British Wreck Commissioner's Inquiry
Day 28
Final Arguments, cont.
The Commissioner:
To tell you the truth, I do not pay much attention to what Mr. Bruce Ismay said upon a matter of that kind. He is not a sailor.
Mr. Scanlan:
He is not a sailor, my Lord, but he is the representative of the owners, and the principal owner of the "Titanic" - one of the principal members of the Company or syndicate which owned the "Titanic"; and in the circumstances in which he is connected with this voyage of the "Titanic" I think the observation is quite fair to him. A number of people who have given their evidence speak of doubling the look-out as being a proper thing. I do not think there could have been better evidence with regard to that than the evidence we had today from Captain Rostron. It was his practice. And I think in other points, as to the degree of care and the precautions which should be taken, his evidence strongly supports the contention which I have made all along that in the presence of ice, in proximity to ice, and especially where ice is reported, the look-out should be doubled, and in particular look-out men, or at least one look-out man, should be stationed in the bows.
The Commissioner:
Do you apply this observation to this case? Do you think if there had been a dozen men there they would have seen the iceberg any sooner?
Mr. Scanlan:
I think they would have had a chance of seeing it sooner; they might have seen it sooner; but if there was not a certainty that they would have seen it sooner, then the other obvious precaution should have been taken - of slackening the speed of the ship.
The Commissioner:
Have you thought about a combination of causes in this connection?
Mr. Scanlan:
Yes, my Lord.
The Commissioner:
That is to say, a bad look-out plus excessive speed.
Mr. Scanlan:
I have not thought of a bad look-out, my Lord.
The Commissioner:
No, you will not contemplate the possibility of your men not having looked properly, but have you thought about the combination of bad look-out, or, if you like, a bad disposal of the look-out - that you do not object to.
Mr. Scanlan:
No, I must not quarrel with that.
The Commissioner:
That does not hurt your clients - a bad disposal of the look-out, together with excessive speed.
Mr. Scanlan:
Of course, I am bound not to complain of the combination, because I have already complained of both of those things taken separately and individually.
The Commissioner:
What I mean is this: Can you logically attribute the accident to the two together, or must you confine yourself to one?
Mr. Scanlan:
I do not think so, my Lord. I do not think it is necessary to confine myself to one. In the evidence of Captain Rostron, he said in some circumstances (and he is a very clear-sighted man, I have no doubt, and a man with excellent eyes and great practice.), a look-out man might see an object ahead sooner than the man on the bridge. I think, therefore, that that is a wise precaution.
The Commissioner:
He does, but he says in 75 percent of the cases the men on the bridge see an object before the look-out man.
Mr. Scanlan:
Yes, my Lord. As your Lordship has suggested one view about the look-out, perhaps I should be permitted to say this: Captain Rostron saw one berg probably about the distance ahead that Fleet and Lee [Original spelled Leigh.] saw the berg which caused the collision; therefore, it would be unreasonable to hold that the look-out men who were posted in the crow's-nest could have seen this berg sooner than they did, whether your Lordship takes the view that there was a haze, or refuses to adopt that view.
Another thing which confirms this is the fact that only the two look-out men saw the berg, and on this occasion the Officer on the bridge, who was Mr. Murdoch, did not see the berg. There is nothing to show that Mr. Murdoch was not a careful Officer; there is nothing to show that his mind was in any way distracted from his duty at the time the collision occurred, and when you couple those two considerations together, that these men did see it, and this other man who was in an equally good position did not see it, the iceberg in all probability was seen by those men as far ahead as they could have seen it in the peculiar circumstances of the night, and of the position in which they were placed.
You have the evidence of Captain Jones as to stationing a look-out on the bows. He is a man who believes in going ahead. His evidence is at page 665.
The Commissioner:
Who was Jones?
Mr. Scanlan:
He was one of the Captains called.
The Attorney-General:
Captain of one of the Dominion Line boats.
The Commissioner:
The Dominion Line goes to Canada, does it not?
Mr. Scanlan:
Yes, my Lord.
