The Solicitor-General:
Yes, my Lord, that is the one. It is at the top of page 8 of my learned friend's cross-examination. Now, my Lord, the only reason why I call attention to that is that although this represents, and represents with substantial accuracy, he sense of the decoded message, whenever messages are so decoded for any collateral purpose by the Admiralty, they are always transposed so that in case any ingenuous person were to discover the message as decoded and the original, he could obtain the secret of the code, which of course is vital that no person should obtain. Therefore a transposition is always made, and it has been suggested to me that the transposition has had the result of putting in undue prominence in the message the instruction to keep a course in mid-channel. Now, my Lord, the exact literal rendering of the message when decoded is as follows: "Between South Foreland and Folkestone keep within two miles of shore and pass between two light vessels. Take Liverpool pilot at Bar. Avoid headlands. Pass harbours at full speed. Steer mid-channel course. Submarines off Fastnet." Now, my Lord, that is the precise message as it was delivered, and that was the reason for it.
Now, my Lord, I think the most useful order in which I can deal with these various matters, and I propose to deal with them quite briefly, is, I think, to take chronologically the instructions which were issued to the Master, and then, having considered those instructions and the extent to which he either followed them or deviated from them, to ask your Lordship what answer ought to be given to the two questions which affect the Master, which in form are two, although I think it might be possible to take the view that substantially they are a single question - "Whether any blame attaches to the Master for the loss," a very comprehensive question which appears to cover the other, and, secondly, the more particular question, whether instructions were given to the Master by the Admiralty, and whether he was in default in not carrying those instructions out. We know, of course, that instructions were given, and the question is whether the Captain was in default in not carrying those instructions out.
My Lord, I do not propose to deal now with the instructions which were given so far back in April; for instance, the Confidential Daily Voyage Notice of the 15th of April, "German submarines appear to be operating chiefly off prominent headlands and landfalls. Ships should give prominent headlands a wide berth," except as showing what an experienced navigator who received this notice so long ago as the 15th of April ought to have had in his mind as the view of the Admiralty, based, of course, as he must have known, upon very wide experience and great consideration. On the 15th of April that was the notice. Then on the next day there was issued the Confidential memorandum which Captain Turner has now admitted he completely misunderstood: "War experience has shown that fast steamers can considerably reduce the chance of a successful surprise submarine attack by zigzagging, that is to say, altering course at short and irregular intervals, say ten minutes to half an hour. This course is almost invariably adopted by warships when cruising in an area known to be infested by submarines. The under-water speed of a submarine is very low, and it is exceedingly difficult for her to get into position to delivery an attack unless she can observe and predict the course of the ship attacked." Now, my Lord, Captain Turner, when asked about this, said he understood this to be an instruction or a suggestion which was not to be acted upon until the moment that the merchant vessel had actually seen a submarine. The only possible comment, of course, upon that statement is that there is nothing in the language of the instruction which supports such a construction, and there are plain words contained in it which show that that was not its meaning; indeed, Captain Turner, who, I respectfully agree with your Lordship, gave his evidence throughout with great candour, when he was asked on this point, and his attention was directed to the language of this general advice, admitted at once in a very proper manner that he had not sufficiently considered its terms, and it was now plain that the adoption of the zigzagging tactics was not in any way limited to occasions on which the submarine had become visible to the merchant vessel which was to adopt those tactics.
The Commissioner:
Are not there directions somewhere that if a submarine is sighted the course to adopt is to get it astern and to keep it astern?
The Solicitor-General:
I do not recall that, my Lord, but there may be.
Commander Anderson:
The instructions are to bring it ahead.
The Commissioner:
To bring what ahead?
Commander Anderson:
The submarine.
The Commissioner:
What are the orders?
Commander Anderson:
It is in the order of February 10th, Section B.
The Commissioner:
I have always understood that if a submarine is coming, the object is to get her directly astern. What I mean, Sir Frederick, is this, that the interpretation which the Captain was putting upon this order to zigzag, or recommendation to zigzag, was inconsistent with some other order.
The Solicitor-General:
Yes. It is Section 2A which your Lordship has. Is not that the one?
