon this. That discussion which Mr. Lightoller had with the Captain, which he explained as referable to a possible haze, is now, so far as I am concerned at any rate, out of the case. I mean that I have given the greatest consideration to all that my friend, Mr. Scanlan, said, and if I may say so, I do not think anyone could add anything to what he said about it. No one could add anything to what was said, and said very well, by him, but it does not go quite far enough. It only indicates that there was evidence of it and I agree, if I may say so, with the view your Lordship expressed as your own opinion and that of the gentlemen assisting you, that there was no haze.

Now my reason for referring to that is this. There was a good deal of discussion during this evidence about the haze and Mr. Lightoller was asked about it, and his point is - I am not going into detail about the haze - that there was some doubt. My suggestion on this evidence is that Captain Smith was very uneasy about this; he was certainly not comfortable in his mind. He was doubtful about it and the conversation that he has with Mr. Lightoller indicates it, because the Captain says: "If it becomes at all doubtful, in the least doubtful, let me know at once." Now what did that mean? They knew that they were approaching a region in which they might expect - I do not want to put it any higher than that - and there might possibly be a haze, as sometimes happens, and at any rate there might be difficulties; but if the conditions changed at all, if they were in the slightest degree worse than they were, then he wanted to be called and only wanted to be called because he knew they were approaching a region in which they might expect to find ice; that is the full extent to which I desire to push this evidence; and that, I submit, is the absolute, clear and logical conclusion from what has been stated.

The Commissioner:
Then you really think that that conversation did take place; I do not want you to answer that question.

The Attorney-General:
I do, my Lord. It is certainly very difficult to say what the exact words were.

The Commissioner:
My difficulty is that I cannot reject it.

The Attorney-General:
No, my Lord, and in one sense my difficulty is that I have got to deal with it. I mean to say all this is the evidence which is relied upon against me. When I say against me, I mean against the view for which I am contending now.

The Commissioner:
My difficulty is that it seems to me to support your view.

The Attorney-General:
That is my contention, but that is not why it was introduced.

The Commissioner:
Unless you think it worthwhile, I do not think you need dwell upon this part of the case any more.

The Attorney-General:
Your Lordship means with regard to Lightoller's evidence?

The Commissioner:
Yes.

The Attorney-General:
I have called attention to those pages.

The Commissioner:
I have read it very carefully indeed, and have got it all in my mind.

The Attorney-General:
Very well. Then I do not propose to deal with it any further.

Now, my Lord, there are just one or two references that I would like to give to support the view which I have presented to you of the state of knowledge of those who were on board the vessel, apart from the questions we have just been discussing, and this I can do very shortly and without troubling your Lordship to read the reference, but just simply getting it on the Note, because it is beyond question that the fact that the ice might be expected in June, but would not be expected in April, is proved definitely by Mr. Sanderson at page 477, at Questions 19294 to 19311.

The Commissioner:
What is the significance of that in face of the telegrams?

The Attorney-General:
The significance, my Lord, is as explaining that even though - I am dealing with the argument of my learned friend Sir Robert Finlay, that is the way I am using it in answer to him - even though, and contrary to the view I am putting to the Court, the Captain was justified in thinking that he had passed to the Northward of the ice which had been reported to him, he should have expected that further ice would have been coming South. That is the point of it.

The Commissioner:
That is a perfectly legitimate observation.

The Attorney-General:
And that is all I want to say with reference to it.

The Commissioner:
If some bergs were coming down and he managed to go to the North of them, it was not an unreasonable thing to say there may be others coming.

The Attorney-General:
Quite.

