PART IV.
CAUSE OF RAPID SINKING OF THE SHIP.
WERE THE WATERTIGHT DOORS AND PORTS IN THE 'EMPRESS OF IRELAND' OPEN OR SHUT AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION.
Definite evidence was given to show that the vertical sliding watertight door providing communication between engine room and after boiler room at the stokehole level was effectively closed after the collision took place; but no information was available as to whether the reserve bunker doors higher up on the same bulkhead, or that on
the forward bulkhead of the fore boiler room, between the lower and main decks, connecting the reserve bunker with the steerage passenger or cargo space, were open or shut, although it is presumed they were shut. An unsuccessful attempt was made to close the vertical sliding door between the two boiler rooms at the stokehole level, but no evidence was available with reference to the two doors on the same bulkhead between the lower and main decks.
Immediately above the main deck, as set out in the detailed statement of the vessel's construction, at least one horizontal sliding watertight door was fitted in each of the bulkheads numbered 3 to 9, and no evidence was forthcoming to show that any of these doors were closed at the moment of the collision. It was stated that some of the doors on the port side were closed after the collision, as the gear for actuating these were adjacent to the steward's quarters and readily accessible; but attempts made to close the starboard door of the 3rd class dining, saloon, and the door on the same side of the ship at the fore end of the 2nd class accommodation, were ineffectual.
The door last-named was vitally important, since it was in a bulkhead which completed, above the main deck, the watertight bulkhead at the after end of the boiler compartments. It may be mentioned that the operation of closing the doors on the port side would be facilitated by any list to starboard, the arrangement being such that the weight of the door under the circumstances mentioned tended to close it; but the contrary was true of those on the starboard side. One witness mentioned that he either heard or saw some gear for closing watertight doors working, and from his position at the time, it is possible that the door at the after end of the 2nd class lavatory accommodation on the starboard side was closed.
Practically all the doors between main and upper decks must necessarily have been open under ordinary circumstances for convenience of communication between cabins and dining saloons, etc., and therefore in view of the fact that the only two known attempts to close doors on the starboard side were unsuccessful, it seems practically certain that other attempts on that side, if made, had a similar result, and that nearly all the watertight doors on the starboard side between main and upper decks remained open after the collision.
It was stated in evidence that all the lower ports would be closed at the time of the collision, whilst others higher up would be open. Other evidence showed that some ports in cabins between the main and upper decks were closed some hours before the collision, and that others in the alleyways between the same decks were open at that time. It is certain that some ports at this level were open after the collision, for one passenger, in the 3rd class accommodation forward, deposed to being awakened by water falling on his bed from the open porthole, and others testified to seeing water pour through port holes in alleyways and elsewhere near the after end of the ship.
Evidence was also forthcoming to show that water entered through open ports inside between the upper and shelter decks.
NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE COLLISION, AND POSITION AT WHICH 'EMPRESS OF IRELAND' WAS STRUCK.
So far as the Empress of Ireland is concerned, no direct evidence as to the extent of the damage was available since no survivor from the Empress of Ireland nor anyone from the Storstad has testified to having seen the torn side of this vessel. Divers report that the sunken liner is lying on her starboard side at a considerable inclination from the horizontal, and with her starboard bilge buried in mud. No examination of the damage has been possible up to the present time, and the engineer in charge of the diving operations considers such examination a very hazardous and perhaps impossible undertaking. Information on this point can therefore only be gathered from an examination of the damaged bow of the Storstad. This vessel was more extensively damaged on the starboard than on the port bow, as first contact with the Empress of Ireland was made on that bow; but on the port side also the injuries were severe.
The shelter deck of the Storstad apparently entered just 'below the shelter deck of the Empress of Ireland, the stem head of the former above the shelter deck being broken off. The vertical depth of the hole made in the side of the Empress of Ireland must have been approximately 46 feet, about 26 feet of this being below water at the time of the collision. It is not possible to determine the lateral dimensions of the aperture, as there may have been some longitudinal ripping action, which would produce a wider hole than one caused by a single direct blow. But, excluding such action and estimating the size of the hole from the position of the limiting marks of. injury on Storstad, the conclusion has been reached that the area below water of the hole made in the side of the Empress of Ireland was, immediately after the collision, no less than 350 square feet.
The position at which the Storstad came into contacjt with the Empress of Ireland can be determined with some precision. In the first place a cabin number plate (No. 328) from the last named vessel, was found after the collision on the shelter deck of the Storstad, near the stem. The cabin bearing this number was an outer one situated between the upper and shelter decks of the Empress of Ireland slightly abaft amidships, the door being 7 feet in from the side. Further, the engineer on watch in the forward boiler room stated that 20 seconds after the collision 'water rushed through the starboard No. 2 bunker', entering the stokehole through the full area of the bunker doorway; whilst the engineer on duty in the after boiler room noticed water pouring in in large volume out of the forward bunker door on the starboard side almost immediately after the shock of the impact was felt.