Admiral Inglefield:
B and C refer to it. You will see: "When a submarine is ahead or astern" - so and so.
The Commissioner:
Very well. Pass on.
The Solicitor-General:
If your Lordship pleases. We come then to the material dates of the voyage in the early days of April, and here, my Lord, I must make one submission that may perhaps be worth keeping in mind. Mr. Aspinall in his address to your Lordship seemed to me perhaps somewhat unduly to limit himself to a consideration of what actually took place from the time the Captain, in order, as he says, to get a fix, approached the land on the day in question. Surely, my Lord, one must begin one's enquiry a little earlier. Here was a case in which the "Lusitania” was sailing under wholly unprecedented circumstances from New York. It was a case in which we know that warnings of some kind had been issued, and of which it is sufficient to say that no one on board was unaware that the voyage was one in respect of which it was to be apprehended that there might be an attack by submarines. Therefore the period of vigilance and of consideration and coordination of every step taken for the purpose of bringing the ship safely into harbour was that of course of the whole voyage, and not any particular moment when the vessel was already near the coast of Ireland.
Now, my Lord, bearing that consideration in mind, we come to the 6th of May, when the message received by the "Lusitania" from the Admiralty at Queenstown was "Submarines are active off the South Coast of Ireland" and, as your Lordship had been told, a few minutes later the "Lusitania" asked for and received a repetition of the message. On the 7th of May, a period when of course their attention had been in the most pointed way directed to the fact that the general submarine menace had materialized at the particular point - on the 7th of May they received a message, "Submarine area should be avoided by keeping well off the land." Now, I would invite your Lordship to consider very, very carefully in relation to this particular instruction whether this was one which the Master carried out in its true meaning, and whether, if he failed to carry it out, the second question, which deals with the position of the Master here, must not be answered in a certain way. I make the general observation I have to make upon this point now. The instructions are that the submarine area is to be avoided by keeping well off the land.
The Commissioner:
Which telegrams are you referring to?
The Solicitor-General:
The one of the 7th of May, my Lord.
The Commissioner:
To whom?
The Solicitor-General:
To all British merchant vessels.
The Commissioner:
Where is it referred to in the evidence?
The Solicitor-General:
I will give your Lord ship the reference.
The Commissioner:
Are you reading from the admiralty memorandum?
The Solicitor-General:
Yes, my Lord.
The Commissioner:
Would you tell me where it is?
The Solicitor-General:
If your Lordship will look, "it has been ascertained that the following wireless message passed" (it is towards the end of the page) "on the 6th of May, the 7th of May and the 7th May."
The Commissioner:
Are you reading from the Memorandum headed "Lusitania”?
The Solicitor-General:
Yes, headed "Lusitania," my Lord.
The Commissioner:
Where is it?
The Solicitor-General:
It is very curious, my Lord. I cannot explain it at all. Your Lordship's copy is not the same as mine oddly enough. I have a different document to the one your Lordship has.
The Commissioner:
What is the document that you have got?
The Solicitor-General:
Mine, my Lord, is an Admiralty Memorandum, prepared by the officials of the Board of Admiralty and headed "Lusitania."
The Commissioner:
Could you find me any reference to it in the evidence, Mr. Aspinall?
Mr. Butler Aspinall:
No, my Lord, it is not in the evidence. It is new.
The Solicitor-General:
I have been working on it throughout the case.
The Commissioner:
This second wireless message dated the 7th of May and addressed to all British merchant vessels, "Submarine area should be avoided by keeping well off the land." Is not in the document that I have at all, and I have two or three telegrams on the 6th of May, two of which you do not seem to have.
The Solicitor-General:
I think they are over the page on your Lordship's copy; they are out of order, I think.
The Commissioner:
Possibly they are. It seems to me to be a different document; yet oddly enough it is dated the same day.
The Solicitor-General:
Yes.
The Commissioner:
What is the meaning of it, Sir Ellis; do you know?
Sir Ellis Cunliffe:
I think the explanation, my Lord, is that the first date or the first print with the italics is an exact translation verbatim of the code, and the later one in the event of it being thought that this might be heard in open Court.
The Commissioner:
Will you tell me which is the one which is an exact translation, the one which Sir Frederick has or this one?