The Commissioner:
I say it in your favour: if it is a wise precaution to do what this Captain says he has been in the habit of doing for the last 27 years, I do not see why it should not be done anywhere else where there is ice reported.
Mr. Scanlan:
Yes, my Lord. Another Captain, Captain Cannons, at page 667, says at Question 23771: "If any condition of the weather prevented you from seeing clearly, you would double the look-out? - (A.) Decidedly."
The Commissioner:
That is not to the point.
Mr. Scanlan:
At Question 23778 he is asked about doubling the look-outs.
The Commissioner:
Yes, that is to the point.
Mr. Scanlan:
"Is it considered that the position of the stem head is a good commanding position from which to see low-lying ice? - (A.) Yes, it is a position of advantage."
Of course, there is the most important and, to my mind, convincing evidence of Sir Ernest Shackleton on this point. His evidence is at page 720. He is asked by the Attorney-General at Question 25041, "That would rather suggest that your view would be that you could detect bergs of that kind better at the stem than you could at the crow's-nest? - (A.) Better, the nearer you are to the waterline. When we navigated in thick or hazy weather there was always one man on the look-out and one man as near the deck-line as possible. (Q.) That is thick or hazy weather? - (A.) Yes, that is thick or hazy weather, or even clear just the same. (Q.) What I want you to tell my Lord is, Do you think it is of advantage in clear weather to have a man stationed right ahead at the stem as well as in the crow's-nest? - (A.) Undoubtedly, if you are in the danger zone; in the ice zone. (Q.) And supposing you were passing through a zone where you had ice reported to you would you take precautions as to the look-out? Supposing you only had men in the crow's-nest, would you take any other precaution? - (A.) I would take the ordinary precaution of slowing down, whether I was in a ship equipped for ice, or any other, compatible with keeping steerage way for the size of the ship." Then he says he would slow down.
The Commissioner:
What did you say the speed of the "Titanic" would have to be to keep steering way on?
The Attorney-General:
Six knots; that is admitted.
Mr. Scanlan:
Then there is an important piece of evidence at page 734, from Captain Fairfull. He is asked at Question 25272 - other captains had been examined and he is asked if he agrees with them - "Is your practice in accordance with theirs? - (A.) All except that when we get to the ice track in an Allan steamer, besides having a look-out in the crow's-nest, we put a man on the stem head at night. (The Commissioner.) I do not hear what you are saying. (The Witness.) Besides having a look-out in the crow's-nest in crossing the ice track, I put a man on the stem head at night. (Q.) Whether it is clear or not? - (A.) Yes." Another Witness is asked if he agrees with him, but I am afraid he agrees with too many.
The Commissioner:
What do you mean?
Mr. Scanlan:
There is another Witness, Braes, on the next page, and he is asked at Question 25286, "Have you heard the evidence of the last four Witnesses? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) Is your practice when you may be meeting ice at night similar to their practice? - (A.) Just the same." I do not take any advantage of that question, because the practice of the four referred to differs very considerably, and I do not think I can take him as concurring with Captain Fairfull.
Sir Robert Finlay:
The next sentence says, "I never slowed down, so long as the weather was clear."
The Commissioner:
There is a great mass of evidence to the effect that in clear weather speed is not reduced although they know that they are in an ice region.
Mr. Scanlan:
Yes, my Lord.
The Commissioner:
They trust they will be able to avoid the ice. And that seems to have been the practice of a great number of skilled and experienced captains?
Mr. Scanlan:
Yes.
The Commissioner:
That may have been all right according to their experience, and now to their experience has been added a very important circumstance, namely the loss of the "Titanic."
Mr. Scanlan:
Yes, my Lord. Then I may say that almost universally, with the single exception of Captain Rostron, there is no suggestion, that I am aware of, of diminishing speed. There may be some other. But at all events it cannot be said that it is a universal practice not to double the look-out, or not to station men on the stem head.
The Commissioner:
That is certainly true.