Now, my Lord, there is also this observation to be made about it. Of course, the alteration of the course, proceeding below the corner, to the Southward of the corner 7 to 10 miles was before they had got the "Californian" telegram at all; the 'Californian" telegram did not come till 7.35 or something like that, by the "Titanic's" time, and the course had been altered and changed afterwards at 5.50, and from 5 to 5.50 they continue. Now, my Lord, may I just say a word; and it shall not be more in view of what your Lordship has been good enough to indicate, with reference to these telegrams, the wireless messages. They have been referred to so much that it is only necessary for me to call attention to this, that what they do report is bergs, growlers, and field ice. That is the first one that was received, the one from the "Caronia," and says 42º North" and "49º to 51º West. April 12th." The second one from the "Baltic," which evidently was thought to be of extreme importance (I will indicate why I say that in a moment), is because there the Greek steamer reports passing icebergs - "a large quantity of field ice today," and then it gives the latitude and longitude; and as we know that is very close to the spot at which the "Titanic" did actually strike the iceberg - very close indeed. That is a message which the "Titanic" would have received at about twenty minutes to two. Your Lordship will remember the evidence turns upon this. According to Mr. Ismay, at about twenty minutes to two or a quarter to two, just before he was going in to lunch, Captain Smith came and handed him this Marconigram which he then put in his pocket and retained till somewhere about 7 o'clock in the evening when he was asked for it again, and, my Lord, the only reference I want to make to that, the only one which I think is really relevant to the question which you have to answer now, is that Captain Smith evidently thought (as he must have thought) that that was a most important message, but we are left a great deal to surmise as to what happened. We have had Mr. Ismay's recollection as to what happened - not of the conversation, because there was none - but of the handing of the telegram; and we are left, I must say, in some difficulty in understanding what actually took place between him and Captain Smith in view of what he stated. But all we know about it, and we must accept the evidence (I accept that in this case as I took Mr. Lightoller's in the other) as it stands; we have no other. And what Mr. Ismay says is, that it was handed to him, and he admits it was handed to him because it was so important. Now, as affecting Mr. Ismay, I am making no comment. The use I am making of this is to show what value Captain Smith attached to that message; that is the point - that he showed it to Mr. Ismay, and of course it is idle, as it seems to me, to suggest that Mr. Ismay was there on board as an ordinary passenger, and it was only because of his statement to that effect that it became necessary to go into so much detail as to what his position was; but I am not suggesting and did not suggest at the time your Lordship asked me the question at an earlier stage in the case, that he interfered in the navigation. That is not the point of it at all. The point of the observation is that he was here on board the vessel and that Captain Smith when he received that Marconigram thought it was of such importance that he took it to him, gave it to him and fetched it away again by 7 o'clock in the evening; and I doubt whether it adds much to what one can see, or in fact anything, when you look at the context of the telegram, because it is so perfectly plain that it is just exactly within the region within which they must pass within the next few hours, so that nobody could afford to look upon that telegram lightly, and certainly I know your Lordship has not from the first moment that it was brought to your attention.

Now, my Lord, when they had got all that knowledge the question that arises upon it is, what ought they to have done?

The Commissioner:
The only precaution taken, as far as I remember, was to tell the man that he was to keep a sharp look-out for ice.

The Attorney-General:
Yes. There is just one slight incident, I think, to which I would like to refer in fairness to Mr. Murdoch. He had the fore-scuttle hatch closed because it made a glow, and he wanted to prevent that so that they would get a better view of the ice; I mean he was careful about that. I doubt whether it has been referred to much in the evidence.

The Commissioner:
I remember the evidence, but it has not been referred to.

The Attorney-General:
I will give the reference to it as it has not been referred to. It certainly shows that he had it in mind and took that precaution. One cannot leave it out in considering what they did. It is at page 421, Questions 17706 to 17709. What it comes to is that he ordered Hemming at a quarter-past 7 on that evening to close the fore-scuttle hatch to shut off the glow, as he wanted it to be all dark before the bridge so that they could see the ice more easily. That is the position, and that is all that was done.

Now, my Lord, the two suggestions I am going to make are, first of all that what they ought to have done was to have reduced their speed; and secondly, that they ought to have doubled the look-out and put a look-out in the eyes of the vessel as close to the stem as they could get him. I will deal first with the latter question about the look-out. The evidence is quite short upon it. Your Lordship had your attention called in detail to it by my learned friend, Sir Robert Finlay, who travelled through all the evidence about this; I am not proposing to do that. Your Lordship will understand when I give these references that they are selections which tell in favour of the view for which I am contending. There is a body of evidence which takes the other view. I am not referring to that, and I will show your Lordship why in a minute - it may be difficult to say. Possibly your Lordship may think it right to express your view about it when you come to report, as to whether in such circumstances there ought to have been a look-out man stationed on the stem. I suggest, that it is well worthy of consideration, that according to the evidence of very experienced men, it is the best way of detecting ice, and I am only going to trouble your Lordship with the evidence of Captain Rostron of the "Carpathia," who dealt with this at page 745. If your Lordship would look at Question 25534 on page 745, you will see he was asked: "You would attempt to keep out of the way of ice-fields and alter your course, but for icebergs you would go on your course, and depend upon picking them up with your eye, and then avoiding them when you have picked them up? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) I think you have already told me, but I should like to make just sure of it, that you would take special precautions with regard to the look-out by putting men in the eyes of the vessel? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) When you had an ice report? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) As well as having a man in the crow's-nest? - (A.) Yes." Then your Lordship says: "Do you put two men in the crow's-nest? - (A.) I only put one." And then I put to him, "And two in the eyes?" And he said, "Yes." And at page 734, my Lord, Captain Fairfull, of the Allan Line, takes the same view at Question 25272: "Is your practice in accordance with theirs? - (A.) All except that when we get to the ice track in an Allan steamer, besides having a look-out in the crow's-nest, we put a man on the stem head at night." Then your Lordship says: "I do not hear what you are saying," and he says, "Besides having a look-out in the crow's-nest in crossing the ice track, I put a man on the stem head at night. (Q.) Whether it is clear or not? - (A.) Yes." Your Lordship sees that I am only referring you to the passages that show that whether it is clear, or whether it is not clear, the practice of some experienced men is to put them on the stem because it is so important.