Sir Ellis Cunliffe:
That one is the exact translation.
The Commissioner:
Then that is the document that you were to have used in open court if this part of the inquiry had taken place in open court.
Sir Ellis Cunliffe:
Yes, my Lord.
The Solicitor-General:
I must confess I do not want the statement. I think it would be very unfair for me when it has been put to the Master and had not been produced in evidence to found any further comment upon it.
The Commissioner:
Except that we certainly want to get at the truth. Do you know anything about it, Mr. Aspinall?
Mr. Butler Aspinall:
No, my Lord, I do not. I am told by Mr. Furness that he received what purported to be an exhaustive list of the telegrams, and that is what we have been working on.
The Commissioner:
You see I had neither the one nor the other, but Admiral Inglefield has been good enough to get me a copy of the one, and that is the one that you have, I think, Mr. Aspinall, and the one that Sir Frederick Smith has is one I have never seen.
The Solicitor-General:
Well, my Lord, it is of less importance because the point is really covered by the cable, the wireless of 6th of May, which I have already dealt with in order to call attention to its exact phrasing.
The Commissioner:
Yes. It appears to me that that is so. Therefore, I do not think you need trouble about it.
The Solicitor-General:
I do not propose to, my Lord, if that is your view.
Now, my Lord, the observations that I have to make as to the course which the Captain in fact adopted I think can be made in relation to this wireless message of the 6th of May. He has been instructed by this time in the clearest manner that he must give headlands a wide berth, more than once. He knows that to be the Admiralty view. He is now instructed to keep a mid-channel course, so that on a dangerous voyage and one known to him to be dangerous, he is informed that the Admiralty instructions are, (a) to avoid headlands, and (b) to keep a mid-channel course.
Now, my Lord, certain observations were made upon these instructions and upon the position of the Master in relation to those instructions by Mr. Aspinall. My Lord, I do not think it necessary to argue at any length what the position of the Master would be if he received instructions from the Admiralty which were in conflict with instructions issuing from another Government Department. It must, I suppose, as your Lordship indicated, be clear that the Captain must use his experience and discretion in the position in which he is placed in judging which instruction is an overriding obligation, and in reaching such a conclusion he will properly give due weight, not an excessive weight, but due weight to the fact that the Admiralty instructions are issued in direct relation to a particular crisis which ex hypothesi has arisen, and that the other instructions are of a more general character.
Now, my Lord, it is possible to deal with the effect of the receipt of these instructions to the Master in a variety of ways, but I think it is better to adopt, and fairer to adopt, the explanation or explanations which he himself puts forward. In the first place, he said in answer to the Attorney General, "Speaking as a seaman, I was in mid-channel." Well, my Lord, you are advised upon these points by very competent professional gentlemen, and I do not propose to expend any time in arguing whether this was mid-channel or not. The only observation I would make upon it is that it certainly was not mid-channel in any language of geographical precision. A doubt is indicated by my learned friend, Mr. Aspinall, as to whether at this point there is any tract of water to which the description mid-channel can properly be applied at all. I certainly do not intend to waste any time upon such a controversy. I make this observation only, that it should be considered whether it is reasonable to ask from those who are giving instructions of this kind by wireless and economising words of explanation from the nature of the case - that they should be expected to say to a Captain of a vessel when they are giving these instructions, we cannot use the expression "mid-channel" because there is not anything which can be precisely called a channel there, but we mean you to keep far away from the shore in the kind of manner that we should direct you to do by using the expression "mid-channel" if there were a channel. Surely it is to be considered whether the true view is not that every sailor would know perfectly well the meaning of the instruction was to keep a mid-channel course, and if he chooses to disregard that instruction he cannot be reasonably heard to say "Oh, well, I could not keep a mid-channel course there, although a few miles afterwards I could have done because there is really, if you look at the map, not a proper channel there at all.
The Commissioner:
Or any channel?
The Solicitor-General:
Or any channel. It is to be considered, I submit, my Lord, whether this is not the plain meaning of it, that he was to keep a deep water course at a very considerable distance from the land just as if there had technically been a channel there he would have done if he had kept on a mid-channel course. The Court will consider whether that is not the meaning.