Mr. Scanlan:
I think I may say that a large number of Captains speaking for themselves and speaking for their own line, as the Captain of that Allan Line steamer does, when they are in these circumstances of danger do at all events make this provision for safety, that they double the look-out. While the White Star people followed what may have been the practice, and a very dangerous practice, and took an unnecessary risk in navigation, at all events, they failed to do this; they failed to adopt the precaution which I pointed out to your Lordship is in a large number of cases adopted, and I submit should have been adopted by them, and by all responsible for the navigation of a ship in similar circumstances of danger. It seems to me manifest that a Captain who has such knowledge and drives a ship at a speed of 21 1/2 to 22 knots into a region of ice, must know he is taking a risk. There seems to me to be no suggestion of justification of this practice, but inveterate custom.
The Commissioner:
Will you look at the evidence of Captain Moore, who is the Captain of the "Mount Temple"?
Mr. Scanlan:
Yes, my Lord.
The Commissioner:
He goes to Canada. He answers a general question put to him by Mr. Harbinson at page 209, [9316] "Would you consider it safe in the neighbourhood of an ice-field" - that is an ice-field - "provided your boat had the power to go ahead at 21 knots an hour? - (A.) It would be most unwise to go that speed at nighttime." He is speaking apparently with reference to an ice-field.
Sir Robert Finlay:
Yes, the expression there is "ice-field," and at Question 9406, on the next page, it is put specifically as to field ice. "(Q.) You meet constantly field ice on your way to Montreal, do you not? - (A.) Yes, but we go round it. (Q.) And when you say it is not wise to go 21 1/2 knots - I think your expression was in the neighbourhood of ice - did you mean field ice? - (A.) Field ice." At page 209 the expression is "ice-field" and on page 210 it is "field ice."
Mr. Scanlan:
At page 208, my Lord, he gives some important evidence from Question 9261 downwards, about instructions he has from his company.
The Commissioner:
Oh, yes; you need not read that; I remember that quite well. He has specific instructions.
Mr. Scanlan:
Yes, my Lord, and then he doubles his look-out even on a clear night. You will find that on the same page. I will not further labour that point.
I was saying, my Lord, that the only justification for this practice of going ahead at full speed is inveterate custom, long-standing usage of mariners -
The Commissioner:
Oh, no, not quite that, I think; it is not the justification; at least, I do not think they ought to put it in that way if they do. What they say is, "Hitherto experience has shown us that we may in safety in clear weather keep our speed." That is what they say, and I am not aware of any evidence to the contrary, but of course that is not conclusive of the question.
Mr. Scanlan:
That is the point I was coming to, my Lord. They may say this is a custom of very long standing and an almost universal custom. They may also say that there has been long immunity from serious accident in following this custom, dangerous as it may appear, that there has not been any serious accident.
The Commissioner:
As far as I know I have heard of none, you know.
Mr. Scanlan:
What I am to submit on that is that even in those circumstances and with those two elements of justification brought forward, such a course of conduct, going ahead at full speed at night by a track or lane which leads you into a region where you know you will meet ice, is an unjustifiable custom, and that no amount of usage and no immunity from serious consequences in the past would justify it. When is a custom of that kind to stop? Is it to stop after one accident, or is it a custom which may be persevered in until a series of great disasters takes place? Because, my Lord, from the evidence of Mr. Ismay and Mr. Sanderson, those responsible for the conduct of the White Star Line, there have been no positive directions given, even since the disaster to the "Titanic," which would, so to speak, bind their Captains to adopt -
The Commissioner:
You are on a wrong line now. What they have done since has got nothing to do with it.
Mr. Scanlan:
Quite, my Lord.
The Commissioner:
It was what they omitted to do before.
Mr. Scanlan:
What they did before is sufficiently serious, and I have said all about it I need say. But I think the recommendations of your Lordship might have some effect in stopping this practice in the future. It is in that view and in that hope -
The Commissioner:
Have you ever considered who the people are who are really responsible for it, if it is a wrong custom or practice? Is it not the passengers?
Mr. Scanlan:
The demand of the public?
The Commissioner:
The demand of the public.
Mr. Scanlan:
And the taste for high speed?
The Commissioner:
Yes.
Mr. Scanlan:
That leads to a disregard of precautions of safety which one would think that ordinary common sense, apart from seamanship, would dictate. But does that relieve the owners of vessels and those in charge of vessels of their responsibility?