From these facts it is clear that the Empress of Ireland was damaged in the immediate vicinity of the water tight bulkhead fitted between the two boiler rooms, whilst the stem of the Storstad must have penetrated into the side of the Empress of Ireland sufficiently far to reach the door of the cabin before mentioned. 'This door was 16 feet abaft the bulkhead, the watertightness of which was destroyed.
EFFECT OF THE COLLISION ON THE STABILITY OF THE 'EMPRESS OF IRELAND'.
Just before the collision, the mean draft of the vessel was 27 feet; she was carrying 1,160 tons of cargo, 2,300 tons of coal, and all the double bottom tanks were filled with either fresh or salt water. Her metacentric height under these circumstances was just over 40 inches, and with all port holes closed her stability at large angles of keel was ample.
The immediate effect of the damage referred to above was to destroy the watertightness of the bulkhead dividing the two boiler rooms, and to place these compartments (with a combined length of, 175 feet) in communication with the sea. From an examination of the damage done to the bow of the Storstad it has been estimated that the area of the-hole made in the side of Empress of Ireland was sufficient to allow an initial inflow of water into the vessel of 265 tons per second, supposing such inflow unobstructed. Coal and other obstructions would lessen this rate, but it is certain that in a very short time both boiler rooms would be entirely flooded up to the water level outside, as from the evidence is known to have been the case. Flooding these compartments involved a mean sinkage of practically 9 feet, and assuming, in the first place, that the water as it rose in these compartments was symmetrically distributed with reference to the middle line of the ship, this sinkage would take the main deck 4 feet below the water at amidships, and this deck would be below water throughout its length except for a comparatively short portion forward. Under these conditions of damage the ship would still have had a metacentric height of just over two feet, and would have continued to float upright had the water tight doors in bulkheads above the main deck bounding the damaged length been closed. Under the actual conditions prevailing at the time of the collision, however, with the side of the vessel, where struck open to the sea above the main deck, and with bulkhead doors on the starboard side of that deck open, water could find its way freely over that deck, thus wholly destroying the vessel's stability and causing her to capsize and founder.
For convenience of description it has been assumed in the foregoing that the entering water was distributed symmetrically with reference to the middle line of the ship, but initially this was certainly not the case. The Storstad penetrated the starboard side of the Empress of Ireland at the cross coal bunker fitted between the two boiler rooms, this cross bunker being subdivided athwartships by the water-tight bulkhead separating the boiler rooms. This bunker was also divided at the middle line of ship, below the lower deck level, by longitudinal water-tight or dust-tight communication and steam pipe passages, connected by a non-water-tight partition. The part of this cross block which was in the forward boiler room was connected on the starboard side to a longitudinal bunker running to a cross-block at the forward end of that room, this latter being divided below the lower deck and at the middle line of ship, by a non-water-tight longitudinal partition. Very similar arrangements existed abreast the after boiler room, details of these being given in the portion of this report which deals with the construction of the ship. The bunker bulkheads of this vessel, in accordance with usual practise, were not water-tight. It may be added that the arrangement of coal was practically symmetrical with reference to the middle line of ship.
There is no evidence that the Storstad destroyed any portion of the bunker bulkheads, so that very shortly after the impact a large quantity of water must have entered the bunkers on the starboard side for the whole length of the boiler rooms, which water was able to escape only through bunker doors into the boiler rooms and relatively slowly also across the middle line partitions in coal bunkers to the port side of the vessel. Under these circumstances the ship would at once commence to list to starboard, the precise angle of inclination at any time being dependent upon the actual rate of inflow of water and the rate of its distribution across the ship. In the absence of this information a close estimate of the list is not possible; but making reasonable approximations an inclination of some 15 to 20 degrees appears probable under these circumstances. From such a list the vessel might have recovered as the water got to the port side, if all port holes, and all watertight doors in bulkheads bounding the boiler compartments up to upper deck, had been closed; but with doors and sidelights open to the extent known to have obtained after the collision, water was free to enter other compartments and the final capsizing and foundering became inevitable.
Thus, summarizing the foregoing, it will be seen that whilst the entry of water on the starboard side naturally induced a tendency to heel to that side, the heeling effect was increased by the fact that the bunker bulkheads retarded the free flow of water across the ship. Very shortly after the collision the vessel must, for this reason, have listed to a considerable angle, and this, combined with the bodily sinkage of the vessel, would speedily immerse the side ports known to be open between main and upper decks. As the sinkage, due to the entry of water through the injured side and through the port holes, continued, water would, under the actual circumstances existing at the time of the collision, obtain free access to the main deck, with the results already indicated.
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