Now, my Lord, you must of course consider together the instruction to keep a mid-channel course and the very specific caution to avoid headlands. Now, what does the Master say about his failure, if it was a failure, to avoid headlands in the vicinity of the Head of Kinsale? He says, and if it is true it is a good answer, "It was necessary for me as a seaman to approach as nearly as I did approach the Old Head of Kinsale in order to" - to use his own expression - that he should get his fix or should get a 4-point bearing. Now, here again your Lordship is advised of course by highly trained gentlemen, and I, for that reason, do not propose to argue this point at any length, but I merely indicate the considerations on which it is possible your Lordship might seek some guidance. On the first place, I desire to indicate a doubt as to whether on a clear day with the sun shining, on a familiar voyage in daylight made by an experienced seaman used to that very voyage, there was the slightest necessity to get a fix at all. That suggestion I make, of course, for consideration and after having taken advice, I suggest that it would have been perfectly possible under all the circumstances which I have indicated by a sextant observation to decide with complete safety the position of the vessel. That is the first observation. Then I make a second: that it was perfectly possible on the statement of the Master himself without coming to get his fix or a 4-point bearing, to have checked his position by taking cross-bearings. Your Lordship has, I think, the Master's statement sent by his solicitors, or by the solicitors of the company, Messrs. Hill, Dickinson and Company; I think it was sent by them to the Board of Trade; and, my Lord, this is how the Master puts it in that document which my learned friend, for other purposes, has referred to. He says: "With respect to the courses steered: From Latitude 40 degrees 10 N. and Longitude 49 W. the 'Lusitania' was navigated on a great circle towards Fastnet and when approaching Ireland made a course to pass 20 miles off Fastnet. Ireland was sighted at about 12.10 p.m. on the 7th May when Brow Head bore about two points abaft the beam. The 'Lusitania' was then about 26 miles distant from Brow Head." Your Lordship notes that at 12.10 Brow Head bore at two points abaft the beam. That is important in view of the consideration I am going to urge upon your Lordship in a moment. "Fastnet was not visible, the weather being clear. The course then and for some time previously steered was S. 87 Magnetic, so that Fastnet when abeam was about 20 miles distant. The weather which had earlier in the day been misty, cleared between 11 o'clock and noon. The ship's speed was 18 knots. There was a light breeze and a smooth sea. The course S. 87 E. was steered because is [sic] was a safe and proper course when inward bound off the Irish coast, particularly in view of the Admiralty instructions. This course of S. 87 E. was maintained" - this is important - "until 12.40 p.m. when Galley Head was sighted a long distance off on the port bow." Well, my Lord, I calculate that Galley Head was some 25 miles away when it was sighted, having regard to the bearings given by the Master. Now, my Lord, if it was possible for him, as it was, to see Galley Head, he was 30 miles from Brow Head at that time; he was 22½ miles away from Baltimore Bay; 25 miles from Galley Head; 22 miles from Cape Clear, and he was well within sight of Tow Head, at a distance of about 21 miles.
Now, my Lord, under those circumstances, the time being 12.40 then, 20 minutes to one, the view which I should like your Lordship to consider with the professional gentlemen who sit with your Lordship is this: whether there was the slightest difficulty, or that I am wrong in suggesting that a sextant observation would have been adequate to determine his position with complete safety; or, if I am wrong in saying that, whether at any rate, at this time there was not the most ample means of ascertaining his precise position by taking cross-bearings.
The Commissioner:
You mean at 12.40?
The Solicitor-General:
Yes, at 12.40.
The Commissioner:
How far was he from the land then?
The Solicitor-General:
From Brow Head he was 30 miles; from Cape Clear he was 22 miles; from Baltimore Bay he was 22½ miles; from Galley Head he was 25 miles, and from Tow Head he was about 22 or 23 miles.
The Commissioner:
Was he not too far away?
The Solicitor-General:
No, my Lord, he was in sight of Galley Head, and he said in his statement that he could see Galley Head.
The Commissioner:
He said to me that the weather was very clear, and that you cannot depend upon the eyesight when the weather is so very clear.