The Commissioner:
You can answer that question with a "No," because the fact, assuming that it is a foolish act, that the public ask the captain of a ship to do a foolish act is no justification for his doing it.
Mr. Scanlan:
No, my Lord; and then running at full speed and the making of records, or the keeping one's place as a shipowner in the competition amongst shipowners to do a voyage quickly, would not either be a justification for the avoidance of what would seem to be fair and reasonable precautions.
I have something further to say in reference to the responsibility in the sense of this Question 4, of the owners of the "Titanic." I say nothing at all about Mr. Bruce Ismay as an individual. I may say, if I may respectfully say so, that I was very much impressed by the evidence of a number of Witnesses as to the amount of care he took and the amount of help that he gave to a number of women and children, in getting them into the boats when he was on the deck of the ship before he left it. But, insofar as he is a shipowner, and, insofar as he took any part in this voyage, I think all his actions are fair subjects for criticism and comment in this Enquiry.
What I wish to direct your Lordship's attention to now, is the question of lifeboat accommodation. This involves amongst the questions submitted, No. 3: "In the actual design and construction of the 'Titanic,' what special provisions were made for the safety of the vessel and the lives of those on board in the event of collisions and other casualties." Then Question No. 5 is: "What was the number of the boats of any kind on board the 'Titanic'? Were the arrangements for manning and launching the boats on board the 'Titanic' in cases of emergency proper and sufficient? Had a boat drill been held on board, and, if so, when? What was the carrying capacity of the respective boats?" Then Question 25 is, "When the 'Titanic' left Queenstown on or about 11th April last, was she properly constructed and adequately equipped as a passenger steamer and emigrant ship for the Atlantic service?"
This brings me to examine, which I shall do very briefly, the provision of lifeboats. We know the number of passengers she could have carried was over 3,500. She had on the occasion 892 of her crew and 1,316 passengers - a total on board of 2,208. Her lifeboat accommodation was for 1,178 persons.
The Attorney-General:
That covers all boat accommodation; they are not all lifeboats.
The Commissioner:
1178 boat accommodation?
Mr. Scanlan:
Yes.
The Commissioner:
Give me the number she was entitled to carry.
The Attorney-General:
3547.
The Commissioner:
That is with the crew?
Mr. Scanlan:
Yes; she had, in point of fact, 2208.
The Commissioner:
Is that 2208 an admitted figure? There was some question about two.
The Attorney-General:
Yes, about 2206 or 2208.
The Commissioner:
Am I to take it at 2208?
The Attorney-General:
We have analysed it for the purpose of getting at the exact figure. We have got it from the documents I referred to this morning, and the exact figure is 2201. I do not think you have had that before.
The Commissioner:
No, I have not.
The Attorney-General:
We have assumed always that it was 2206 or 2208, and which it was was not quite clear; but I think you had better take it as 2201, because we have taken that with considerable care.
The Commissioner:
What do you say, Sir Robert?
Sir Robert Finlay:
If it has been calculated, I am quite contented to take it as that; I am not certain that it is more exact than the other. But the difference is not very great. I am told by Mr. Furniss that he has agreed that with the Board of Trade.
The Commissioner:
Very well. Take it, Mr. Scanlan, at 2201; it makes no difference to your argument.
Mr. Scanlan:
No, I have made a note of that figure. Then we have the total number saved of passengers and crew, 703.
The Attorney-General:
No, 711 is the figure. That has been got this morning.
Mr. Scanlan:
That is so.
The Attorney-General:
Take that as the right figure.
Mr. Scanlan:
Yes, the figure we have got today, 711. Now I am to ask this question, my Lord: Was this provision of lifeboats sufficient? It was evidently insufficient.
The Commissioner:
Insufficient in what sense?
Mr. Scanlan:
Insufficient for all on board; insufficient for the accommodation in the event of an accident for all those carried on this particular voyage; and, still more insufficient for the people who could have been carried, the full complement of the passengers and the crew of the vessel. The Board of Trade have power to make regulations with regard to the provision of life-saving appliances on ships, but I think the owners of ships have a duty incumbent on them apart from the regulations and requirements of the Board of Trade under this section to make provision for the safe carrying of their passengers. That is a general proposition in this particular case.