The Commissioner:
There is, of course, a good deal of evidence the other way.

The Attorney-General:
Yes. I say so, my Lord. Then comes Sir Ernest Shackleton, who dealt with it at page 721. He took a very definite view. He says that the nearer you get to the waterline the better position you are in to detect ice. That is the substance of what he says. It is at pages 720 and again on 721. The question on page 720 is No. 25043: "What I want you to tell my Lord is: Do you think it is of advantage in clear weather to have a man stationed right ahead at the stem as well as in the crow's-nest?" And he says, " Undoubtedly, if you are in the danger zone; in the ice zone. (Q.) And supposing you were passing through a zone where you had ice reported to you, would you take precautions as to the look-out? Supposing you only had men in the crow's-nest, would you take any other precautions? - (A.) I would take the ordinary precaution of slowing down, whether I was in a ship equipped for ice or any other, compatible with keeping steerage way for the size of the ship." And then he said also that he would put the man in the stem of the vessel. He says the same thing at page 721, Question 25087. And Captain Jones, who, your Lordship may recollect, was asked some questions, says the same at page 675, Questions 23653 to 23658.

Mr. Laing:
Was he a captain of the Allan Line?

The Attorney-General:
No, I do not think so; it is the Dominion Line. He says the same thing - one in the crow's-nest and one in the stem head. I need not trouble your Lordship, having given you the references, by reading it all. In one of those questions and answers to which I referred, he said that it had always been their custom to do that - to put one in the crow's-nest and one in the stem at night. Then Mr. Lightoller, at page 304, says something to which I want to refer upon this. He says this: that in anything but clear weather they put on extra look-outs, and they put them in the stem on the "Titanic," and the only reason apparently -

The Commissioner:
They actually had a watch on the stem of the "Titanic" during the voyage?

The Attorney-General:
They had, during the voyage from Southampton. That is quite right. And if that is the case your Lordship has got the evidence clearly before you - it is at Question 13520, at page 304. If that is the case, my Lord, one cannot understand, I submit, why, in these circumstances, with this anxiety, which undoubtedly was operating upon the minds of those who were responsible for the navigation, of approaching a region where ice might be expected - to put it no higher - I say, one cannot understand why the precaution was not taken of putting a man in the stem of the vessel, because the object of it is that clearly the look-out man may be able to see in the stem earlier than the man in the crow's-nest; and that in any event what it does is gives an added security. That is done as soon as the weather is not clear. Even although the weather is clear and you are approaching the region of ice or are in the region of ice, in the vicinity of ice or where you may expect ice at nighttime, travelling at 700 yards a minute, I do submit it is impossible to understand why this precaution of putting men on the look-out in the stem of the vessel was not adopted by them. It is difficult to say (I do not profess to be able to say - of course no one can) whether, if you had them in the stem, that would have prevented this disaster; I do not know. But at least one can say this, that according to the evidence of all those, or of a number of those who are experts in detecting ice, that that would be a precaution which certainly was taken or would be taken by them, and is an advantage. And it was not in this case even necessary to carry further men. All that they had to do was to give the order when they got to this time of night, and were discussing it - all that they had to do was to say that these two men, or one man, should have gone forward into the stem; and when you bear in mind the rate at which they were progressing I do submit that they ought to have done it, and that it was a precaution that they ought to have taken; and then, my Lord, I get further to this, that as regards the speed it is quite clear what it was. According to the evidence of one Witness, it was 45 knots for two hours, according to cherub log - it does not matter very much about the exact speed; it is sufficient to say that, according to the evidence of another Witness (Mr. Boxhall) he said he was quite satisfied that the speed was 22 knots. And according to the evidence of one further Witness, one of the Quartermasters, he said after he took up the log after the vessel had been in the casualty, he found she had made the 260 knots from noon that day, when the log had been set; that he took it up at about 11.45, and that would give a speed of 21 3/4 to 22 knots. And, therefore, it is that I have allowed something lower than that, in the test I have been taking, without doing any injustice to the White Star Line by taking 700 yards a minute, which is less than the evidence so far established.

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