The Solicitor-General:
What he says in his letter is (and he gives the course which was maintained, as your Lordship remembers, till 12.40) that Galley Head was sighted at 12.40, in the letter I am reading. Now Galley Head was 25 miles away, taking his own markings and working them out.
The Commissioner:
But what I mean is this. Could he by eyesight judge that it was 25 miles away?
The Solicitor-General:
For the purpose of making his observations he would not require to know it. All that you want is, in order to check your position by cross-bearings, to get certain places that you can identify. I believe that is so. And if you can get certain places which you can so identify, then you check your position by taking cross-bearings; it does not matter how far you are.
Admiral Inglefield:
That is only approximate, at that great distance.
The Solicitor-General:
I cannot, of course, and I shall not attempt to enter into any controversy upon the point. I am much obliged to the Admiral. The suggestion I would make is that you can measure and obtain these distances on the chart when you have got the facts in respect of which the measurements are applicable. If I am told that you cannot obtain a reliable bearing by either of the means I have suggested, I should rejoice very much if the Court was able to take that view.
Now, my Lord, those are the two observations which I have to make upon that point, and I come now to deal with a further point, and it is the point which is made by my learned friend, Mr. Aspinall, and which was taken by the Master in the letter which his solicitors wrote to the Board of Trade with reference to the message that the submarine was a [sic] Coningbeg. Now, my Lord, the whole point there, it seems to me, can be dealt with with [sic] very briefly: it is a very short point. It is said by Mr. Aspinall, and said by the Master in his examination by Mr. Aspinall, that as he was informed that this submarine was 20 miles to the south of Coningbeg, receiving this information on the 7th, that that is a complete justification for him adhering roughly to the course he was on, but by so doing he was disregarding the other and more general Admiralty instructions. I suppose the way he would put his case would be to say that all general instructions have to yield to the particular warning as to the position of this submarine south of Coningbeg.
Now, my Lord, my observation upon that is that it requires very careful consideration whether he did not adopt the most dangerous course of the alternative courses that were open to him. He has been told that he is to obtain a landfall as far as possible in the dark. He gets his landfall in daylight, and then, because he hears that 80 knots away, some four or five hours steaming, a submarine has been seen, he keeps on his existing course in a degree of perilous proximity to the shore and under circumstances which would bring him to the particular point of danger in broad daylight.
Now, my Lord, when it is asked, what other course it is suggested he ought to have adopted, I reply that it must be considered whether Mr. Aspinall has made any satisfactory, or indeed any reply, to the suggestion which has already been made as to what the Captain ought to have done. One must always remember that this was a case in which time was absolutely unimportant. All the Captain had to do, if it humanly could be done, was to carry the "Lusitania” into the Mersey, and if a week or two had been wasted it would of course have been an utterly unimportant consideration.
Now, my Lord, what must be considered that he ought to have done is this. When he received the message about the submarine off Coningbeg, ought he not to have examined the matter in the following spirit? I am warned that four or five hours' journey away a submarine is waiting at Coningbeg. It is either still there or it is not still there. If it is not still there, I ought instantly to go out to sea in order to carry out the letter and the spirit of the Admiralty instructions about a mid-channel voyage. If, on the other hand, it is still there, am I justified in going past or reasonably near the place where it is in daylight affording it may be a conspicuous target? Then would not a reasonable man have asked himself this further question? Is there anything else that I can do which will fill in the hours until darkness with relative security and enable me to pass this dangerous point if the submarine is still there with the minimum of risk? My Lord, firs of all, what did he do, and, secondly, what might he have done? What he did do within 9 or 10 miles of the headland was to travel at a speed of 18 knots instead of 21, intending to adhere to the course which he has indicated. What he might have done is an issue to be considered. What he might have done was simply to carry out the Admiralty regulation by getting away at all costs from the land, either by zigzagging or otherwise, without adopting Mr. Aspinall's suggestion that he might have turned back which would have been foolish in view of the news with respect to the submarine traveling west, that he might with a great degree of safety have consumed the time until he could make a rush through the channel, which we are all agreed he must pass through at some time or other, the Tuskar and the Smalls, when it was dark. My Lord, if he had done this and if an accident had happened, and surely this is the way to consider it, my Lord, on what possible grounds could his conduct have been criticized if he had adopted this course? What could have been said in the way of reflection upon his care, prudence or confidence had he adopted the course which I am suggesting? By doing so, he would have complied with the letter and with the spirit of the Admiralty regulations, and all the time he would have avoided many of the risks which he most evidently ran, and I do not, as at present advised, see one risk that he would have run which the course he adopted enabled him to escape.