I am to submit to your Lordship that the owners of the "Titanic" had brought specially home to them the insufficiency of the lifeboat accommodation which they had proposed to install on the "Titanic" and on the "Olympic." I refer to the evidence of Mr. Carlisle and also the evidence on this point of Mr. Ismay and Mr. Sanderson. Without going into the evidence and reading it, the evidence of Mr. Carlisle is that he submitted his plans, which would have provided for full accommodation on the "Titanic" to the directors of the White Star Line at two separate meetings, and that when those plans were submitted the directors of the White Star Line, Mr. Bruce Ismay and Mr. Sanderson were put to their election as to whether they should have the somewhat scanty provision of lifeboats recognised by the Board of Trade, or whether they would have adequate lifeboat accommodation for all they were entitled to carry, and in particular for the number of passengers who were carried on this fatal voyage. Both Mr. Ismay and Mr. Sanderson admit in their evidence that plans were submitted, but they have no recollection of the particular plans which would have shown accommodation for the number of passengers that could have been provided for, if the evidence of Mr. Carlisle is to be accepted by your Lordship as to what he submitted to them.
I may leave the matter, except for this further remark: the evidence of Mr. Wilding, at page 534, Questions 20758 and 20766, is to the effect that it would have been practicable, in the case of the "Titanic," to have provided adequate lifeboat accommodation. I do submit that this evidence brings home to the owners of the White Star Line a responsibility in connection with the disaster, by reason of their not having on the "Titanic" sufficient lifeboats to accommodate all on board. I could give the special references, but I think it is probably better not to trouble your Lordship with them.
The Commissioner:
In this connection I daresay you have taken into account in some way or another the fact that no more than two-thirds of the lifeboat accommodation provided was utilised.
Mr. Scanlan:
Yes, my Lord, I was going to refer to that, and the fact that while you had lifeboat accommodation for this number, so few were saved.
The Commissioner:
That, of course, is another topic.
Mr. Scanlan:
It is another topic, my Lord. I do not think I can say any more on this topic.
Then one of the Questions asked is as to binoculars and searchlights. I already understand your Lordship's view about binoculars.
The Commissioner:
You invited me, you know, to express an opinion. That is disposed of. You need not go any further with that.
Mr. Scanlan:
Not entirely, I may say, my Lord, to my satisfaction.
The Commissioner:
Oh, I think so.
Mr. Scanlan:
I feel a certain regret -
The Commissioner:
I am sure you are quite satisfied.
Mr. Scanlan:
I feel a certain regret at the loss of the binoculars; I could have let the searchlight go much more readily.
Now with regard to the launching of those boats - and this will bring me at once to the question which your Lordship has suggested - I think Questions 5, 16, 17, and 19, are those in this case which are directed to that point. We have the numbers saved, and we have this strange fact that while accommodation was provided for 1178 only 711 were saved. Then looking through the list prepared by the Attorney-General, you find the greatest disparity in going over the boats, number by number, in respect of the passenger accommodation actually provided and utilised. You find boat No. 1 with 12 people; you find No. 11 boat had 74 people.
The Commissioner:
What you do find is that the evidence says so.
Mr. Scanlan:
Yes.
The Commissioner:
It is quite evident that the evidence is not right, because if you have taken the trouble, as no doubt you have, to add up the numbers that are deposed to as having been in the boats, you will find that there were put into the boats and saved a great many more than ever were saved.
Mr. Scanlan:
There certainly is a good deal of exaggeration, but some things have come out clearly enough, and that is, for instance, with regard to No. 1 boat, that it only had five passengers and seven of the crew, and in regard to some other boats that they were properly filled.
The Commissioner:
Is it your contention that if there had been more lifeboats on board this vessel more lives would have been saved, although the lifeboats that were there were not used more than to the extent of two-thirds of their capacity?
Mr. Scanlan:
I do say, my Lord, that if there had been discipline -
Continued >