The Commissioner:
You cannot tell that.
The Solicitor-General:
No. I say I do not see one, but of course what one has to do is to put oneself in the position in which he was with the knowledge which he had before him, and I suggest it may be considered whether the language I have used goes too far.
The Commissioner:
All the knowledge he had I supposed about submarines was the telegram to tell him that there were two submarines 20 miles south of Coningbeg?
The Solicitor-General:
Yes, and, secondly, that it was an infested area, and in the view of the Admiralty the coast line was particularly dangerous.
Now, my Lord, unless there is any other point upon which your Lordship thinks I can help you, I think that exhausts all the points I wish to make. I ought, perhaps, just to say this with reference to the Admiral's observation upon the point I was making with reference to cross-bearings. It is, of course, a balance of considerations, and it may be that your Lordship will think it worth while to enquire whether either a sextant observation or a bearing, depending upon a choice of various identified points on the littoral, even if not meticulously accurate, would not under the special circumstances of this voyage have provided the Master with a degree of precision adequate for all practical purposes and preferable to the risks which he ran in order to obtain an ideally desirable bearing. My Lord, I hope I have made that clear.
The Commissioner:
Yes. You stated to us quite accurately when you began that the only object of the Board of Trade is to get to the truth. We are not in the position of Magistrates, and the only question I want to ask is this. Is there anything which occurs to you which can be said in favour of the Captain in the course that he followed?
The Solicitor-General:
Well, my Lord, if I were putting it in favor of the Captain, I think I should lay very great stress on the extraordinary difficulties in which he found himself and upon the responsibilities of the voyage, and I think I should further remember that all the instructions which he received (I think my memory serves me rightly there) were general instructions with the exception of the instruction with regard to the submarine which was 80 miles away at Coningbeg.
Now, my Lord, if I may humbly say so, in deciding this matter I should certainly, I think, consider at any rate very carefully what course one could really extract from him, because that is really what it comes to, having regard to the fact that he had these general warnings about headlands and that he had this specific warning about a submarine to the south of Coningbeg. Is his failure to so what I suggest he might have done, to go out to sea, a ground upon which a Captain is entitled to do what undoubtedly would have the greatest possible consequences? I cannot put it higher than that.
Mr. Butler Aspinall:
My Lord, might I say one word with regard to the failure, on the part of the Captain, to go out to sea. Off the South Coast of Ireland there were undoubtedly submarines. The suggestion is that the danger might have been avoided if the Captain had gone out to sea. It would have meant that this great vessel in daylight was capable of being seen by those on the submarine which was cruising about in the place where the submarines were operating, and I submit, in view of the fact that apparently there were several submarines, that for her to be putting out to sea, a big object as she was, it is highly probable it would have been inviting attack.
With regard to the other two points which the Solicitor-General made; namely, the sextant point and the cross-bearing point, it is to be noticed that Sir Edward Carson did not put those points to the witness.
The Commissioner:
What is the area over which a submarine can sight these ships - what is the radius?
Admiral Inglefield:
I should say if it is calm weather, and he had come out of the water, his eye would be as much as 14 feet off the level of the sea, and the "Lusitania” funnels would be nearly 120 feet up, he could see the smoke from her funnels from 15 to 20 miles on a calm day.
The Commissioner:
I want to know what area he can see through the periscope.
Admiral Inglefield:
About 5 miles.
The Commissioner:
Do you mean a radius of 5 miles?
Admiral Inglefield:
Yes.
The Commissioner:
With his eye he can see the smoke, you say?
The Commissioner:
Can you say what the 14 feet represents?
Admiral Inglefield:
The top of his conning tower would be about 8 or 9 feet, and his eye would be another 6 feet, and on a clear day, with those big funnels, taking the height of the ship, it would be 150 feet to the top from the water line, and he could see the three streams of smoke coming out of the funnels. There is one thing I should like to ascertain: to find out if on the forenoon of the 7th he ascertained his position in any way by observation to the south - the usual observation taken at sea.
The Commissioner:
Can any one tell me whether in the forenoon of the 7th the Captain took an observation, or whether he did not?
Mr. Butler Aspinall:
We will go and ascertain that, my Lord.
WITNESS.
William Thomas Turner - Captain - ss " Lusitania " - Recalled
Testimony
The Solicitor-General:
That is the point the witness wishes to make, and we have now got it from the Captain.
The Commissioner:
If you are satisfied, that is enough.
The Solicitor-General:
I did not want it, but there is no dispute about it.
The Commissioner:
Now I should like to ask a question. I shall have to deal with this point, and having regard to the form of the question - I suppose the form has been carefully considered - it is very possible for us to give a very short answer. "Were nay instructions received by the Master of the 'Lusitania' from the owners of the Admiralty before or during the voyage from New York as to the navigation or management of the vessel on the voyage in question?" You will observe, Mr. Solicitor, that that does not ask, "and what instructions." Therefore that question can be answered by Yes or No. Then, "Did the Master carry out such instructions?" Well, that question can be answered Yes or No, and I should like to know whether you think it wise that we should attempt to answer in detail. I will tell you what is running through my head. If we blame the Master, there is an appeal from our decision, and that appeal cannot properly be heard - at least, I think not - if we give a judgment which gives no reasons; I am talking about this particular voyage, or course; and I am not sure that it is desirable to give reasons, I mean in the public interest. I can conceive that the appeal might be heard in camera, and that the reasons that we give might never be heard of by the public, but the larger the audience to which these observations are made, the greater the risk, and I should like to know from you whether, as representing the Board of Trade, who propound these questions and put these questions before us, what kind of answers you really wish to convey. I fancy - I do not know because I saw a previous draft of the questions, and then I saw this draft of the questions, and this draft of the questions departed from the previous draft in this way, that the previous draft asked what were the instructions, and this draft does not, and as this was the final draft, I came to the conclusion that those advising the Board of Trade had purposely abstained from asking what the instructions were.
The Solicitor-General:
That was so, my Lord.
The Commissioner:
Very well. Then, of course, if I understand that that is so, I should probably not attempt to refer to the instructions and should confine myself to a simple answer, yes or no.
The Solicitor-General:
Yes.
The Commissioner:
Then comes the next question which I think is answered by the way you have answered the first question because if we are to go into details in answering the question, "Did the Master carry out such instructions?" it would be almost impossible to avoid saying what the instructions were.
The Solicitor-General:
Is your Lordship quite right in saying (I have not considered the point before) that an appeal would be in any way hampered by the fact that these questions had not been answered with greater fulness [sic] than your Lordship contemplates?
The Commissioner:
All I can say is that if the matter comes on appeal before a tribunal, according to my notion, it is very desirable that the tribunal should know what the reasons were which guided the tribunal below.
The Solicitor-General:
Of course, I agree respectfully with your Lordship, but I think there would be no difficulty. At least, I should assume that there would be inherent powers in the Court of hearing it in camera there.
The Commissioner:
I assume so. I never heard of such a thing as taking an Inquiry of this kind in camera until this case.
The Solicitor-General:
It arose in the case of that spy whom the Attorney General prosecuted at the Old Bailey.
The Commissioner:
I know it was taken in camera in that case. I have no doubt that it would be possible to hear the appeal in camera. I do not see any difficulty about it.
The Solicitor-General:
It is possible that the difficulty which your Lordship indicates, that the Court will not have any full detailed reasons for these answers, might be met by asking you in more detail what your reasons were, if that point arose.
The Commissioner:
It might be, and I could tell them by word of mouth.
The Solicitor-General:
Yes.
The Commissioner:
Very well. Then I think that would be the most convenient course. Now I shall not close this Inquiry in case we should want any further evidence or in case we should want any further assistance from Counsel. I simply now adjourn it sine die.
(Adjourned sine die.)